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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to explain the change in developing countries’ intellectual property legislation 
as a response to their Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) obligations. When the 
TRIPs  Agreement  was  negotiated  during  the  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade  talks, 
developing  countries  resisted  its  adoption  because  of  their  different  domestic  norms  and 
traditions relating to intellectual property rights and concerns about the administrative costs of 
implementing  the  agreement.  Nevertheless,  when  the  TRIPs  Agreement  came  into  force, 
almost all developing countries altered their domestic intellectual property laws, and many did 
so prior to the deadline for implementation and/or adopted more rigorous intellectual property 
rules than required by TRIPs. That many developing countries have adjusted their domestic 
intellectual property law poses the puzzle that this thesis seeks to explain. It does so by testing 
two  competing  explanations:  the  role  of  external  pressures  (both  in  terms  of  great  power 
coercion  and  legalisation  of  international  institutions)  and  domestic  politics.    This  thesis 
combines  a  survey  of  the  timing  and  quality  of  102  WTO  developing  country  members’ 
legislation across patents, copyrights, and trademarks, with detailed case studies of changes to 
intellectual  property  legislation  in  India  and  Indonesia,  which  are  both  unlikely  cases  for 
compliance,  but  reflect  different  domestic  political  circumstances.    The  empirical  findings 
demonstrate that external pressures cannot provide a satisfactory explanation, as policy change 
occurred  both  with  the  presence  and  in  the  absence  of  these  pressures.  In  order  to  fully 
understand  the  change  in  developing  countries’  intellectual  property  legislation,  it  is  also 
necessary to analyse the preferences of domestic actors (societal and governmental) and how 
they interact. By arguing this, this thesis thus suggests the importance  of taking domestic 
politics  into  account  to  explain  change  in  developing  countries’  domestic  legislation  as  a 
response to inconvenient international obligations.  3 
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Chapter 1 
Developing Countries’ Unexpected Responses to the TRIPs Obligations: 
Introducing the Puzzle  
 
1.1 Introduction 
   
One of the most significant results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks was the 
first comprehensive and enforceable multilateral accord on trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights, widely known as the TRIPs Agreement. In contrast to other issues during the 
Uruguay Round, the TRIPs Agreement is not about liberalising trade, but aims to harmonise 
domestic regulatory and legal systems. In doing so, it went substantially beyond the existing 
intellectual property (IP) regime under the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 
by establishing minimum standards for members’ domestic IP laws with respect to terms and 
scope of protection for a wide range of intellectual property rights (IPR) categories, under a 
single  multilateral  agreement.  Its  negotiation  process  exhibited  relentless  attempts  of 
developing countries, led by Brazil and India, to resist the adoption of the agreement, because 
of the concerns about the difference in philosophical strands, and the  administrative costs 
associated  with  implementing  the  agreement.  However,  due  to  hard  bargaining  by  major 
developed countries, particularly the United States, the EU, and Japan, developing countries 
acceded to the agreement.   
 
Despite the moral and economic objections, and its foreseen short term negative implications, 
including high cost in adjusting their domestic laws, almost all developing countries have 
altered their domestic laws in response to the TRIPs agreement. Many have done so before 
they were required to, and many have adopted more rigorous IP rules than they are strictly 
required by TRIPs. The fact that many developing countries have reformed their domestic IP 
law, poses the puzzle that this thesis seeks to explain: why, in spite of strong opposition of its 
adoption,  and  the  problematic  nature  of  IPR  protection  as  international  norms,  have  most 
developing  countries  adjusted  their  domestic  IP  laws  in  accordance  with  the  TRIPs 
agreement?  This  thesis,  therefore,  intends  to  analyse  why  and  how  developing  countries’ 
domestic IP laws have changed in response to the TRIPs Agreement. It does so by testing two 
competing explanations: the role of external pressures (both in terms of great power coercion 
and legalisation of international institutions) and domestic politics of compliance analysis.   15 
 
 
In order to introduce the underlying argument of this thesis, the rest of the chapter is organised 
as follows. The next section presents the existing literatures concerning the debate on the 
implication and philosophical aspects of IPR protection, which are very crucial in highlighting 
why developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPs Agreement is a puzzle. The chapter 
then defines what compliance is, in order to clarify the focus of the study. The next part 
discusses competing perspectives in understanding change in developing countries’ domestic 
legislation as a response to their international obligations. It basically argues that, given the 
fact  of  the  conflicting  norms  between  domestic  and  international  norms  under  TRIPs,  IP 
policy  reform,  taken  by  developing  countries’  governments  as  a  response  to  their  TRIPs 
obligations, in particular challenges the constructivists’ account, which predicts that IP policy 
reform  would  be  unlikely  to  take  place.  In  this  regard,  external  pressures  explanation,  as 
argued both by neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, arguably would be more likely to 
provide  better  accounts  for  understanding  IP  policy  change  in  developing  countries.  
Nevertheless, as will become clearer later in this thesis, external pressures accounts also fail to 
provide  satisfactory  explanation.  This  thesis  then  argues  that,  in  order  to  understand 
developing countries’ responses to their TRIPs obligations, it is also necessary to analyse the 
preferences of domestic actors (societal and governmental) and how they interact. The next 
section  offers  the  analytical  framework  of  this  thesis,  by  identifying  the  dependent  and 
independent variables, and how these variables are measured. The following section discusses 
the research methods, including locating the research sources and explaining how the research 
is conducted. The last part of the chapter describes how the argument of this thesis will be 
manifested in the rest of the thesis. 
 
1.2  The TRIPs Agreement: Why is It Controversial?  
 
As one of the problematic issues under the current global trade regime, various aspects of the 
TRIPs  Agreement  have  been  studied  extensively.  As  can  be  observed  from  the  existing 
literature,  a  broad  range  of  a  body  of  literature  on  the  relationship  between  developing 
countries and the TRIPs Agreement, in principle, can be divided into four different aspects. 
First,  the  existing  literature  that,  in  essence,  engages  with  the  debate  relating  to  the 
implications  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  especially  for  developing  countries’  economic 
development (for example Braga (1996), Maskus (1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), Finger and 16 
 
Schuller (2000), Chang (2001), Kerr (2003), Wade (2003), Mayne (2004), Dutfield (2006a), 
Vogel (2006), Lippoldt (2006)). Second, other scholars focus more on competing norms and 
tradition relating to IPR protection (such as Gutowski (1999), Marron and Steel (2000), May 
(2000), Drahos (2002a), Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), Richards (2004), Ngenda (2005)). 
Third, some studies in particular deal with the debate on the history of the TRIPs Agreement, 
including the negotiations process and/or how the agreement finally concluded (among others 
include Emmert (1990)
1, Watal (2001), Drahos (2002b), Gervais (2003)). Fourth, a vast body 
of  literature  also  pays  particular  attention  to  how  developing  countries  responded  to  their 
TRIPs obligations. The literature on this strand mostly focuses on the implementation of the 
TRIPs Agreement in specific case study countries/regions, or also concerning a specific IP 
category  (such  as  Blakeney  (1996),  Bass  (2002/2003),  Heath  (2003),  Heath  ed.  (2003), 
Chaudhuri (2005), Eren-Vural (2007), Deere (2008), Goldstein and Straus eds. (2009)). The 
debates  in  existing  literature  essentially  resemble  the  underlying  question  of  whether  the 
TRIPs Agreement is good or bad for developing countries, and why the TRIPs Agreement is 
widely seen as a controversial trade agreement.  
 
The following discussions will pay attention mainly to the first two aspects of the debate, the 
implications of the TRIPs Agreement for developing countries’ economic development, and 
competing  perspectives  in  understanding  IPR  protection.  The  third  aspect  of  the  debate, 
relating to the historical background of the TRIPs Agreement, will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2. The fourth aspect of the debate, concerning developing countries’ responses to 
their TRIPs obligations, will be examined later in this chapter, particularly in section 1.4, on 
explaining policy change and competing perspectives, since this debate, in principle, is rooted 
in different accounts of major International Relations (IR) theories, in understanding domestic 
policy change as a response to international obligations. In addition, since the main purpose of 
this thesis is to explain change in developing countries’ IP legislation, this thesis as a whole 
fits into the fourth aspect of the debate. 
 
                                                 
1 This article focuses on the negotiation process since it was published when the negotiation was still ongoing. 17 
 
1.2.1  The TRIPs Implications: Costs and Benefits  
 
For the first aspect of the debate, relating to the implications of the TRIPs Agreement, it is 
important to underline that there is no consensus among scholars as to whether the TRIPs 
Agreement is beneficial or harmful for developing countries’ economic development. Given 
the  fact  that  the  benefit  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  on  their  economic  development  is  still 
questionable, developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPs Agreement poses the puzzle 
that this thesis seeks to explain.  
 
Some studies assert that the TRIPs Agreement is advantageous for developing countries, since 
it  will  foster  economic  growth  through  the  increased  flow  in  the  transfer  of  technology, 
encourage  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  promotion,  and  will  also  facilitate  in  local 
innovative  activities.  It  is  expected  that  a  strong  legal  IPR  protection  will  provide  stable 
protection  for  foreign  investors—particularly  in  technology-related  sectors—to  do  their 
business in developing countries (Wang, 2005, p.800). Within this context, Braga and Fink 
(1998,  pp.542–43)  argue  that,  since  intangible  assets,
2  which  frequently  translate  into  the 
ownership of intellectual property, is one of the main reasons behind FDI flows, this has made 
higher  standards  of  IPR  protection  crucial  in  order  to  increase  FDI  flows  to  developing 
countries. Similarly, Maskus (2000a, p.155; 2000c, p.7) states that developing countries will 
be benefiting, since a strong legal protection of IPR will not only expand foreign investment 
and technology flows, but also will provide a favourable circumstance for the development of 
their own innovative domestic firms. As Maskus (2000a, p.147) further argues, by having a 
strong  legal  IPR  protection,  a  country  provides  a  competitive  advantage  for  domestic 
innovative firms, and will also generate incentives for further invention.  
 
Other  studies,  however,  are  more  critical  to  the  role  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  for  FDI 
promotion, transfer of technology, and local innovation. While the importance of strong IPR 
protection is also acknowledged, some studies indicate that this is not the only, or the main, 
reason of the expansion of FDI. Multinational corporations’ decisions to invest in developing 
countries  depend  on  several  other  important  conditions,  including  market  size,  growth 
prospects, the availability of necessary resource endowment, and desired political conditions 
                                                 
2 These include “…new technologies, know-how among employees, management skills, reputation of quality…” 
(Braga and Fink, 1998, p.542).   18 
 
(UNCTAD, 2002, p.14). Similarly, supporting the study by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in the interview with the author, a representative from 
one  of  the  leading  Geneva-based  research  institutes,  dealing  with  IPR  protection  and 
developing countries, argued that there is no solid empirical evidence of the direct correlation 
of applying stronger IPR protection with the promotion of FDI.
3 In this context, he further 
argues that a widely cited example is African countries, where they implemented strong IPR 
protection, but they are unable to attract significant FDI, especially compared to their Asian 
counterparts. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the empirical evidence of the usefulness of 
applying  more  rigorous  IPR  protection  is  still  questionable,  this  kind  of  argument  is  not 
uncommon among developing countries’ policy makers. For example, in the interview with 
the author, an Indonesian government official firmly perceived that stronger IPR protection 
will  lead  to  attracting  more  FDI  in  developing  countries.  He  further  argued  that  foreign 
investors  will  feel  more  secure  in  investing  in  developing  countries  if  they  improve  their 
standard for IPR protection.
4 
 
As can be seen in the relations between FDI flows and strong IPR protection, the strong role of 
IPR protection in encouraging local innovation is also still disputable. Unless other variables, 
such as highly qualified personnel and sufficient research infrastructure, are available, it is 
difficult that the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement alone will provide incentive for foreign 
firms to expand their research and development activities in developing countries (UNCTAD, 
2002,  p.14;  UK  CIPR  Commission,  2002,  p.23).  Some  studies  also  show  the  historical 
example that IPR was not well protected in now-advanced countries during the period of their 
early industrial development—at least until the late 19
th century (Chang, 2001, pp.293–95; 
Botoy,  2004,  pp.118–19;  Eren-Vural,  2007,  p.111).  Yet,  the  absence  of  strong  patent 
protection did not prevent them from developing their innovative technology. For instance, 
despite  the  fact  that  patent  law  was  absent,  Switzerland  emerged  as  the  most  innovative 
society in the world during the late 19
th century (Chang, 2001, p.295).   
 
Another source of heated debate is related to the critical assessment of the relations between 
IPR  protection  and  the  transfer  of  technology.  It  is  argued  that  instead  of  increasing  the 
transfer of technology, the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement can reinforce a technology gap 
                                                 
3 Author’s interview with a representative from one of the leading Geneva-based research institutes dealing with 
IPR protection and developing countries (Geneva, 25 November 2009). 
4 Author’s interview with an Indonesian government official (Jakarta, 26 August 2009). 19 
 
between developed and developing countries. It is believed that a strong IPR protection will 
reduce  the  ability  of  developing  countries  to  acquire  the  latest  technology  (Chang,  2001, 
p.301).  In  this  regard,  the  history  of  the  economic  development  of  some  countries 
demonstrates that, they have used weak IPR protection as a means of gaining access to foreign 
technologies in order to develop their own indigenous technology, through imitation and the 
adaptation  of  advanced  technology  by  reverse  engineering.  This  is  particularly  observable 
from the experience of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East Asian countries’ 
economic development (May, 2007, p.19).  As a clear example, during its critical phase of 
development, South Korea did not have a strong IPR protection in its domestic law (Wade, 
2003, p.626). Besides owing to a strong government intervention, South Korea managed to 
transform its economy through the importance of imitation and reverse engineering of foreign 
technology,  which  then  became  an  important  variable  in  developing  its  own  domestic 
technological  and  innovative  capacity  (UK  CIPR  Commission,  2002,  pp.19–20). 
Unfortunately, since imitation and reverse engineering are not allowed under the agreement, 
the  implementation  of  TRIPS,  therefore,  has  restricted  the  chance  for  other  developing 
countries to pursue a similar route of development (UK CIPR Commission, 2002, p.20; Wade, 
2003, p.626).  
 
In addition to the debate on its implication for developing countries’ economic development, 
another important source of controversy is related to the burden of the TRIPs Agreement 
implementation.  A  number  of  literatures  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  implementing  the 
TRIPs Agreement is considerably costly, particularly for developing countries, which includes 
both  direct  and  indirect  costs.  The  direct  cost  is  related  to  the  costs  of  improving  legal, 
administrative,  and  enforcement  infrastructure,  while  indirect  cost  is  associated  with 
technology-related payment to foreign owners in the forms of increased royalty payments for 
the use of developed countries-owned intellectual property products (Gutowksi, 1999, p.751; 
Lybbert, 2002, p.310).
5  In this regard, the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement in the 
forms  of  royalty  payment  can  create  a  transfer  of  wealth  from  consumers  in  developing 
countries, particularly to multinational corporations based in developed countries (Dutfield, 
2006a,  p.7;  Hindley,  2006,  p.39).  As  estimated  by  the  World  Bank  in  2001,  developing 
countries  would  have  to  pay  foreign  companies  some US$20  billion  more  in  technology-
                                                 
5 The distinction of direct and indirect costs is debatable, since some scholars such as Chang (2001, p.302), 
considers the increased royalty payments from developing countries to the developed ones, as the example of the 
most direct international impact of TRIPs for developing countries. 20 
 
related payments if they were to implement fully the TRIPS Agreement (Mayne, 2004, p.155; 
Dutfield, 2006a, p.7). On the other hand, the World Bank also estimated that the benefits to 
US companies on IP-related sectors would reach up to US$19 billion per year (Wade, 2003, p. 
624; Blakeney, 2006, p.22). 
 
Furthermore, as Finger and Schuller (2000, p.522) argue, the implementation of the TRIPs 
Agreement  has  far  reaching  institutional  challenges  for  domestic  policy  in  developing 
countries. This is because the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement requires its signatories 
to reform their legal system, including drafting a new one; to enhance administrative structure; 
and to strengthen the institutional enforcement (Finger and Schuller, 2000, p.521). Moreover, 
developing countries also need to improve their institutional capacity in order to have a more 
sophisticated policing system (Kerr, 2003, p.8; May, 2004, p.826). As a consequence, this 
must be accompanied by spending extra money on purchasing equipment and training people. 
This is particularly costly for most developing countries, since these legal and institutional 
requirements were mostly absent prior to the TRIPs Agreement. For example, the cost of the 
World Bank projects to improve the IP regulatory framework in Indonesia during 1997–2003 
was  around  US$14.7  million  (Finger  and  Schuller,  2000,  p.522;  May,  2004,  p.826). 
Meanwhile, even though it can be regarded as having a considerably higher standard of IPR 
protection compared to other developing countries, the cost of the World Bank projects to 
establish an agency to implement industrial property laws in Mexico between 1992 and 1996, 
reached  over  US$30  million  (Finger  and  Schuller,  2000,  p.522).    In  other  words,  the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries involves significant costs. 
 
Considering the costs and the benefits for developing countries’ economic development, most 
scholars tend to acknowledge that in a short term, developing countries, particularly the poorer 
ones, may experience net welfare losses. As discussed earlier, this is owing to the fact that 
they will possibly have to pay a higher price for foreign patented products and technological 
innovations since they are not allowed to imitate them anymore (Maskus, 2000a). There is the 
disagreement,  however,  of  whether  the  long  term  benefits  will  outweigh  those  short  term 
costs. As Dutfield (2006a, p.7) points out, while it is not viable to calculate the long-term 
economic impacts of TRIPs, particularly on developing countries, the short-term costs clearly 
have direct welfare losses, which may already diminish its initial benefits. 
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1.2.2  The TRIPs Norms: Contending Views Regarding IPR Protection 
 
In addition to the discussion of the role of the TRIPs Agreement for developing countries’ 
economic growth and its implementation costs, the existing literature also pays attention to 
competing norms regarding IPR protection. Since the way in which they can be understood is 
rooted  in  different  values,  norms,  and  culture  in  various  societies,  there  is  no  common 
understanding  on  IPR  protection.  Considering  IPR  protection  as  an  international  norm  is 
arguably  problematic,  developing  countries’  responses  to  their  TRIPs  obligations,  by 
reforming their domestic IP legislation rigorously, therefore require further explanation.  
 
The  major  difference  concerning  IPR  protection,  particularly  focuses  on  whether  IPR  is 
regarded as individual rights, as can be found in Western industrialised society tradition, or 
whether  they  should  be  treated  as  collective  goods,  as  mostly  understood  in  non-Western 
industrialised  society  tradition.  Another  dispute  is  concerned  with  the  justification  of  IPR 
protection; whether it should be based on an economic justification through material benefits, 
which is again rooted in Western industrialised society tradition, or on another, non-material 
benefits justification, as can be found in non-Western industrialised society tradition. As will 
be explained further in Chapter 2, these conflicting norms, regarding IPR protection, clearly 
manifested in a wide division between developed and developing countries during the TRIPs 
negotiations.  
 
Much of the existing literature considers that the TRIPs Agreement is Western industrialised 
society-biased (Gutowksi, 1999; May, 2005; Ngenda, 2005). Since the agreement perceives 
that the IPR protection is part of individual rights (Gutowksi, 1999, pp.744-45), the TRIPs 
Agreement resembles the Western liberal tradition, and, therefore, it is seen as promoting a 
Western industrialised society concept of intellectual property (Ngenda 2005, p.60). In this 
regard,  the  TRIPs  Agreement  represents  what  May  (2005,  p.180)  regards  as  “...the 
internationalization [sic] of Anglo-Saxon legal privileging of owners’ rights”. Since norms 
embodied in the TRIPs Agreement are mostly rooted in the Western industrialised society 
tradition,  these  norms  are  in  conflict  with  those  of  a  non-Western  liberal  tradition,  which 
consider knowledge and other forms of IPR as collective goods (Marron and Steel, 2000, 
p.166).  Furthermore,  Ngenda  (2005,  p.62)  contends  that  the  TRIPs  Agreement  envisages 
Western society’s norms and values, which are rooted in its legal, economic, and political 22 
 
regimes. As a result, the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement in developing countries’ domestic 
laws  entails  deeper  structural  reforms.  In  other  words,  it  requires  an  appropriate 
implementation of institutional structures associated with Western liberal democracy and free-
market  systems,  which  can  be  conflicting  with  developing  countries’  social  and  cultural 
configuration (Ngenda, 2005, p.62). 
 
In addition, the existing literature also points out that the underlying argument behind IPR 
protection, as embedded in the TRIPs Agreement, is economic justification through providing 
material benefits, as rooted in Western industrialised society tradition. The argument is based 
on the assumption that creating knowledge requires high cost investment, not only in terms of 
time, but also financial spending. Furthermore, it is too risky to invest in that kind of process, 
since  there  is  no  assurance  that  such  inventive  efforts  will  be  economically  profitable 
(Emmert, 1990, p.1318). At the same time, due to the inherent characteristic of IP as public 
goods, once in existence, IP-related products can easily be used and reproduced by others with 
no additional cost (Emmert, 1990, p.1318). Under this situation, it is rational for economic 
agents to free-ride on inventive efforts of others, while it is not rational for them to undertake 
their own efforts to develop innovative activities (Drahos, 2005, p.143). Therefore, it is argued 
that the protection of IPR can be seen as the most effective way to provide a solution to this 
problem.  
 
In  contrast  to  liberal  traditions,  which  regard  material  incentives  as  vital  to  encouraging 
innovative  activities,  most  traditions  in  developing  countries  recognise  the  contribution  to 
society,  as  well  as  cultural  esteem,  rather  than  material  benefit,  as  the  driving  force  for 
creativity  (Maroon  and  Steel,  2000,  p.166).  Some  studies  also  assert  that  the  economic 
justification for protecting IPR can also produce adverse effects for economic growth. Instead 
of  becoming  an  incentive  for  further  innovative  activities,  IPR  protection  can  hinder  the 
emergence  of  new  creative  works.  The  benefits  of  the  monopoly  nature  of  IPR  tend  to 
encourage the right-holders to extend their rights protection, instead of investing in innovation 
and  new  productive  works,  which  involves  higher  costs  (Drahos,  2005,  pp.145–46). 
Furthermore, the economic justification ignores other important functions of knowledge, such 
as serving as a social instrument to ensure technology transfer and promoting social welfare. 
Therefore, from this point of view, a low standard of IPR protection can serve to protect life 
itself,  by  ensuring  a  supply  of  essential  goods,  particularly  in  the  fields  of  education  and 23 
 
medicine, both for sustenance and development (Gutowski, 1999, p.744). Within this context, 
one of the most frequently cited examples is the impact of strong IPR protection for the access 
by  poor  people  in  developing  countries  to  affordable  medicine.  Some  studies  (Matthews, 
2002, p.113; Mayne, 2004, p.146; Sun, 2004, p.125) show that strong patent protection has 
resulted in an increased price for essential pharmaceutical products, which in turn puts more 
burdens on countries in dealing with health problems.  
 
Previous discussions illustrated the conflicting aspects of the TRIPs Agreement, particularly 
due to its implications on developing countries’ economic development, and the high costs of 
its implementation, as well as its inherently problematic norms. The existing literature tends to 
agree  that  developing  countries  would  bear  extensive  cost  to  implement  the  agreement. 
Furthermore, there is no agreement among scholars as to whether the TRIPs Agreement is 
promoting  or  hindering  developing  countries’  economic  development.  In  addition,  the 
agreement which principally represents IPR protection in the Western industrialised society 
tradition, inherently contrasts with non-Western industrialised society traditions, like those in 
most developing countries’ traditions. Nevertheless, when the TRIPs Agreement came into 
force, almost all developing countries took the necessary steps to reform their domestic IP 
laws, and many did earlier than they had to, and some of them even adopted more rigorous IP 
rules than required by TRIPs. That many developing countries have adjusted their domestic IP 
law, poses the puzzle that this thesis seeks to explain.   
 
1.3  Defining Compliance and Policy Change 
 
Explaining  change  in  developing  countries’  IP  legislation  as  their  response  to  the  TRIPs 
obligations,  is  closely  related  to  the  study  of  developing  countries’  compliance  with 
international  agreement.  Following  Oran  Young’s  (1979)  definition,  the  existing  studies 
suggest “[C]ompliance can be said to occur when the actual behavior [sic] of a given subject 
conforms  to  prescribed  behavior  [sic]  and  noncompliance  or  violation occurs  when  actual 
behavior [sic] departs significantly from prescribed behavior [sic]” (quoted in Chayes, Chayes, 
and  Mitchells,  1998,  p.39;  Simmons,  1998,  p.77;  Raustiala,  2000,  p.391;  Raustiala  and 
Slaughter, 2002, p.539). This thesis, therefore, uses this common definition of compliance, 
which is understood to be a rule-consistent behaviour.   
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Nevertheless,  much  of  the  compliance  literature  contends  that  a  state  can  be  legally  in 
compliance  with  an  international  agreement  even  without  implementing  it,  because  the 
existing  practice  already  resembled  the  agreement  (Martin,  2008,  p.205).  In  this  context, 
implementation, defined as “…the process of putting international commitments into practice, 
the passage of domestic legislation, promulgation of regulations, creations of institutions (both 
domestic and international), and enforcement of rules” (Raustiala, 2000, p.392; Raustiala and 
Slaughter, 2002, p.539), therefore, can be considered as neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for compliance (Raustiala  and Slaughter, 2002, p.539). Despite this fact, in this 
thesis,  however,  implementation  is  going  to  be  used  interchangeably  with  the  concept  of 
compliance. This is owing to the fact that, since IPR protection was mostly alien in most 
developing  countries  prior  to  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  the  implementation  of  the  TRIPs 
Agreement through the adoption of IP laws in national legislation, is a necessary condition in 
order for developing countries to comply with the TRIPs Agreement. Within this context, 
developing countries’ acceptance to the TRIPs Agreement therefore resembles what Keohane 
argues  as  ‘inconvenient  commitments’,  defined  “...as  those  commitments  that  oblige 
governments  (1)  [to]  take  actions  that  they  would,  apart  from  their  commitment,  not 
undertake;  or  (2)  not  to  take  actions  in  which  they  would,  apart  from  their  commitment, 
engage” (1992, p.176). 
 
In this regard, the focus of this thesis is, therefore, on the TRIPs Agreement implementation or 
how the TRIPs Agreement is put into practice in developing countries, through the adoption of 
IP  laws  in  domestic  legislation,  including  its  institutional  arrangement  as  required  by  the 
agreement. To clarify further, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse why and how developing 
countries’  domestic  IP  policies  have  changed  in  response  to  external  trade  obligations, 
specifically the TRIPs Agreement, and whether the policies taken are in accordance or not 
with  their  TRIPs  obligations.  This  thesis,  nevertheless,  does  not  strive  to  assess  the 
effectiveness,  defined  as  “…the  degree  to  which  a  rule  induces  changes  in  behavior  that 
further the rule’s goals; improves the state of the underlying problem; or achieves its policy 
objective” (Raustiala and Slaugther, 2002, p.539), of these policies. This is because, even 
though IP policy change is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for protecting IPR, the 
legislative change itself, does not necessarily lead to a behavioural change or automatically 
achieve its policy objectives. The assessment on policy effectiveness, which requires time and 
resource intensive, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Within this context, this thesis, therefore, 25 
 
does not intend to assess whether the change in developing countries’ domestic IP policy has 
significantly fulfilled its policy objectives outlined by TRIPs or not, which is ranging from 
reducing the piracy to improving technology and innovation.  
 
1.4  Explaining Policy Change: Competing Perspectives  
 
This section engages with the debate concerning different expectations of major IR theories, in 
understanding the change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation as a response to 
their  international  obligations.  Policy  reform  taken  by  most  developing  countries,  as  a 
response  to  their  TRIPs  obligations,  in  particular  poses  a  challenge  to  the  constructivist 
account. Given the fact of the coercive nature of its birth and the incompatibility between 
international  norms  regarding  IPR  protection  under  TRIPs  with  domestic  norms  in  most 
developing countries, constructivists question the legitimacy of TRIPs, and, therefore, expect 
that policy reform would be unlikely to take place. From neo-realists’ points of view, the 
TRIPs Agreement is considered as mainly representing developed countries’ interests, and, 
therefore  they  would  play  a  significant  role  to  ensure  weaker  states’  compliance  with  the 
agreement. By emphasising the role of great power coercion behind a state’s compliance, neo-
realism, therefore, expects that policy change would take place owing to developing countries’ 
fear of punishment from dominant states. Neo-liberal institutionalism pays particular attention 
to the role of international institutions in explaining the reason behind domestic policy change. 
Considering  the  TRIPs  Agreement  is  regulated  under  the  WTO,  which  is  widely 
acknowledged  as  a  legalised  form  of  international  cooperation,  neo-liberal  institutionalism 
expects that developing countries would be more likely to comply with the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
As  will  be  elaborated  in  subsequent  chapters,  however,  the  expectations  as  proposed  by 
leading IR theories, derived from neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism, 
do  not  provide  satisfactory  explanations  in  understanding  policy  change  in  developing 
countries’  IP  legislation.  Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  constructivism,  neither  the 
questionable legitimacy of the TRIPs Agreement from developing countries’ points of view 
nor the incompatibility of international norms under TRIPs with their domestic norms, have 
caused widespread non-compliance by developing countries. Contrary to both neo-realists and 
neo-liberal institutionslists’ expectations regarding the role of external pressure, the change in 
developing countries’ IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations reveals several 26 
 
different patterns of responses that are inconsistent with the external pressure they received. In 
order  to  fully  understand  developing  countries’  responses  to  their  TRIPs  obligations,  this 
thesis suggests the need to utilise a domestic politics of compliance analysis, by examining the 
interaction and preferences of domestic actors (societal and governmental) and how they shape 
domestic policy outcomes.  
 
1.4.1  Norms and Legitimacy: Unmet Expectations? 
 
By  emphasising  the  role  of  norms,  identities,  and  beliefs  in  shaping  a  state’s  decisions 
(Checkel, 1998, pp.327–28; Ruggie, 1998, pp.862-64; Adler, 2002, p.96; Fearon and Wendt, 
2002, p.57), constructivists view the crucial role of international norms
6 in affecting domestic 
policies.
7    In  order  for  compliance  with  international  agreement  to  occur,  therefore, 
constructivists  value  both  the  role  of  legitimacy  of  the  agreement  (Hurd,  1999),  and  the 
compatibility  between  the  international  norms  underlying  the  agreement  and  the  existing 
domestic norms (Checkel 1999, 2001; Cortell and Davis, 2000, p.73). Constructivists contend 
that states would comply with international rules, if they perceive them to be legitimate (Koh 
1997; Hurd 1999). Furthermore, international norms will be considered to be more legitimate 
when  they  resonate  the  values,  practices,  or  beliefs  in  the  domestic  sphere—or  when  a 
‘cultural match’ exists—and, therefore, compliance is more likely to occur (Cortell and Davis, 
2000, p.73; 2005, p.6). Conversely, when the international norms conflict with understandings, 
beliefs, or values in the domestic sphere, domestic actors may find reasons to not comply 
(Cortell and Davis, 2000, p.74). 
 
Developing countries’ opposition during the TRIPs negotiation, due to their norms regarding 
IPR protection conflicting with the ones negotiated under the agreement, is an evidence of the 
incompatibility  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  as  the  international  norm,  with  their  existing 
domestic norms. Given the fact that the TRIPs Agreement represents a different conception of 
                                                 
6 Defined as “…collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p.3; 
Risse and Sikkink, 1999, p.7) or “…a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity…” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.891) 
7 As can be found at realism and neo-liberal institutionalism which have variety of traditions, constructivism also 
cannot be treated as a single perspective. Constructivism has variants including sociological variant, feminist 
variant, emancipatory constructivism, etc (Ruggie, 1998, p.880). However, for the purpose of this thesis, 
constructivism is used in a more general term to encompass all its core features regardless the differences in its 
variants. For a more detailed discussion on philosophical roots and historical accounts of the evaluation of 
constructivism, see Adler (2002, pp.95–118).  27 
 
IPR than that found in most developing countries, constructivists therefore, would expect that 
compliance  would  seem  unlikely.  Furthermore,  from  the  constructivists’  points  of  view, 
developing countries were expected to perceive the TRIPs Agreement as illegitimate, due to a 
contentious nature and a coercive pressure behind its acceptance, which also represents a hard 
bargaining for developing countries. Thus, borrowing constructivists’ argument, as Shanker 
(2003,  p.169–77)  argues,  the  TRIPs  Agreement  essentially  generates  incentives  for  non-
compliance.   
 
It should be noted however, according to constructivists, since norms and identity of the same 
state  can  change,  as  do  its  interests,  there  is  a  possibility  that,  as  their  domestic  norms 
changed,  developing  countries  would  have  the  same  preferences  with  international  norms 
(Ruggie, 1998, pp.863–64). Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso (2001, p.8) point out that the change 
in domestic norms can also be a result of the internalisation of international norms in domestic 
norms.  Furthermore,  following  Finnemore’s  (1996)  argument  regarding  the  diffusion  of 
international norms, IP policy change in developing countries might also be explained as a 
result  of  the  diffusion  of  international  norms  to  developing  countries,  which  may  differ 
radically  from  their  initial  beliefs.  Within  this  context,  constructivists  would  argue  that 
developing  countries’  preference  towards  the  TRIPs  Agreement  can  also  change,  as  their 
normative perception towards the IPR protection changes.  
 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Checkel (1999, p.85), constructivism fails to specify diffusion 
mechanisms  of  how  international  norms  are  transmitted  to  states,  and  whether  they  have 
constitutive effects in the domestic arena. The shortcoming in the constructivist argument is 
also  revealed  by  Kollman  (2011,  forthcoming),  arguing  that  the  constructivist  account  is 
unable  to  specify  “...the  process  by  which  international  norms  lead  to  domestic  policy 
change”. Kollman (2011, forthcoming) further argues that constructivists pay little attention to 
how  domestic  (particularly  political)  actors,  structures,  and/or  culture  would  respond  to 
“...international  normative  pressure  for  change”.  To  overcome  these  weaknesses,  it  is 
important therefore, to analyse the mechanisms available to domestic politics to understand 
how international norms influence the domestic ones, and how domestic actors (both societal 
and  governmental)  perceive  these  norms,  which  in  turn  determine  whether  these  norms 
translate into policy change or not. 
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Following  Checkel’s  (1997,  pp.476–77)  argument,  there  are  two  mechanisms  of  which 
international norms reach the domestic arena: societal pressure and elite learning.  In the case 
of societal pressure on elites, non-state actors mobilise their support for international norms, 
and pressurise decision makers to adopt the norms. As they received the pressure from below, 
the  elites  recalculate  their  strategies,  which  influenced  their  decision  on  policy  making 
(Checkel, 1997, p.477). In the case of elite learning, the internalisation of international norms 
is  a  result  of  the  exposure  of  domestic  political  elites  to  international  norms.  Within  this 
context, when they are exposed to new information and values, as reflected in international 
rules,  through  a  process  of  interaction,  the  elites  themselves  would  internalise  these  new 
norms,  which  eventually  led  them  to  adopt  new  preferences  and  interests,  resembling  the 
international norms they were exposed to (Checkel, 1997, p.477).  
 
Similarly, Risse and Sikkink (1999, p.11) argue that international norms can contribute to 
domestic policy change through the ‘socialisation process’, defined as “...the process by which 
principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense of collective understandings 
about  appropriate  behavior  [sic]  which  then  lead  to  changes  in  identities,  interests,  and 
behavior  [sic]”.    Risse  and  Sikkink  (1999,  pp.12–22)  further  identifies  three  types  of 
socialisation  process  through  which  domestic  actors  can  come  to  internalise  international 
norms:  a  process  of  instrumental  adaptation  with  international  norms;  a  process  of  moral 
consciousness-raising, emphasising process of dialogue, argumentation, and persuasion; and a 
process of institutionalisation and habituation of international norms in the domestic sphere.  
 
Alternatively,  in  addition  to  their  argument  regarding  the  existence  of  ‘cultural  match’  as 
mentioned earlier, Cortell and Davis (2005, p.74) suggest several plausible mechanisms and 
processes that facilitate how international norms can be introduced and embedded into the 
domestic sphere. According to Cortell and Davis (2005, pp.74–84), international norm may 
have impact into the domestic sphere through mechanisms such as, a repeated declaration by 
both  authoritative  state  and  societal  leaders  about  international  norms  embodied  in 
international obligations (or national political rhetoric); a link between an international norm 
and  material  interests  of  domestic  actors;  an  incorporation  of  an  international  norm  into 
domestic institutions; and a stable patterns of state interaction with other states or international 
organisations (or socialising forces). In short, in order to understand how international norms 29 
 
influence the change in domestic norms, and whether this change translates into domestic 
policy outcomes, it is important to look at the mechanisms available in domestic politics.  
 
The discussion on the change in the domestic actors’ preferences concerning IPR protection, 
particularly among domestic political actors, due to the internalisation of international norms 
on IPR protection, can also be found in the existing literature. As Deere (2008, p.167) argues, 
in addition to ‘economic power’ in the form of trade sanctions, ‘ideational power’, promoted 
by  major  developed  countries  and  international  institutions  through  various  mechanisms, 
including by providing IP-related training in developing countries, plays a significant role in 
shaping the preferences of the government in developing countries regarding IPR protection. 
Similarly,  May  (2004,  p.822)  argues  that  international  institutions  and  developed  country 
governments  actively  promote  ‘a  TRIPs  mind-set’  among  policy  makers  in  developing 
countries,  through  various  IP-related  training  programmes.  Following  these  arguments, 
developing  countries’  unexpected  responses  towards  their  TRIPs  obligations  can  also  be 
understood as a result of the internationalisation of new IPR values triggered by the exposure 
of the TRIPs Agreement, by both developed countries and international institutions. 
 
In  conclusion,  in  explaining  IP  policy  change,  constructivists  would  argue  that  the  more 
legitimately international agreement fits with domestic norms, the more likely policy reform is 
to take place. Given the contentious process and the coercive nature behind its acceptance, 
which represents the illegitimacy of the Agreement in the eyes of developing countries, as 
well as due to incompatibilities of the norms embodied in the agreement with the conception 
of IPR protection in most developing countries, constructivists would expect that IP policy 
change would be unlikely to occur. Previous discussion also demonstrated that constructivists, 
however, may also offer another explanation with regard to the internationalisation of norms, 
and the change in domestic norms regarding IPR protection, as the reasons behind IP policy 
change.  
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1.4.2  External Pressures: A Better Explanation? 
 
In explaining IP policy change in developing countries, neo-realism pays attention to the role 
of external pressures in the form of great power coercion, while neo-liberal institutionalism 
suggests  collective  enforcement  through  the  legalisation  of  international  institutions.  The 
existing literature in developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPs Agreement is mostly 
consistent with the neo-realists’ account, which emphasises great power coercion behind IP 
policy change in most developing countries. Despite the fact that the WTO, as represented by 
its  Dispute  Settlement  Body  (DSB),  is  widely  regarded  as  a  highly  institutionalised  and 
legalised international institution, the role of collective enforcement as argued by neo-liberal 
institutionalists, is, however, not as prevalent as in the literature on great power coercion. 
 
1.4.2.1  Great Power Coercion: A Prevailing Cause of Compliance? 
 
Given its emphasis on the relative power of states, neo-realism argues that compliance with 
international rules will vary directly with states’ power (Keohane, 1992, p.177). Furthermore, 
since  international  rules  mostly  represent  the  interests  of  the  most  powerful  states 
(Mearsheimer, 1994/1995, p.33), neo-realism argues that the dominant state (the hegemon) 
plays  a significant role  in preventing defection from those rules, through the use of side-
payments and the imposition of sanctions (Gilpin, 2001, p.97). In this regard, according to 
neo-realists, a relatively powerful state therefore has a greater possibility to not comply with 
international agreements, while at the same time it has the capability to enforce sanctions 
against non-compliant behaviour on the part of a weaker state. Within this context, since the 
TRIPs Agreement represents major developed countries’ interests, neo-realism expects that 
developed countries would enforce the rules. Developing countries, on the other hand, which 
are much weaker economically and politically than that of the dominant states, would comply 
with the TRIPs Agreement essentially because of their fear of the punishment by the great 
power as the rule enforcers (Hurd, 1999, p.383). In short, neo-realism would suggest that great 
power coercion (or its credible threat) is the critical reason behind the change in developing 
countries’ IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations. 
 
Much  of  the  literature  on  developing  countries  and  IPR  protection  is  consistent  with  the 
realists’ view of compliance, as it emphasises coercion by a great power, particularly the US 31 
 
(McIlroy  1998;  Sell,  1998;  Simons,  1999).  Some  studies  indicate  that,  in  order  to  ensure 
developing  countries’  compliance  with  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  the  US  has  employed 
‘aggressive unilateralism’
8 through various mechanisms, including threats of trade sanctions 
(McIlroy,  1998,  p.446).  As  evident  from  the  publication  of  the  United  States  Trade 
Representative (USTR) Special 301 Annual Report on foreign trade partners’ IPR protection 
performance, the US government uses a threat of trade retaliation in order to induce policy 
changes  in  targeted  states  which  are  considered  as  having  inadequate  IPR  protection 
(Blakeney, 1996, p.544; Sell, 1998, p.183). Some studies also highlight the suspension of 
developing  countries’  benefits  under  the  Generalised  System  of  Preferences  (GSP)  as  a 
coercive  tool  by  the  US,  to  ensure  compliance  among  developing  countries  towards  their 
TRIPs obligations (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002, p.86).  
 
The existing literature on great power coercion and IPR protection reveals that developing 
countries also experience other forms of external pressures, and what Deere (2008, p.161–63) 
describes as ‘diplomatic threats’, which again emanate mostly from the US government, to 
improve  their  IPR  protection.
9  Diplomatic  threats,  for  instance,  are  evident  from  repeated 
visits by US top officials to specifically address IPR protection issues with these countries. 
Much  of  the  existing  literature  on  Indonesia’s  IP  policy  reform  confirms  this  argument, 
showing  that  diplomatic  pressures,  mainly  from  the  US  government,  is  behind  the  policy 
reform  taken  by  the  Indonesian  government  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.30;  Rosser,  1999,  p.103; 
Kusumadara,  2000a,  p.133).  Nevertheless,  as  will  be  elaborated  in  Chapter  4,  a  closer 
observation reveals that, IP policy reform in Indonesia did not correspond neatly with the 
external pressures it received.   
 
To  sum  up,  by  emphasising  the  role  of  great  power  coercion,  neo-realists  argue  that 
developing countries’ compliance would be more likely to take place  due to their fear of 
punishment by the stronger state or the hegemon. In other words, neo-realists would expect 
that  the  greater  the  external  pressure,  the  more  likely  policy  reform  is  to  take  place  in 
                                                 
8 As cited by Bayard and Elliott (1994, p.19) the term of ‘aggressive unilateralism’ was first coined by Jagdish 
Bhagwati to attribute the expansion of Section 301 of 1988 US Trade Act. 
9 It should be noted that in addition to ‘diplomatic threats’, Deere (2008, p.161–63) also identifies ‘industry 
pressure and threat’ as other forms of external pressure. Industry pressure and threats are not only in the form of 
direct lobby of these multinational companies, which are mostly based in the US and the EU to the targeted 
governments concerning TRIPs implementation, but also through pursuing legal challenge in national courts in 
the targeted countries regarding IPR violations (Deere (2008), p.161–63). Nevertheless, since these pressures 
were not pressure by the state, this form of external pressure does not fit with the neo-realists’ account. 32 
 
developing countries. Previous discussions also demonstrated that, in the existing literature, 
pressure from the US government is widely acknowledged as a prevalent reason behind the 
change in developing countries’ IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations. 
  
1.4.2.2  Collective Enforcement: Does the WTO DSB Really Bark?
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In  explaining  policy  change,  neo-liberal  institutionalism  pays  attention  to  collective 
enforcement  through  the  role  of  authoritative  international  institutions.  Neo-liberal 
institutionalism also emphasises the costs and the benefits of non-compliance, either in terms 
of reduced prospects for future cooperation (reputation) or in terms of encouraging the non-
compliance of others (reciprocity) (Guzman, 2002, pp.1839-40; Simmons, 2010, p.275). In 
this context, as the WTO is commonly regarded as a particularly highly institutionalised and 
legalised  form  of  international  cooperation–it  provides  information  about  violations  and 
transaction  costs,  reduces  uncertainty,  defines  compliance,  and  provides  mechanisms  for 
enforcing commitments (Keohane, 1988, p. 386; Keohane and Martin, 1995, p.42; Goldstein 
et al, 2000)–neo-liberal institutionalism would expect a high degree of compliance with the 
TRIPs Agreement.   
 
As argued by Otten (1998, p.524), the WTO is well-equipped with the necessary mechanisms 
to ensure its members’ effective implementation of the TRIPs Agreement. The first tool is a 
detailed scrutiny process of the TRIPs review under the TRIPs Council, which is responsible 
for monitoring members’ compliance with their TRIPs commitments. Another important tool 
is the integrated dispute system of the WTO. These mechanisms, according to Otten (1998, 
pp.525-6),  would  encourage  members  to  take  great  care  in  complying  with  the  TRIPs 
Agreement.   
 
As will be elaborated in Chapter 3, the assessment on the WTO complaints, however, reveals 
that, between 1 January 1995 and 31 January 2011, only a few cases had been filed at the 
WTO DSB concerning TRIPs-related issues. During this period, from a total of 420 disputes, 
only  29  cases  (or  6.9  percent)  were  related  to  TRIPs  issues,  which  were  also  often  in 
combination  with  claims  under  other  WTO  agreements (WTO,  n.  d.  (j);  (k)).
11  The  latest 
cases, filed in May 2010 by Brazil and India as complainants regarding the seizure of generic 
                                                 
10 The title is inspired by Pauwelyn (2010) 
11 See also Pauwelyn (2010) for the dispute prior to 2011. 33 
 
drugs in transit, involved some EU member countries. India requested the consultation with 
the EU on 11 May 2010, and then was followed by Brazil on 12 May 2010 (WTO, n. d. (l); 
(m)). It should be noted that at the time of writing, these two cases are still in the consultation 
stage.  Furthermore, among the TRIPs cases filed during this period, as will be explained in 
more detail in Chapter 3, only six developing countries—Argentina, Brazil, China (twice for 
different  aspects,  but  one  not  specifically  on  TRIPs,  but  in  combination  with  the  General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)), India, Indonesia (not specifically on TRIPs, but in 
combination  with  the  Trade-related  Investment  Measures  (TRIMs)  Agreement),  and 
Pakistan—have been respondents in a TRIPs complaint (see also Appendix IV for a complete 
list of the involvement of WTO developing country members as respondents in the WTO 
TRIPs disputes between 1995 and 2011). The fact that only a limited use of WTO DSB on 
TRIPs-related  issues  against  developing  countries  reveals  that,  neo-liberal  institutionalist’s 
expectations concerning the role of WTO DSB, representing a highly institutionalised and 
legalised  form  of  international  cooperation,  only  partially  met.  Nevertheless,  as  will  be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, a state being specifically targeted in an adverse ruling 
does seem to have an impact on its compliance with the TRIPs Agreement.   
 
In addition to the degree of legalisation and institutionalisation of international institutions, as 
stated earlier, neo-liberal institutionalism also attributes the role of international institutions to 
facilitate reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation mechanisms as the reason behind a country’s 
compliance. In terms of reputation, compliance is important for revealing to other countries 
that a country has a good quality of political institutions and traditions. As Simmons (1998, 
p.81) points out, reputation is significant for demonstrating that the country is a rule-of-law 
country, which can provide a good signal for future cooperation. Similarly Guzman affirms 
that:  
“When  a  state  makes  a  compliance  decision  it  sends  a  signal  about  its 
willingness to honor [sic] its international legal obligations. A state that tends 
to comply with its obligations will develop a good reputation for compliance, 
while a state that often violates obligations will have a bad reputation. A good 
reputation is valuable because it makes promises more credible, and therefore, 
makes future cooperation both easier and less costly” (Guzman, 2008, p.33). 
 
In other words, a country tends to comply with its international obligations in order to avoid 
the reputational loss due to the violations (Guzman, 2002, p.1848; 2006, p.383). In this regard, 
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that, the greater the concern of a country about its reputation, the more likely the policy reform 
will  take  place.  As  will  be  discussed  in Chapter  5,  after  being  specifically  targeted  in  an 
adverse ruling in WTO complaint regarding its patent regime, there was a growing concern 
over reputational loss among the Indian political elites, which then also contributed to the 
government’s decision to reform its existing patent regime by the end of the 1990s.  
 
Another important aspect of countries’ compliance with international agreement is reciprocity, 
which usually reflects a country’s response to a violation done by other country as one of the 
mechanisms  to  encourage  compliance  and  discourage  non-compliance  as  argued  by  neo-
liberal  institutionalist.  In  the  case  of  developing  countries’  compliance  with  the  TRIPs 
Agreement,  however,  reciprocal  violation  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  credible  threat  for 
developing  countries  especially  in  the  wake  of  Uruguay  Round.  This  is  because  most 
developing countries at that time were net consumers or net importers of IP-related products 
(see Chapter 2 for further explanation on this issue). As net importers of IP-related product, 
most developing countries did not have many IP-related products to protect, thus, they did not 
have any fear of IPR violation by other countries. Considering this fact, therefore, reciprocal 
violation cannot be seen as a credible threat, and, as a consequence, reciprocal mechanism 
cannot provide a satisfactory explanation in understanding developing countries’ compliance. 
 
In  addition  to  reputation  and  reciprocity  mechanisms,  another  important  compliance 
mechanism  argued  by  neo-liberal  institutionalist  is  retaliation.  As  Guzman  (2002,  p.1866) 
argues, direct retaliation can take the form of a decision by the complying state to terminate its 
own compliance with the agreement (see also Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, p.249; Keohane, 
1985).  In  this  regard,  as  with  the  role  of  reputation,  in  explaining  IP  policy  change  in 
developing countries, neo-liberal institutionalism also expects that, the greater the concern of a 
country about retaliation action by other countries, the more likely the policy reform will take 
place. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, after being specifically targeted in an adverse ruling 
in  WTO  complaint  regarding  its  patent  regime,  in  addition  to  a  growing  concern  over 
reputational loss, a fear of retaliation particularly from the US, was also prevalent among the 
Indian political elites. Along with the concern over reputation loss, a fear of retaliation, then 
also influenced the Indian government’s decision to reform its existing patent regime by the 
end of the 1990s.  
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Dai  (2007,  pp.22–23),  however,  argues  that  while  international  institutions  facilitate 
reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation by monitoring states’ compliance behaviours and by 
providing compliance information, “...it is not clear to what extent international institutions 
monitor  states’  compliance  and  to  what  extent  international  institutions  utilise  compliance 
information  to  enforce  compliance  between  states”.  Furthermore,  Dai  (2005,  p.363)  also 
argues  that,  despite  the  fact  that  international  agreements  have  ‘domestic  distributional 
consequences’,  there  was  a  little  attention  has  been  given,  particularly  by  neo-liberal 
institutionalist scholars, to address domestic mechanisms of compliance, or through which 
domestic  constituencies  can  influence  compliance.  In  this  context,  following  Dai’s  (2005, 
2007)  argument,  in  order  to  understand  how  international  institutions  influence  national 
policies, it is important to analyse what mechanisms are available in the domestic arena. 
 
It can be concluded that since neo-liberal institutionalism emphasises the role of authoritative 
international institutions, in explaining the correlation between international obligations and 
domestic  policy  change,  neo-liberal  institutionalism  would  expect  that  the  more 
institutionalised an international agreement, the more significant an impact it is expected to 
have. As stated earlier,  considering the TRIPs Agreement is a highly institutionalised and 
legalised  form  of  international  agreement  under  the  WTO,  neo-liberal  institutionalism 
expected that developing countries would have a great deal to comply with the agreement, by 
reforming  their  domestic  IP  legislation.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  since  there  is  no 
obligation under TRIPs that requires developing countries to go beyond and/or comply earlier 
than necessary, neo-liberal institutionalism, therefore, only expects developing countries to 
meet the minimum requirement of the TRIPs obligations and at the deadline. In other words, 
neo-liberal institutionalism does not expect developing countries to comply either prior to the 
deadline or to adopt more rigorous rules than required.  
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1.4.3  Bringing  Domestic  Politics  Back  in:  Searching  for  Other  Causes  of 
Compliance 
 
As the preceding discussion suggests, there is a substantial degree of divergence between the 
actual behaviour of developing countries and that suggested by the IR theories.  Moreover, 
scholars writing in different theoretical traditions have highlighted the importance of domestic 
actors and institutions in mediating the impact of international norms and rules on domestic 
policies.
12 In this regard, therefore, in order to understand domestic policy change in response 
to international obligations, one also needs to look at politics within the state, by observing the 
interaction between, and aggregation of, divergent interests among domestic actors (Keohane, 
1992; Kingsbury, 1998, p.356–57; Raustiala, 2000; Guzman, 2002). In this context, according 
to  Kingsbury  (1998,  p.357),  compliance  can  be  understood  as  “...[the]  outcomes  of  the 
political interaction of aggregated preferences or, in discursive accounts, the weighted claims 
and responses of the relevant actors in the discursive community”.  
 
Furthermore, as Raustiala (2000, p.411) points out “… compliance with legal [international] 
rules specifically may be explained by who benefits and who loses in a given cooperative 
setting, the distributional impacts, at a societal level, of the regulatory structure created by the 
legal instrument”. Dai (2007, p.70) contends that the key questions of the analysis of domestic 
politics are “...to specify how competing constituencies influence a government’s decisions” 
and  “...how  a  government’s  accountability  to  divergent  domestic  interests  influences  its 
compliance decisions” (2007, p.72). In this regard, in order to understand domestic policy 
change, following Milner’s (1997, p.17) argument, it is also necessary to explore the structure 
of domestic preferences
13 and various actors within domestic politics, not only because they 
have  different  policy  preferences,  but  also  because  they  are  differentially  affected  by 
government policies.  
 
In  assessing  the  role  of  domestic  actors,  two  distinct  groups  can  be  identified:  domestic 
political  groups  (the  executive  (including  bureaucracy  in  the  various  departments  and 
ministries of government) and the legislature), and domestic societal interest groups (Milner, 
                                                 
12 For the discussion on the impact of international norms and rules on domestic outcomes from the rationalists 
perspectives, see for example, Keohane (1986, 1988, 1992), Raustiala (2000), Guzman (2002), and Dai (2005, 
2007); for the constructivists approaches on this subject, see for instance, Cortell and Davis (1996, 2000, 2005), 
Risse and Sikkink (1999), and Kollman (2011).  
13 Defined as “...the relative positions of the preferences of important domestic actors on the issue at hand” 
(Milner, 1997, p.16). 37 
 
1997,  p.12).  However,  contrary  to  Milner’s  (1997,  pp.33–34)  simplifying  assumption  that 
these agents, executives, legislatures, and societal interest groups are assumed to be unitary 
and rational, as will be explained later in the subsequent chapters, the empirical study shows 
that each group cannot be treated as unitary actor. As can be found particularly in Indonesia’s 
case study, which will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 4, the executive consists of 
several different departments, with their own preferences towards IP policy, which determines 
domestic  policy  outcomes.  Within  this  context,  following  Kingsbury’s  (1998,  pp.356–57) 
argument,  the  actual  behaviour  of  a  state  can  be  more  completely  understood  by 
disaggregating the state into various components including understanding the difference in 
government institutions and ministries which have different preferences, interests, and values 
according to the specific roles they play. 
 
The  existing  domestic  politics  of  compliance  literature  also  recognises  three  categories  of 
domestic actors based on their policy preference, which can be identified not only among 
domestic societal interest groups but also factions within the government: vested, committed, 
and mobilised (Young, 2009).  According to Young (2009), vested domestic actors favour the 
status quo and oppose policy change, either because they materially benefit from it, or because 
they  have  internalised  a  domestic  norm  that  is  at  odds  with  the  international  obligation.  
Committed  domestic  actors  demand  policy  change,  whether  motivated  by  self-interest  or 
principled  beliefs.    Mobilised  domestic  actors,  in  principle,  do  not  really  care  about  the 
specific  policy  for  its  own  sake,  but  are  concerned  about  non-compliance,  which  can  be 
because they either fear the costs of non-compliance, or because they consider compliance 
appropriate (Young, 2009). Within this context, whether compliance will take place or not, 
therefore depends on the relative power of these actors.  
 
As will be explained later in section 1.5 on analytical framework, in the case specifically on 
the role of domestic actors in developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPs Agreement, 
these key types of domestic actors of compliance in general, can transform into three different 
categories: pro-IP (committed domestic actors); IP-sceptics (vested domestic actors); and IP-
indifferent (mobilised domestic actors), see table 1.3. While the adoption of both ‘committed 
domestic actors’ into ‘pro-IP domestic actors’ and ‘vested domestic actors’ into ‘IP-sceptic 
domestic actors’ is essentially unproblematic, the category of ‘IP-indifferent domestic actors’ 
in this thesis is used rather differently with that of ‘mobilised domestic actors’ category. This 38 
 
is because the term ‘mobilised’ in Young’s (2009) domestic actor categories mainly refers to 
the engagement of domestic actors on the policy, particularly in the wake of an authoritative 
ruling of non-compliance, whereas, this is not necessarily the case in the role of IP-indifferent 
domestic actors in IP policy change in developing countries. As will become clearer later in 
this  thesis,  the  ‘IP-indifferent  domestic  actors’  share  similar  concerns  with  the  ‘mobilised 
domestic actors’ about the costs of non-compliance and the appropriateness of compliance; 
their engagement on the policy, however, is not necessarily ‘mobilised’ in the wake of an 
authoritative ruling of non-compliance. 
 
It  should  be  noted  however,  that,  unlike  the  role  of  the  external  pressures  explanations, 
particularly the role of great power coercion, which are extensively echoed in the existing 
literature on policy change in developing countries’ IP legislation, there is little attention to the 
domestic  politics  of  developing  countries’  IP  policies.  Deere  (2008)  is  a  rare  exception. 
Drawing  from  a  comprehensive  empirical  study  on  Francophone  African  countries,  Deere 
(2008,  p.20)  argues  that  “[N]ational  economic  circumstances  and  political  factors  within 
developing countries shaped the capacity of government to filter and manage international 
pressures regarding TRIPs implementation...” (emphasis original). In this regard, developing 
countries’  responses  to  their  TRIPs  obligations  are  influenced  by  a  number  of  domestic 
aspects, such as the availability of national expertise regarding IPR protection, and the degree 
of public engagement, including the role of NGOs in the policy making process (Deere, 2008). 
To date, Deere’s (2008) work is the most comprehensive study on domestic politics analysis, 
in understanding the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement in developing countries.     
 
It  can  be  concluded,  therefore,  by  looking  at  politics  within  the  state  in  understanding 
developing  countries’  responses  to  their  TRIPs  obligations,  IP  policy  reform  taken  by 
developing  countries can be explained as a result of a change in the balance of domestic 
actors’ preferences. Within this context, domestic politics of compliance would expect that the 
more powerful the domestic pro-IP actors, the more likely policy reform is to take place. In 
addition, a larger number of IP-indifferent constituents among domestic actors would also 
provide a more favourable circumstance for IP policy reform to occur.   
 
Table  1.1  summarises  the  expectations  of  the  competing  perspectives  in  understanding 
developing countries’ responses to their TRIPs obligations. Given their emphasis on both the 39 
 
role of legitimacy of the TRIPs Agreement and the compatibility of international and domestic 
norms, constructivists would expect that developing countries would be unlikely to comply 
with the TRIPs Agreement, which is viewed as not only illegitimate but also incompatible 
with  their  domestic  norms.  Constructivism,  however,  expects  that  as  domestic  norms  in 
developing countries change due to socialisation and the internalisation of international norm 
under TRIPs, domestic IP policy reform would also be more likely to take place. By focusing 
on the role of great power coercion, neo-realists predict developing countries’ compliance 
would take place because of their fear of punishment by stronger states. As with neo-realism, 
neo-liberal  institutionalism  also  pays  attention  to  the  role  of  external  pressure  behind 
compliance.  Neo-liberal  institutionalism  however,  emphasises  the  role  of  collective 
enforcement, represented by authoritative international institutions, in explaining change in 
developing countries’ IP legislation. As the TRIPs Agreement is governed under the WTO, 
which  is  widely  argued  as  a  highly  institutionalised  international  institution,  neo-liberal 
institutionalism expects policy reform would take place as developing countries’ responses to 
their TRIPs obligations. Unlike other perspectives that treat a state as a unitary actor, domestic 
politics of compliance analysis, which focuses  on the balance of various domestic actors’ 
preferences, argues that compliance would take place when pro-IP domestic actors outweigh 
the anti-IP domestic actors. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of Competing Perspectives’ Expectations on Developing Countries’ 
IP Policy Change 
 
  Constructivism  Neo-realism  Neo-liberal 
institutionalism 
Domestic 
politics 
General 
expectations 
of 
compliance 
The more 
legitimate the 
international 
agreement, the 
more likely 
policy reform 
will take place  
 
The more the 
international 
agreement fits 
with domestic 
norms, the more 
likely policy 
reform will take 
place 
The greater the 
external pressure, 
the more likely 
policy reform 
will take place 
The more 
institutionalised an 
international 
agreement, the more 
significant impact it is 
expected to have 
 
The greater the 
concern about 
reputation/reciprocity/
retaliation, the more 
likely policy reform 
will take place 
The more 
powerful the 
domestic pro-
IP actors are, 
the more 
likely policy 
reform will 
take place 
Overall 
expectation 
regarding 
developing 
countries 
and TRIPs  
No policy 
reform 
Policy reform 
should have 
occurred 
Policy reform should 
have occurred 
No overall 
expectation
14 
 
1.5  Analytical Framework 
 
In order to explain the change in developing countries’ IP legislation as a response to their 
TRIPs  obligations,  this  thesis  combines  a  survey  of  the  timing  and  quality  of  102  WTO 
developing country members’ legislation across patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
15  with 
detailed case studies of changes to intellectual property legislation in India and Indonesia, 
which  are  both  unlikely  cases  for  compliance,  but  reflect  different  domestic  political 
circumstances. By  analysing these three main  IPR categories in selected case studies, this 
thesis intends to compare policy change, not only between different case study countries, but 
also to compare policy change within the same country for different aspects of IPR categories.  
                                                 
14 Since the tendency of domestic politics of compliance analysis is a positive account of behaviour rather than 
predictions, domestic politics analysis cannot provide a general model of compliance (Guzman, 2000, p.1839; 
Gourevitch, 2002, p.321).  
15 In the early stage of the study, the survey observed 105 WTO developing country members according to the 
World Bank’s categories of country/territorial’s economy levels. However, by the end of December 2010, some 
developing countries (Croatia, Latvia, and Poland) were already upgraded to a high income economy.  41 
 
 
Since  this  thesis  focuses  on  explaining  domestic  policy  change  in  developing  countries’ 
domestic IP legislation, in this thesis, therefore, policy change is treated as the dependent 
variable. As explained earlier, in order to test external pressures explanation (argued by both 
neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists) and domestic politics of compliance analysis, the 
possible explanations as to the reasons behind policy change, such as great power coercion, 
authoritative international institutions, and domestic actors’ preferences, are then going to be 
treated as the independent variables.  
 
In  order  to  assess  policy  change,  this  research  pays  attention  to  whether  the  observed 
developing countries have adopted a minimum standard of IPR protection, and its mechanisms 
for the domestic enforcement, or not, by the designated period. This can be measured by 
looking at the timing of the adoption of IP laws in national legislation, and the quality of the 
IP  legislation  adopted.  As  will  be  explained  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  3,  since  different 
members of the WTO have different deadlines according to their respective economic level of 
development, the timing of the adoption of major IP law in developing countries is relative to 
the deadline for compliance for each country (see table 2.2 in Chapter 2).  Regarding the 
quality of the legislation adopted, as will also elaborated further in Chapter 3, the quality of 
the legislation is assessed by utilising Deere’s (2008, p.74) classifications of a country’s IP 
laws, which is based on a survey of the extent to which developing countries took advantage 
of TRIPs options and safeguards, as reflected in their legislation (see table 3.2 in Chapter 3).  
By employing these measurements, this thesis will test the rival expectations derived from the 
IR theories of compliance, and echoed in the existing literature on developing countries and 
the TRIPs Agreement, as summarised in table 1.1. 
  
As the role of great power coercion is crucial for neo-realism, this thesis uses the substantial 
pressure by the US, which is widely regard as the hegemon, as a proxy for the independent 
variable of great power coercion. As briefly discussed earlier, it is widely acknowledged in the 
existing literature that the US is largely regarded as being particularly aggressive in pursuing 
trade barriers and in protecting IPR (McIlroy, 1998; Simons, 1999; Drahos and Braithwaite, 
2002). Furthermore, the US trade laws are well-equipped to exercise pressure on foreign trade 
partners in order to protect IPR (McIlroy, 1998; Simons, 1999; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002). 
The  US  also  has  applied  significant  direct  pressure  on  targeted  states,  which  are  highly 42 
 
dependent on access to  the US market, and, therefore, have made them vulnerable to US 
threats of trade sanctions (Sell, 1998, p.177). As can be observed from the existing literature, 
US  aggressiveness  is  resonated  in  various  US  trade  policies,  including  the  suspension  of 
developing countries’ benefits under the GSP, the annual publication of the USTR Special 301 
Report on its trading partners’ adequacy to the US standards of IPR protection, and the USTR 
National Trade Estimate Report, which provide a great tool of leverage for the US to negotiate 
improvements in foreign IP regimes. For these reasons, therefore, US pressure is utilised as a 
proxy for the independent variable of great power coercion. 
 
As briefly stated earlier, publication of the USTR Special 301 Annual Report on foreign trade 
partners’ IPR protection performance allows the US government to use the threat of trade 
retaliation in order to induce policy changes in targeted states which are considered to have 
inadequate IPR protection (Blakeney, 1996, p.544; Sell, 1998, p.183). It should be noted that 
Special 301 is Section 1301 of the US Omnibus Trade  and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
(Grier, 2005). It is sometimes confused with Section 301, but the two are different. Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is “...much broader than Special 301 because Section 301 can be 
used  to  address  foreign  unfair  practices  affecting  American  exports  of  goods  or  services, 
whereas Special 301 which was created during the Uruguay Round deals specifically with IP” 
(McIlroy, 1998, p.447).
16 In this context, Special 301 is primarily designed to enhance the 
US’s ability to negotiate improvements in foreign IP regimes. This is done by identifying 
those countries that deny ‘adequate and effective protection’ of IPR, or that refute ‘fair and 
equitable market access’ to US IP holders (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002, p.89). 
 
As also extensively identified in the existing literature, in addition to publication of the USTR 
Special 301 Annual Report, another significant coercive tool used by the US is the suspension 
of developing countries’ benefits under the GSP. Under the US GSP Programme, a beneficiary 
country was permitted to export qualified products into the US market on a duty-free basis 
(Drahos  and  Braithwaite,  2002,  p.86).  Initially,  when  the  GSP  began  working  in  1976, 
protection of IPR was not part of the criterion of eligibility for a country to receive GSP 
benefits. The IPR protection becoming the GSP’s condition only emerged later, in 1984, due 
                                                 
16 Prior to the introduction of Special 301, in 1985, for example, the US took action against the Republic of Korea 
and Brazil under Section 301, due to the limited scope of these countries’ legal protection for patent, trademark, 
and copyright (Blakeney, 1996, p.544). Similarly, in 1987, under Section 301, the US increased tariffs on 
Brazilian exports in order to pressurise the Brazilian government to improve its protection for pharmaceutical 
products (Blakeney, 1996, p.545).  43 
 
to persistent pressures from the US industry associations (Sell, 1998, p.195; Drahos, 2002a, 
p.773; Eren-Vural, 2007, p.121). In this regard, the GSP mechanism indeed provides room for 
the  US  to  develop  a  carrot  and  stick  approach  to  ensure  compliance  among  developing 
countries  towards  their  TRIPs  obligations,  as  well as  the  globalisation  of  IP  with  the  US 
standard  (Drahos  and  Braithwaite,  2002,  p.86).  As  Drahos  and  Braithwaite  (2002,  p.87) 
further  argue,  “[S]tates  complying  with  US  demands  on  intellectual  property  would  be 
rewarded with GSP benefits while those that did not might lose them”.  
 
In order to get at neo-liberal institutionalist explanations of domestic policy change, this thesis 
also considers the WTO complaint as a proxy for the independent variable of the role of 
authoritative international institutions. The WTO complaint represents the high-watermark of 
internationalised enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement, since it leads to binding third-party 
adjudication, and also the imposition of sanctions. This thesis, therefore, utilises the data from 
WTO  TRIPs  disputes,  with  particular  attention  to  developing  countries’  involvement  as 
respondents. 
 
In this regard, in assessing the role of external pressures in detailed case studies, the level of 
external  pressures  is  categorised  from  strong  to  none  (see  table  1.2).  External  pressure  is 
considered as strong if it has immediate effect, such as in the forms of threats and actual action 
of trade sanctions. This also includes being on the USTR Special 301 Report with Priority 
Foreign Country (PFC)
17 status, as well as being a respondent in the WTO dispute on a TRIPs-
related issue. External pressure is regarded as moderate when there is no immediate effect, 
such as in the forms of pressures and lobbies from foreign industry and government, including 
being on the USTR Special 301 Report with Priority Watch List (PWL) or Watch List (WL) 
status. The lowest level of pressure is when there is no pressure that can be identified.  
 
                                                 
17 Chapter 3 will elaborate further on the classification of a country’s status on the USTR Special 301 Report. 44 
 
Table 1.2 Levels of External Pressures 
Level  Measurement 
Strong  •  On the USTR Special 301 Report with PFC status 
•  Brought to the WTO dispute on a TRIPs issue 
•  Threats, and the actual action of trade sanctions, including 
withdrawal of GSP 
Moderate  •  On the USTR Special 301 Report with PWL or WL status 
•  Diplomatic lobby from major developed countries’ government 
•  Industrial pressure from multinational companies 
None  •  No pressures identified 
 
Concerning  the  third  independent  variable  of  domestic  actors’  preferences,  based  on  their 
policy  preferences—which  can  be  influenced  by  material  benefits  or  principled 
beliefs/ideological stands—on domestic IP legislation, domestic actors from both political and 
societal interest groups can be categorised into three constituents: anti-IP policy reform (or IP-
sceptics), pro-IP policy reform, and IP-indifferent.
18 As summarised in table 1.3, the anti-IP 
policy  reform  represents  domestic  actors  that  oppose  policy  change,  either  because  they 
materially benefit from the existing domestic legislations, or because they have internalised a 
domestic norm that is incompatible with their TRIPs obligations. This could be a domestic 
industry benefiting from low IPR protection—such as local producers of counterfeit goods, or 
a local industry relying on reverse engineering—or NGOs—which are mostly concerned with 
the misappropriation of traditional knowledge patented by multinational companies or bio-
piracy.
19  
 
The  pro-IP  policy  reform,  on  the  other  hand,  represents  domestic  actors  who,  whether 
motivated by self-interest or principled beliefs, favour policy change. Domestic societal actors, 
can include local authors and musicians who are concerned about protecting their IP-related 
work, or a domestic industry benefiting from a strong IPR protection regime. For domestic 
                                                 
18 The assessment on domestic actors’ preference has highly relied on the analytical framework developed in a 
trade policy study from International Political Economy (IPE), which disaggregates the state to analyse how its 
internal process explains foreign economic policy outcomes (Gourevitch, 2002, p.310). As Gourevitch (2002, 
p.311) further argues, domestic actors’ preferences are not always driven by economic or material benefits, but 
can also be due to an ideological or values system.  
19 According to Dutfield (2006b, p.6), bio-piracy can be defined as “…the misappropriation of genetic resources 
and/or traditional knowledge through patent system…[and]…the unauthorised collection for commercial ends of 
genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge”. Similarly, Shiva (2001, p.49) defines bio-piracy as “…the use of 
intellectual property systems to legitimize [sic] the exclusive ownership and control over biological resources and 
biological products and processes that have been used over centuries in non-industrialized [sic] cultures”. 45 
 
political  actors,  it  is  mostly  evident  among  government  officials  eager  to  attract 
technologically sophisticated FDI.  
 
In the middle of these two standpoints, can be identified the IP-indifferent constituents, which 
mainly  reflect  the  domestic  actors’  preference  who  essentially  do  not  care  about  IPR 
protection for its own sake, but rather view policy reform as necessary, either because of 
considering the costs of non-compliance, or perceiving compliance as appropriate. This can be 
seen  mostly  among  government  officials  who  view  that  policy  reform  should  be  taken 
because,  as  a  signatory  of  the  international  agreement,  a  country  should  respect  that 
agreement; or, simply in order to avoid trade sanctions.  
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  following  domestic  politics  of  compliance  analysis,  the  bigger  the 
number of pro-IP constituents in domestic actors the bigger the chance for IP policy change to 
take place. In addition, a larger number of IP-indifferent constituents among domestic actors, 
would also provide a more favourable circumstance for IP policy reform to occur.  
 
Table 1.3 Domestic Actors’ Preference Categories in IP Policy Reform 
General Domestic 
Actors’ Preferences 
of Compliance 
Domestic Actors’ 
Preferences over 
IP Policy Reform 
Motives/Objectives 
Committed  Pro-IP   •  Encourage domestic invention and innovation 
•  Gain foreign investment and technology 
•  Protect their rights (including authors and 
musicians) 
•  Protect their IP-related business 
Mobilised
20  IP-indifferent  •  Respect international trade agreements 
•  Concern over reputation 
•  Avoid trade sanctions 
Vested  IP-sceptics   •  Fear misappropriation of traditional 
knowledge and bio-piracy 
•  Fear negative implications for access to 
affordable medicine 
•  Protect their business (producers of counterfeit 
products and/or local industry with no capacity 
to invest in research and development 
activities) 
                                                 
20 See previous section for the explanation of the difference in the term of ‘mobilised’ in domestic politics of 
compliance in general and that of ‘IP-indifferent’ in domestic politics of developing countries’ compliance with 
the TRIPs Agreement. 46 
 
 
Testing the role of external pressures (both in the forms of great power coercion and collective 
enforcement), and domestic actors’ preferences regarding IPR protection, is therefore the main 
purpose of this thesis. This is done in order to elucidate why and how IP policy change occurs 
in developing countries, despite their strong opposition during its negotiations and inherent 
conflicting norms embodied in the agreement.  
 
1.6  Research Methods  
 
This  thesis  is  designed  as  a  case  studies-analysis.  As  explained  earlier,  the  case  studies 
analysed in this thesis intend to answer the question of why and how domestic  IP policy 
change takes place, by assessing the role of external pressures, and analysing the preferences 
of domestic actors and the interaction among them on IP policy reform. This thesis starts with 
a  set  of  expectations  derived  from  competing  theories  regarding  developing  countries’ 
response  to  their  TRIPs  obligations.  Through  the  examination  of  case  studies,  this  thesis, 
therefore,  examines  those  expectations  provided  by  previous  research  and  the  competing 
theories (De Vaus, 2001, p.221).  
 
As  stated  earlier,  this  thesis  focuses  on  developing  country  members’  legislation  across 
patents,  copyrights,  and  trademarks,  with  detailed  case  studies  of  changes  to  intellectual 
property  legislation  in  India  and  Indonesia.  The  two  countries  are  selected  because  they 
represent unlikely cases in the change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation which, 
according to Keohane (1992, p.176), embodies an ‘inconvenient obligation’. India is selected 
because it is well-known as one of the developing countries that were strongly against the 
inclusion of the TRIPs Agreement during the Uruguay Round. However, when the agreement 
came  into  force,  by  the  end  of  its  transition  period,  India  had  already  fulfilled  its  TRIPs 
obligations, and even adopted copyright and trademark laws with more rigorous rules than 
those required by TRIPs. Indonesia was also considered an unlikely case, since IPR protection 
was essentially unknown in its legal traditions prior to TRIPs and it even contradicted its 
domestic norms. Yet, after the TRIPs negotiations were concluded, Indonesia was among the 
WTO developing countries that fulfilled its TRIPs obligation by reforming its IP legislation 
earlier  than  required,  and  adopted  more  rigorous  rules  than  those  outlined  by  TRIPs, 47 
 
particularly  for  its  trademark  and  patent  legislation  (see  Chapter  3  for  a  more  detailed 
discussion on the case studies selection and justification).  
 
In addition, despite their similarities, Indonesia and India are also selected because the two 
have different features concerning their domestic politics, particularly the role of domestic 
actors in IP policy issues. In this regard, India is selected as a representative of a developing 
country with the strong involvement of domestic societal actors, while Indonesia is selected as 
a  representative  of  a  developing  country  with  a  limited  involvement  of  domestic  societal 
actors. The variance in political process as to whether a bottom-up (as in the case of India) or a 
top-down (as in the case of Indonesia) process is important for the analysis to locate the main 
domestic actors in IP policy process. In a more ‘top-down’ political process, it is crucial to 
analyse  different  domestic  political  actors  (government  officials  or  different  government 
institutions). In a more ‘bottom-up’ political process, in addition to domestic political actors, it 
is also important to pay attention to the various domestic societal actors’ preference in policy 
making process. In doing so, it is expected to elucidate the unexplained variance in developing 
countries’ response to their TRIPs obligations. As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, the 
policy change in developing countries with the strong involvement of domestic societal actors, 
as reflected from the case study of India, is a result of the interaction of divergent domestic 
societal actors, and represents the interest of the strongest actors among domestic societal 
actors. On the other hand, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the policy change in developing 
countries with a limited level of domestic societal actors’ involvement in IP policy making, as 
in the case of Indonesia, can be explained as a result of the calculation (or pragmatism) of the 
dominant government institutions in order to respond to external pressures. 
 
In analysing the case studies, this research relies on documentary evidence, which are gathered 
from the publicly available official documents from case study countries, the WTO (and also 
its predecessor the GATT) Secretariat, the WIPO Secretariat, the US government, and other 
international  organisations.  The  documentary  evidence  is  crucial  to  assess  the  state  of 
compliance in terms of both the timing of the adoption of IP legislation and the quality of IP 
legislation adopted. The initial findings based on documentary evidence therefore are used as 
the  basis  for  deeper  analysis  through  interviews.  The  official  documents  from  case  study 
governments include the texts of main IP laws, IP statistics, and other official documents that 
are gathered from offices dealing with the administration of patent, copyright, and trademark 48 
 
protection.  The  official  documents  from  the  WTO  and  the  GATT  Secretariat  include 
participants’ position papers and proposals during the TRIPs negotiations, the TRIPs Council 
Annual Reports, the WTO developing country members’ official notification to the TRIPs 
Council, the WTO DSB reports, and other relevant documents. In addition, this thesis also 
uses the WIPO countries’ notification reports, particularly to  gather information regarding 
developing countries legislation, which is unavailable from the TRIPs Council’s documents. 
The  official  documents  from  the  US  government  include  the  USTR  Special  301  Annual 
Reports and the USTR National Trade Estimate Annual Reports. The publication from the US 
government is particularly important for identifying the degree of external pressures received 
by developing countries. This thesis also uses publications and reports from other international 
organisations, including the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD),  the  United  Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and the World Bank. 
The  policy  papers  from  international  non-governmental  organisations  and  independent 
research institutes dealing with developing countries and IPR protection, are also widely used 
in this study, and, where relevant, trade associations’ publications. It should be noted that for 
the  Indonesian  case  study,  official  documents,  the  texts  of  main  IP  laws,  and  any  other 
published materials in the Indonesian language are also extensively used in this study.  
 
The initial findings on the state of compliance based on documentary evidence are further 
analysed through interviews especially to understand why and how the case study countries 
comply with the TRIPs Agreement. For this purpose, elite interview is employed as a research 
tool to gain information, because this research aims to understand the policy process with key 
policy makers and experts on related issues. Here, following Morris (2009, p.209), elites are 
defined as ‘those with close proximity to power’ or ‘with particular expertise’. These include, 
not  only  policy  makers  from  the  case  study  countries,  but  also  key  figures  of  both 
governmental and non-governmental institutions dealing with the TRIPs issue. As the nature 
of this research is to explore deep information and knowledge (Johnson, 2002, p.106), an in-
depth  interview  technique  is  used,  and  all  the  interviews  were  conducted  by  in-person 
interviews except for one interview which was conducted by telephone.  For this purpose, two 
field trips were undertaken for this research. The first field trip was in Jakarta from August to 
September 2009, and the second field trip was conducted in Geneva during November 2009. 
In all, this research draws on 21 not-for-attribution interviews. In Jakarta, the interviews were 49 
 
conducted  with  government  officials,  a  former  diplomat,  an  NGO  representative,  and 
researchers  from  a  state  research  institute.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  interviews  with 
Indonesian government officials and Indonesian NGO representative were conducted in the 
Indonesian  language.  In  Geneva,  the  interviews  were  conducted  with  representatives  of 
permanent  mission  case  study  governments,  a  counsellor  of  the  US  mission  in  Geneva, 
counsellors of the WTO Intellectual Property Division, a Geneva-based journalist dealing with 
IP issues, a representative of Geneva-based international organisation, and representatives of 
Geneva-based research institutes dealing with developing countries and IPR protection (see 
appendix X for a complete list of the interview).   
 
Nevertheless, due to financial scarcity, I was not able to conduct my field research in India. In 
this regard, it seems that compared to the Indonesian case study, for which I could get quite a 
significant  number  of  interviews,  the  number  of  interviews  for  the  Indian  case  study  is 
incomparable. However, despite facing this problem, during my field research in Geneva, I 
had a chance to have an interview with a former Indian delegate, who was involved in the 
TRIPs negotiation during the Uruguay Round, and also to have an interview with a former 
Indian official who had a significant role during the amendment process of IP legislation in 
India after the birth of the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, even though I could only have a 
limited number of interviews for my India case study, it does not necessarily mean that the 
validity and the substance of the assessment on the Indian case study are then compromised. 
Moreover, the lack of primary data from interviews for the Indian case study is compensated 
by the fact that, compared to the Indonesian case study, other sources from official documents 
for the Indian cases study, including parliamentary debate in two Houses are, more extensively 
accessible.  
 
1.7  Outline of the Thesis 
 
The  structure  of  this  thesis  is  outlined  as  follows.  Chapter  2  provides  a  comprehensive 
explanation of the TRIPs Agreement, in order to establish why policy change in developing 
countries’ domestic IP legislation, as a response to their TRIPs obligations, is puzzling. In this 
regard, the chapter presents the key areas of contention, the negotiation tactics, and how the 
agreement  was  finally  reached.  The  chapter,  in  essence,  argues  that,  by  establishing  the 
minimum standards of terms and scope of protection for a wide range of IPR categories, and 50 
 
obligating the members to enforce these standards in their domestic legislation, the TRIPs 
Agreement poses inconvenient obligation for developing countries, since IPR protection was 
largely absent in most developing countries’ domestic legislation prior to TRIPs. The chapter 
also discusses the development of the TRIPs Agreement since the Uruguay Round to date, in 
order to illustrate further the continuation of developing countries’ dissatisfaction with the 
TRIPs Agreement, even 17 years after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.   
 
Chapter 3 presents the results of a survey on the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement of 
102 WTO developing country members, on the timing and quality of their domestic IP laws 
across patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Based on the analysis of both the timing and the 
quality  of  legislation  adopted,  the  chapter  argues  that  none  of  the  established  IR  theories 
adequately explain the variance in the change in developing countries’ IP legislation. The fact 
that  the  vast  majority  of  developing  countries  took  the  necessary  steps  to  reform  their  IP 
legislation  as  a  response  to  their  TRIPs  obligations,  challenges  the  constructivists’ 
expectations of non-compliance by developing countries. Furthermore, the empirical findings 
also  undermine  both  neo-realists  and  neo-liberal  institutionalists’  accounts  on  the  role  of 
external  pressures,  either  in  the  form  of  great  power  coercion,  or  the  legalisation  of 
international institutions, in explaining IP policy change. Based on the results of the survey, 
India and Indonesia are selected for deeper analysis, since the two represent unlikely cases for 
compliance, but reflect different domestic political circumstances.  
 
The case study of the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement in Indonesia is the main focus 
of  Chapter  4.  The  chapter  argues  that,  contrary  to  both  neo-realists  and  neo-liberal 
institutionalists’ expectations, IP policy change in Indonesia does not always correspond to 
external pressures. This is because IP policy reform took place with both the presence and the 
absence of external pressures. The empirical findings demonstrate that IP policy reform took 
place  in  the  absence  of  substantial  external  pressure,  when  there  was  a  shift  in  the 
government’s  preference  regarding  IPR  protection,  from  sceptical  (particularly  concerning 
patents) prior to and during the TRIPs negotiation, to being more favourable in the TRIPs era. 
The Indonesian case study also demonstrates that, there was no sufficient evidence to support 
the  neo-liberal  institutionalists’  argument  regarding  the  role  of  authoritative  international 
institutions in influencing domestic IP policy change. As will become clearer in the chapter, a 
closer observation on the interaction among domestic actors further reveals that, in a relative 51 
 
absence of domestic societal actors’ involvement in the policy making process, government 
institutions play a critical role in determining the process of IP policy change in Indonesia.  
 
Chapter 5 serves to analyse the domestic IP policy change in India. The chapter argues, as in 
the case of Indonesia, India’s IP policy reform took place both in the presence and the absence 
of external pressures. Moreover, the external pressures explanation is unable to capture the 
difference  in  India’s  response  to  its  TRIPs  obligations  for  different  types  of  IP  category. 
Empirical findings demonstrate that India’s response to its TRIPs obligations varies across 
different types of IPR, and correlates strongly with the relative strength of the pro-IP domestic 
constituents  for  different  IPR  categories.  The  chapter  further  argues  that  the  empirical 
evidences  in  the  Indian  case  study,  to  some  extent,  arguably  supports  the  neo-liberal 
institutionalist account of the role of reputation and retaliation behind domestic policy change. 
This is particularly evident as, after being brought to the WTO dispute, the Indian government 
used  reputational  loss  and  fear  of  retaliation  to  overcome  domestic  opposition  to  policy 
reform.  Nevertheless,  the  case  study  of  India  also  demonstrates  that  analysing  domestic 
politics  of  compliance  is  the  key  to  understanding  how  external  pressures  translate  into 
domestic policy change. 
 
The last chapter concludes the discussion of the previous chapters. In addition to underlining 
the  limitations  of  the  study,  the  chapter  also  highlights  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical 
contributions of this thesis, drawing from the empirical findings in the detailed case studies 
discussed in the last 2 chapters. The chapter argues that, since major IR theories of both neo-
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, which emphasise external pressures, are unable to 
provide  a  satisfactory  explanation  regarding  developing  countries’  responses  to  their 
inconvenient obligations, this thesis confirms the necessity to bring domestic politics back into 
the study of IR. The chapter also suggests that a comprehensive understanding of IP policy 
reform in developing countries cannot be achieved without looking at developing countries’ 
different approaches to different IP categories, which correspond to the existence, or non-
existence, of domestic constituents for various types of IPR protection.  The last part of the 
chapter concludes the overall discussions, by underlying how these main findings contribute to 
our understanding concerning developing countries in the current international trade regime.  52 
 
Chapter 2 
The TRIPs Agreement: An Unlikely Case for Developing Countries’ Compliance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the basic background information on the TRIPs Agreement, in order to 
highlight  why  the  developing  countries’  responses  to  their  obligations  under  the  TRIPs 
Agreement is puzzling. The wide differences between developed and developing countries in 
understanding IPR, and their rival views on how they can be protected under a multilateral 
framework, resulted in a contentious and long negotiation process. Since its conclusion mainly 
owed to the hard bargaining by major developed countries, led by the US, the EU, and Japan, 
arguably  the  legitimacy  has  become  one  of  the  controversial  aspects  of  the  agreement.  
Furthermore,  since  developing  countries  are  obliged  to  adopt  minimum  standards  of  IPR 
protection—a subject which is alien for most of them—in their national legislation, this has 
made TRIPs become an unwelcome agreement for developing countries. 
 
To fulfil its aim, the first section of the chapter explains what IPR is before discussing the 
contending perspectives in understanding IPR, and its implication in the effort to design a 
multilateral framework for IPR protection. Since IPR is understood differently in different 
cultures, there is no common conception in how to protect them. This tension was reflected in 
the  difference  between  developed  and  developing  countries’  positions  during  the  Uruguay 
Round negotiations, which will be the focus of the next section of the chapter. The discussion 
on  the  negotiation  process  pays  particular  attention  to  the  key  area  of  contention,  the 
negotiating tactics, and how the agreement was finally reached. However, before presenting 
the negotiation process, the chapter will briefly highlight international regulations of IPR prior 
to TRIPs. This is important in order to understand how far the new agreement departs from its 
predecessors. Before concluding the discussion, this chapter will provide a brief explanation of 
the development of TRIPs since the Uruguay Round. This section intends to illustrate the 
continuation of developing countries’ dissatisfaction with the TRIPs Agreement, even after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The last part of the chapter concludes the main arguments, 
and provides the basis for the discussion of next chapters. 
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2.2 What are Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)? 
Intellectual property (IP) can be broadly understood as “...creations of the mind, inventions, 
literary  and  artistic  works,  and  symbols,  names,  images,  and  designs  used  in  commerce” 
(WIPO, n. d. (a)). While intellectual property rights (IPR) can be defined as “...the rights 
awarded by society to individuals or organisations principally over creative works, inventions, 
literary and artistic works, and symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce” (UK 
CIPR, 2002, p.12; WTO, n. d. (a)). These rights grant a person or a firm control over the use 
of  the  product—which  encompasses  a  wide  range,  from  ideas  and  images,  sounds  and 
symbols, words and music, text and designs, to formulae and blueprints—as well as enables 
the holders to determine the distribution and price of the product (Capling, 2004, p.180). More 
importantly, by possessing this right, the creator or the owner can exclude others from making 
unauthorised use of their creation for a certain period granted under the law. In this regard, 
since the creator or the owner is granted an exclusive right over the protected products, this in 
turn provides material benefits as the incentive for the right-holders.  
Following this definition, there can be identified several types of IPR, which can be divided 
into two main categories of creations: the first category is industrial property and the second 
category is artistic and literary property (WIPO, n. d. (a); WTO, n. d. (a)) (see table 2.1). 
Industrial  property  has  functional  commercial  innovation  or  values;  this  includes  patents, 
industrial  designs,  trademarks,  geographical  indications,  and  trade  secrets.    While  specific 
types of IP, such as copyrights, is considered as artistic and literary property, since it has 
cultural or aesthetic character. This includes literary and artistic works, such as novels, poems 
and  plays,  films,  musical  works,  drawings,  paintings,  photographs  and  sculptures,  and 
architectural designs. According to WIPO (n. d. (a)), rights related to copyright include those 
of performing artists in their performances, producers of phonograms in their recordings, and 
those  of  broadcasters  in  their  radio  and  television  programmes.  However,  current 
technological developments, with the emergence of some hybrid sui generis systems, have 
made the distinction between industrial property and that of artistic and literary property rather 
unclear. In this regard, hybrid sui generis systems include integrated computer circuits, plant 
breeders’ rights, and data protection (UK CIPR Report, 2002, p.13).  
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Table 2.1 Specific Types of IPR 
Main 
Categories 
Specific Types  Definition 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
Patents  Granted for all types of processes and products, including those 
related  to  the  primary  sector  of  production,  namely  agriculture, 
fishing  or  mining,  etc.  In  order  to  be  patentable,  an  invention 
usually  needs  to  meet  the  requirements  of  novelty  (previously 
unknown  to  the  public),  inventive  step  (or  non-obviousness, 
containing  sufficient  innovativeness  to  merit  protection)  and 
industrial applicability (or usefulness). 
Trademarks  Signs  or  symbols  (including  logos,  names,  and  particular  words 
such as personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and 
combinations of colours as well as any combinations of such signs) 
registered  by  a  manufacturer  or  merchant  to  identify  goods  and 
services. 
Geographical 
Indications 
Indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
member,  or  a  region  or  locality  in  that  territory,  where  a  given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the goods is essentially 
attributable  to  its  geographical  origin.  These  are  signs  or 
expressions used to indicate that a product or service originates in a 
particular country, region or place.  
Industrial 
Designs 
Protects the ornamental or aesthetic aspect (shape, texture, pattern, 
colour rather than the technical features) of an industrial article. 
Trade secret  Confidential  information  of  commercial  value,  including 
confidential business information and know-how, such as lists of 
clients or recipes which can be an enterprise's most valued asset. 
Unlike  patents,  trade  secrets  are  protected  as  long  as  the 
information has commercial value and is kept secret. 
Utility Model  Protection is given to the functional aspect of models and designs, 
generally in the mechanical field. Utility models–which are 
concerned with the way in which a particular configuration of an 
article works—are distinct from industrial designs, which are only 
concerned with the aesthetic character of an article. 
A
r
t
i
s
t
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
L
i
t
e
r
a
r
y
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
  Copyrights  Protection  to  authors  of  original  works  of  authorship,  including 
literary, artistic, and scientific works. 
S
u
i
 
G
e
n
e
r
i
s
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
s
 
The layout (or 
topography) of 
integrated 
circuits 
A specific sui generis form of protection for design of integrated 
computer circuits. Integrated circuit means a product which is 
intended to perform an electronic function. Layout-design 
(topography) means the three-dimensional disposition of an 
integrated circuit or prepared for an integrated circuit intended for 
manufacture.  
Plant Breeders’ 
Rights 
Granted to breeders of new, distinct, uniform and stable plant 
varieties. 
Database 
Protection 
Protection in respect of databases, preventing unauthorised use of 
data compilations, even if non-original. Exclusive rights to extract 
or utilise all or a substantial part of the contents of the protected 
database are granted. 
 55 
 
Sources: The Washington Treaty of 1989; The TRIPs Agreement of 1994; South Center, 1997; 
Matthews,  2002;  the  UK  CIPR  Report,  2002;  UNCTAD,  2002;  Matsushita, 
Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, 2006; WIPO, n. d. (b, g). 
Note: The TRIPs Agreement sets minimum standards on all the categories of IPR, with the 
exception of utility models and breeders' rights (South Center, 1997, p.4). 
 
2.3 International Regulations of IPR Protection prior to WTO 
 
The protection of IPR is not a new issue in the international arena. According to Gutowski 
(1999,  p.713),  IPR  has  been  protected  in  various  international  conventions  since  the  19
th 
century.  Moreover,  trademark  protection  can  be  traced  back  to  ancient  Greece  and  Rome 
(Emmert, 1990, p.1337). Furthermore, as Emmert (1990, p.1337) argues, “[P]atents appeared 
in the fourteenth century in the form of state-guaranteed monopolies called “privileged”; they 
were not granted as a reward for innovation or creativity, however, but rather as a political 
favor [sic] or simply to generate money for the authorities”. In addition, a modern patent, in 
the form of a ten-year monopoly, was first introduced in Venice in 1474 to creators who 
registered their novel and workable ideas (Emmert, 1990, p.1337).  
 
Some of the first key international agreements for the protection of IPR were the 1883 Paris 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Industrial  Property  and  the  1886  Berne  Convention  for 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. As there is no requirement of a minimum standard 
of protection, the coverage of these agreements has been quite uneven (Capling, 2004, p.182). 
These  two  conventions  also  suffered  from  the  lack  of  effective  enforcement  and  sanction 
provisions (Groombridge, 1999, p.997), as well as dispute settlement mechanisms (Gervais, 
2003, p.10). Furthermore, the absence of detailed rules on the enforcement of rights before 
national judicial administrative authorities has resulted in each member country being free to 
determine its own level of protection and its own enforcement mechanisms (Capling, 2004, 
p.182).
21  
  
The  increasing  importance  of  intellectual  property  in  international  trade  (Gutowski,  1999, 
p.714), and the greater recognition of the contribution of technology to competitiveness (South 
Center, 1997, p.10), began to push IPR protection up the international trade agenda during the 
1970s. US firms were at the forefront of these efforts, and, with the support of business groups 
                                                 
21 A comparison between the TRIPs Agreement and its predecessors is summarised in table 2.3. 56 
 
in  the  EU  and  Japan,  managed  to  persuade  their  respective  governments  that  intellectual 
property should be an important issue to address in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (Sell, 2000b, p.176).
22  
 
2.4 TRIPs and Developing Countries: An Unwelcome Agreement 
 
As a result of the advocacy of the global business collaboration led by US-based firms, the 
launching of the new multilateral trade round in September 1986, saw IPR protection emerge, 
not only as one of the most important, but also one of the most controversial trade issues. 
During the negotiation process, there were two opposing blocs within the TRIPs negotiating 
group.
23 Such divisions largely reflected the gap between developed countries, which are the 
net exporters or the net producers of IP, and developing countries, which are the net importers 
or the net consumers of IP (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p.284; Wade, 2003, p.624).  The 
negotiations on trade-related aspects of IPR during the Uruguay Round therefore can be seen 
“...as a battle between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, the ‘industrial countries’ versus 
the “Third World”, the ‘North’ versus the ‘South’” (Capling, 2004, p.185). In order to argue 
that the agreement can be considered as an unwelcome international agreement, especially for 
developing countries, this section discusses the contentious process of the TRIPs negotiations, 
and  shows  that,  only  through  hard  bargaining  by  developed  countries,  was  the  agreement 
finally achieved. 
 
2.4.1 Sharp Divisions: The Pro- Vs the Anti-TRIPs  
 
The two opposing blocs within the TRIPs negotiating group can be identified as the pro-TRIPs 
and  the  anti-TRIPs.  The  pro-TRIPs
24  was  led  by  the  US  supported  by  its  industrialised 
counterparts, particularly, the EU and Japan. The pro-TRIPs Agreement was “...pushing for a 
new and comprehensive agreement on intellectual property” (Capling, 2004, p.184), which 
would cover a broader aspect of IPR, accompanied by a strong dispute settlement system, and 
                                                 
22 For further discussion related to the significant role of the US business community and its global corporate 
networking behind the inclusion of IPR protection on the agenda of multilateral trade negotiations during the 
Uruguay Round, see Sell (1999, 2000a, 2000b) and Matthews (2002). 
23 The issue related to IPR protection was discussed in the Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods. This was one of the 14 negotiating groups 
established during the Uruguay Round. 
24 Watal (2001) uses the term demandeurs to refer to developed countries led by the US, the EU, and Japan 
during the TRIPs negotiations.    57 
 
harmonisation of domestic laws (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p.283). The opposite position 
was the G10
25 developing countries, led by India and Brazil. The G10 developing countries 
refused to negotiate any broader discussion of the IPR issue. They insisted on negotiating just 
a limited scope of IPR, namely, only in the context of the prohibition of trade in counterfeit 
goods (Capling, 2004, p.184; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, p.283). The argument from each 
bloc is discussed in more details in the following sections. 
 
2.4.1.1 The Pro-TRIPs: Major Developed Countries’ Demand  
 
As can be seen from the US’s initial suggestions for negotiation on TRIPs, the main reason 
behind developed countries’ efforts to include IPR protection during the Uruguay Round was 
the belief that the protection of IPR promotes innovation and intellectual creativity, and thus 
encourages investment in commercialisation of new ideas and technology (US, 1987a, p.1). In 
this  view,  the  adequate  protection  of  intellectual  property  would  contribute  to  economic 
growth and development, through, for example, the increased transfers of technology and of 
direct international investment (EU, 1988, p.2). In other words, strong IPR protection and its 
enforcement are essential to the expansion of international trade, investment, and distribution 
of technology, as well as economic development.  
 
The Pro-TRIPs developed countries further argued that inadequate and ineffective protection 
and  enforcement  of  IPR  would  result  in  trade  distortions,  since  failure  to  provide  IPR 
protection is assumed to deter the inventors and authors to enter the unprotected markets for 
their products (US, 1987a, p.1). The immediate effect is therefore to eliminate or diminish 
trade in potential markets, while in the long term it will discourage the investment on research 
and development. In other words, the absence of adequate protection of basic IPR would not 
only result in the reduction of voluntary international transfers of technology and capital, but it 
would also become disincentive for investment in research and development (EU, 1988, p.2). 
 
                                                 
25 The Group of Ten developing countries consist of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia (Matthews, 2002, p.24). In later development, there are several additional 
developing countries which clearly expressed their similar position to this group. However, this thesis is going to 
use the widely-used term of ‘the G10 Developing Countries’ in referring to developing countries led by India and 
Brazil (Matthews, 2002, p.24; Capling, 2004, p.184) during the TRIPs negotiations regardless of its expansion in 
terms of the number involved. 58 
 
Another  concern  raised  by  developed  countries  was  that  the  existing  conventions  were 
insufficient to prevent counterfeiting and piracy, since they were not equipped with effective 
dispute settlement provisions (US, 1987a, p.3). The inadequate dispute settlement provision is 
also worsened by the absence of adequate and effective protection for IPR under national 
laws. In this regard, from developed countries’ points of view, without international standards 
for national enforcement, global IPR protection would be meaningless (Watal, 2001, p.333). 
 
With  these  backgrounds,  there  were  several  objectives  that  were  proposed  by  developed 
countries to be considered further during the negotiation. The negotiation should be focused 
firstly on creating an effective economic deterrent to international trade in goods and services, 
which  infringe  intellectual  property  rights  through  the  implementation  of  border  measures 
(US,  1987b,  p.3).  Developed  countries  also  stressed  the  importance  of  having  adequate 
standards and norms in IPR protection that should be applied indiscriminately in all members’ 
national legislations. Furthermore, the agreed standards should also be accompanied by the 
effective  enforcement.  Developed  countries  also  argued  that,  in  order  to  have  effective 
enforcement, the monitoring and surveillance should be extended into a multilateral level, and 
equipped with strong dispute settlement procedures (US, 1987b, p.3). Nevertheless, it is also 
acknowledged that the necessity to ensure that any efforts to protect intellectual property or 
enforce IPR should not create any barriers to legitimate trade. In addition, the EU and Japan, 
in particular, also proposed the application of the general principles and mechanisms of the 
general agreement that ensure liberalisation of trade, including national treatment and Most-
Favoured Nations (MFN) on IPR protection (EU, 1987, p.1; Japan, 1987, p.2).   
 
In  addition to the US, the EU, and Japan’s drafts, other developed countries, such as the 
Nordic countries, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand, also filed suggestions and drafts 
of  the  agreement  during  the  negotiation.  Most  of  their  suggestions  resembled  the  US’s 
position.  However,  these  developed  countries  also  recognise  the  necessity  to  incorporate 
special and differential treatment for developing and the least developed countries, in the form 
of  a  transitional  arrangement,  to  carry  out  domestic  change  as  required  by  the  agreement 
(Australia,  et  al.,  1990,  p.1).  Similarly,  as  can  be  seen  from  Switzerland’s  draft  of  the 
agreement,  in  order  to  achieve  successfully  strengthened  protection  and  enforcement  of 
intellectual property rights, it is necessary to provide appropriate transitional arrangements for 
developing  countries  and  the  least  developed  countries  (Switzerland,  1990,  p.3).  In  this 59 
 
context, a number of developed participants including Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, 
and  the  Nordic  countries,  proposed  several  forms  of  transitional  arrangements,  which,  in 
principle, take the different stages of the members’ economic development into account, thus 
providing  flexibility  to  implement  the  agreement  according  to  the  members’  own 
circumstances  and  needs  (Australia,  et  al.,  1990,  pp.2–4).    As  can  be  seen  from  later 
development, the suggestions regarding a transitional period for developing countries were 
also accommodated in the final text of the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
2.4.1.2 The Anti-TRIPs: The G10 Developing Countries’ Resistance 
 
The US and other major industrialised countries’ proposal received strong resistance from 
developing countries. Developing countries also questioned the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT)  as  the  venue  for  IPR  protection  negotiations,  not  only  because  the 
protection  of  IPR  has  no  direct  or  significant  relationship  to  international  trade,  but  also 
considering  the  existence  of  a  more  competent  and  appropriate  international  organisation 
under the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which would be more suitable for 
dealing  with  this  issue  (Matthews,  2002,  p.31).  As  a  response  to  major  industrialised 
countries’  proposals,  developing  countries,  led  mainly  by  India  and  Brazil,  submitted 
alternative  points  of  view  in  understanding  IPR  protection.  In  essence,  it  includes  the 
limitation  of  the  scope  of  negotiation  agendas,  the  consideration  of  developing  countries’ 
development objectives, and the fear of the detrimental effect of excessive IPR protection. 
 
Developing countries, India in particular, insisted that the scope of the negotiation agendas 
should be limited to the restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of IPR. From 
the developing countries’ points of view, these practices obviously can be considered to be 
trade-related, and they, therefore, can distort or impede international trade (India, 1989, p.2). 
Whereas other aspects, such as the scope and the duration of IPR protection, which are not 
specifically related to the trade issue but more to development policy in general, should be left 
for  every  country  to  define  according  to  their  own  socio-economic,  developmental, 
technological, and public interest needs and priorities. In this regard, it is clear that developing 
countries were only willing to negotiate a very limited aspect of IPR protection.  
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Even though most developing countries acknowledged the importance of the protection of IPR 
for promoting innovation and creativity, they also stressed the necessity to take into account 
the  development,  technological,  and  public  interest  objectives  of  developing  countries 
(Argentina, et al., 1990, p.6). Given the enormous economic and technological gap between 
the  industrialised  and  developing  countries,  developing  countries,  therefore,  rejected  the 
uniform standard for IPR protection. Considering their level of economic development, for 
most developing countries, patents are closely linked to critical developmental priorities, such 
as  “...food  production,  poverty  alleviation,  nutrition,  health  care,  and  disease  prevention” 
(Watal, 2001, p.29), while these may not be the priorities for developed countries. As can be 
seen from the preamble of the proposal from some developing countries, such as, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, 
developing countries also recognised “...the special needs of the least developed countries in 
respect of maximum flexibility in the application of the Agreement in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base” (Argentina, et al., 1990, p.2).  Hence, contrary to 
the suggestion from developed countries regarding the importance of integrating the GATT 
principles, developing  countries argued that neither national treatment  nor MFN treatment 
could apply in IPR protection, since they were necessarily linked to trade in (material) goods 
(Gervais, 2003, p.15).  
 
Another important concern raised by developing countries was the fear that excessive IPR 
protection may lead to rigid monopoly situations, as well as to the abusive or anti-competitive 
use of IPR. In this context, instead of promoting growth and development, on the contrary, a 
rigid and excessive protection of IPR may create a disadvantageous situation for developing 
countries, and restrict the participation of developing countries in international trade (Brazil, 
1988, p.3). A very strict protection of IPR would lead to a monopoly of technical knowledge, 
and would result in the restriction of developing countries to freely acquire and adapt foreign 
technology, or to import new processes and products from alternative foreign sources (Brazil, 
1988, p.3). This reflects developing countries’ fear that “...the adoption of stronger IPR would 
be detrimental to their welfare and development prospects” (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, 
p.279).  The  flexibility  of  an  IPR  protection  system  is  therefore  essential  to  developing 
countries,  since  greater  access  to  technological  innovation  is  also  significant  to  their 
development needs. Furthermore, to prevent a rigid monopoly situation resulting from the 
excessive protection of IPR, developing countries argued that the agreement should not only 61 
 
set principal rights, but also establish some provisions related to the obligations of the IPR 
owners. This includes the provision that obliges the patent owners to refrain from engaging in 
abusive or anticompetitive practices, which may adversely affect the transfer of technology 
(Argentina, et al., 1990, p.11). 
 
2.4.2 How the Agreement was Finally Reached: Hard Bargaining for Developing 
Countries 
 
Despite  their  strong  objections,  nevertheless,  developing  countries  eventually  accepted  the 
TRIPs Agreement, which is mainly mirrored the developed countries’ positions. The existing 
literature mainly identifies three main reasons for this outcome: the introduction of a single 
undertaking principle, the exploitation of issue linkage, and the persistence of US unilateral 
pressure.  
 
Developing  countries’  bitter  acceptance  is  first  closely  related  to  the  new  mechanism 
introduced  during  the  Uruguay  Round,  the  so-called  single  undertaking  principle.  Unlike 
under the GATT system, where the contracting party may choose and adopt an agreement that 
was suitable for them, under the newly introduced principle, all the individual agreements 
were treated as ‘integral parts’ and ‘binding on all members’ (Steinberg, 2002, p.360).  For 
this reason, all countries were obliged to adopt all agreements which were embodied in the 
Uruguay Final Act
26 as a package deal without any exception (Cattaneo, 2000, p.627; Hindley, 
2006, p.40; VanGrasstek and Sauve, 2006, p.851). Furthermore, to join the WTO, the US and 
EU withdrew from the GATT 1947
27 and terminated their GATT 1947 obligations to any 
country that did not accept the Uruguay Round Agreement, including TRIPs (Steinberg, 2002, 
p.360). As a consequence, this has made it hard for developing countries to resist, since, if 
they did not accept the Final Act and join the WTO, they would lose the access they had had 
to the US and EU markets under GATT.   
 
Another reason is the significant role of the issue linkage as part of the negotiation deals 
(Matthews, 2002, p.45). In this regard, developing countries were willing to accept developed 
                                                 
26 The Uruguay Final Act consists of six main parts: the Agreement Establishing the WTO; the GATT 1994 
(which is legally different from the GATT 1947, see explanation in the following footnote); the GATS; the 
TRIPs Agreement; Dispute Settlement; Trade Policy Reviews (WTO, 2008, pp.23–24).  
27 It should be noted that the GATT 1947 is legally different from the GATT 1994, since the establishment of the 
WTO has replaced the GATT as an international organisation. As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
GATT serves as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods (WTO, 2008, p.19). 62 
 
countries’ intellectual property agenda in exchange for concessions on other trade objectives, 
such as market access to developed countries for significant exports, particularly agriculture 
and textiles (Gutowski, 1999, p.756; Cattaneo, 2000, p.627; Sell, 2000, p.176; Arup, 2004, 
p.7; Capling; 2004, p.188; Richards, 2004, pp.133–38).
28 Prior to the Uruguay Round, even 
though agriculture was covered under GATT, the US and the EU managed to secure their 
protectionist policy from GATT disciplines.  Both the US and the EU heavily subsidised and 
protected  their  agricultural  sector  through  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports,  which  have 
made their agricultural products so competitive in the international arena (Jawara and Kwa; 
2003, pp.26–27). This then resulted in a detrimental effect for developing countries, as, not 
only were they unable to compete with cheap imported agricultural products from the US and 
the EU in their own domestic market, but they were also unable to get access to enter the 
highly protected US and EU markets. In this context, by accepting the TRIPs Agreement, 
developing  countries  were  hoping  to  get  the  benefits  from  agricultural  liberalisation  and 
subsidy reduction in major developed countries under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). 
While regarding textiles, developing countries would expect to gain the benefit of access to 
US and EU markets under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) (Jawara and Kwa, 
2003, p.45). 
 
The adoption of the TRIPs Agreement is also because of developing countries’ fear of the 
threat of unilateral sanctions, mainly from the US regarding the lack of IPR protection. Some 
developing countries, mostly newly industrialising countries, such as Mexico, South Korea, 
and Singapore, began to alter their original position due to unilateral pressure from the US 
(Drahos, 2002, pp.775–76; Capling, 2004, p.186). During the Uruguay Round, these countries 
suffered from US sanctions through the suspension of their benefits under the Generalised 
System  of  Preferences  (GSP)  because  of  their  inadequate  IPR  protection.  Drahos  and 
Braithwaite (2002, p.88) further report that Mexico in 1987 was subject to a US$50 million 
loss of its GSP benefits, while in 1989, Thailand had to lose US$165 million, and India in 
1992 came in for GSP losses of US$80 million. Within this context, the use of US unilateral 
pressure is seen as an effective means of dividing developing countries’ positions during the 
negotiations (Watal, 2001, p.44). Given this fact, Maskus (2000a, p.4) and Hindley (2006, p. 
39)  argue  that  unilateral  pressure  from  the  US  certainly  played  a  critical  role  in  getting 
developing countries to agree with the TRIPs Agreement. 
                                                 
28 Author’s interview with a counsellor of the WTO IP Division (Geneva, 17 November 2009). 63 
 
 
In addition to those main reasons, developing countries’ acceptance of the TRIPs Agreement 
is also because there was the acknowledgement of developing country concerns with respect 
to TRIPs. These include a longer transition period and other flexibility arrangements, which 
can be utilised by developing countries to fulfil their obligations under the TRIPs Agreement 
(see  section  2.4.3.2  for  further  discussion  of  flexibilities  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement). 
Moreover,  developed  countries’  governments  undertook  to  provide  financial  and  technical 
assistance to support the legislative and administrative reforms associated with implementing 
the TRIPs Agreement, a commitment incorporated in Article 67 of the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
To conclude, the inclusion of the TRIPs Agreement displays the power disparity between 
developed  countries  as  the  major  holders  of  IPR  and  developing  countries  as  its  net 
consumers. Developing countries’ governments, however, accepted an unpalatable agreement 
because of the costs associated with rejecting it and in exchange for promised benefits in other 
areas.  They had also managed to negotiate some concessions in order to mitigate the impact 
of complying with the agreement. Considering the coercive nature of its negotiation process, 
and  only  with  a  great  reluctance  from  developing  countries,  can  the  agreement  finally  be 
reached, the agreement, arguably, is considered to have a low degree of legitimacy, and has 
made it become an unwelcome agreement, particularly for developing countries.  
 
2.4.3 The Outcome of the Agreement 
 
The TRIPs Agreement, which is formally known as Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement, 
went  significantly  beyond  existing  IPR  protection  (see  table  2.3).  It  establishes  minimum 
standards of terms and the scope of protection for a wide range of IPR categories. The TRIPs 
Agreement  also  incorporates  all  basic  principles  of  previous  international  IP  agreements, 
including  national  treatment  and  MFN  principles,  as  well  as  extending  coverage  to  more 
countries. Furthermore, the TRIPs Agreement provides international criteria for the national 
enforcement  of  IPR  through  civil,  criminal,  and  administrative  proceedings  in  members’ 
territories. In addition, as with all the agreements under the Uruguay Round Final Act, the 
TRIPs  Agreement  is  also  equipped  with  a  more  effective  and  binding  dispute  settlement 
mechanism to solve disputes among members (Reichman, 1998, p.586; Helfer, 2004, p.2; Das, 
2005, p.37; Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, 2006, pp.704–5). The first part of this 64 
 
section will present the outcome of the agreement in general. The next part will pay attention 
particularly to the flexibilities granted under the agreement. 
 
2.4.3.1 The TRIPs Agreement: Principles and Obligations  
 
As reflected in its preamble, the TRIPs Agreement aims to achieve the following objectives: to 
promote the effective and adequate protection of IPR, which is regarded as private rights; and 
to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade through multilateral arrangements. 
In order to achieve it, the preamble of the TRIPs Agreement also seeks “...to ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade” (the TRIPs Agreement 1994). Furthermore, it is clearly stated that 
the  agreement  also  aims  to  reduce  “...tensions  by  reaching  strengthened  commitments  to 
resolve disputes on trade-related intellectual property issues through multilateral procedures” 
(the TRIPs Agreement 1994). Even though the agreement considers IPR as ‘private rights’, it 
also  recognised  “...the  underlying  public  policy  objectives  of  national  systems  for  the 
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives” (the 
TRIPs Agreement 1994). In this regard, it can be seen that even though the objectives of the 
TRIPs Agreement mainly incorporated developed countries’ positions, it also acknowledged 
developing countries’ points of view on the underlying public policy objectives of the national 
policy of its members.   
 
The TRIPs Agreement also incorporates the GATT principles of non-discrimination/MFN and 
national treatment. The national treatment obligation (Article 3) means that all WTO members 
should  provide  the  same  opportunity  for  protecting  the  IPR  of  people  from  other  WTO 
member countries as they do for their own citizens. The national treatment principle is not new 
to the TRIPs Agreement. It has been the standard of IPR protection since the late 19
th century, 
under the Paris and Berne Conventions. The MFN obligation (Article 4) indicates that the 
members should treat all other WTO members equally. As Gervais (2003, p.104) argues, MFN 
is  to  ensure  uniformity  of  the  multilateral  trade  environment,  “[U]nder  this  system…any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted (usually bilaterally) to nationals of any (not 
just  of  another  WTO  Member)  other  country  must  be  accorded  to  nationals  of  all  WTO 
Members”. As can be seen from the previous section, the inclusion of the GATT principles of 
non-discrimination and national treatment reflected developed countries’ positions rather than 65 
 
those of developing countries, which rejected the incorporation of these principles for IPR 
protection. 
 
The TRIPs Agreement sets the minimum standard of protection for all types of IPR, including 
patents,  copyrights,  trademarks,  undisclosed  information  and  trade  secrets,  geographical 
indications, industrial designs, and integrated circuit layout designs for its members’ national 
legislation. It does not only incorporate a minimum fifty-year term of copyright protection as 
required in the Berne Convention, but also introduces a minimum twenty-year term of patent 
protection, which was not part of the Paris Convention. In addition, it extends the scope of 
copyright protection beyond literary, artistic, and scientific works, to include new areas such 
as software and databases (WIPO, n. d. (b); WTO, n. d. (b); see table 2.3).  However, it is also 
clearly stated on Article 1.1. of the TRIPs Agreement that “[M]embers may, but shall not be 
obliged  to,  implement  in  their  law  more  extensive  protection  than  is  required  by  this 
Agreement,  provided  that  such  protection  does  not  contravene  the  provisions  of  this 
Agreement”  (the  TRIPs  Agreement  1994).  The  same  Article  also  provides  a  room  to 
manoeuvre for the members in implementing the provisions by stating “[M]embers shall be 
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement 
within their own legal system and practice” (the TRIPs Agreement 1994). Nevertheless, by 
codifying and setting minimum standards of IPR protection, the TRIPs Agreement largely 
reflected developed countries’ positions instead of the developing ones. 
 
Another major difference between the multilateral IP agreements prior to the WTO, with the 
one  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  is  related  to  the  enforcement  provisions  under  national 
legislation. While previous laws did not establish adequate and effective standards for IPR 
protection under national laws, the TRIPs Agreement provides international criteria for the 
national  enforcement  of  IPR,  which  should  be  available  in  members’  territories.  The 
agreement requires that national enforcement should be available through civil, criminal, and 
also administrative proceedings, as well as common procedural requirements concerning the 
administration  and  maintenance  of  IPR  being  implemented  in  each  national  government 
(Reichman, 1998, p.586; Das, 2005, p.37; Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis, 2006, 
pp.704–5).  Furthermore,  Vandoren  (1999,  p.27)  argues  that  the  effective  procedures  and 
remedies  for  the  enforcement  of  IPR  can  be  provided,  not  only  through  the  normal  civil 
judicial process, but also through customs action against imports of counterfeit and pirated 66 
 
goods,  as  well  as  through  criminal  procedures  in  respect  of  intentional  counterfeiting  and 
piracy on a commercial scale.  
 
A further important feature of the agreement is related to dispute prevention and settlement 
mechanism. In this regard, any disputes among the members related to the IPR protection will 
be subjected to the integrated dispute settlement system under the WTO (Vandoren, 1999, 
pp.27–28). The dispute settlement under this new mechanism is based on clearly-defined rules 
by a panel of impartial experts, and its decision is automatically adopted, unless there is a 
consensus to reject a ruling (WTO, 2008a, p.56). This implies a more legally binding or rule-
oriented approach, and the effective nature of the dispute settlement mechanism, compared to 
the previous system under GATT, in which any country may block the adoption of a decision. 
Within this context, settling the dispute under a multilateral procedure also essentially entails 
that unilateral action is prohibited, as stated by the UNCTAD “[T]he adoption by another 
Member  of  unilateral  trade  sanctions  would  be  incompatible  with  the  multilateral  rules” 
(UNCTAD,  2002,  p.40).  In  this  regard,  this  mechanism  can  be  beneficial  for  developing 
countries  to  ease  unilateral  pressure  particularly  from  the  US  through  its  Section  301. 
Nevertheless, the WTO Panel Report later in 1999
29 confirmed the compatibility of the US 
unilateral  action  through  Section  301  with  the  WTO,  since  the  Clinton  Administration 
committed  to  base  its  301  action  on  the  WTO  Panel  or  Appellate  Body  findings  (WTO, 
1999b).  This  can  partly  explain  the  persistence  of  US  unilateral  pressure,  even  after  the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Watal, 2001, p.59). 
 
The enforcement mechanism is complemented with a strong monitoring system through the 
establishment  of  a  special  body,  the  Council  for  TRIPs  (commonly  known  as  the  TRIPs 
Council). Each WTO member is represented in this Council, which formally meets in Geneva 
around five times a year, and is obliged to notify and submit their implementing legislation to 
this Council for examination. Article 68 of the TRIPs Agreement states that, “[T]he Council 
for  TRIPs  shall  monitor  the  operation  of  this  Agreement  and,  in  particular,  Member’ 
compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the opportunity of 
consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.” As 
part of its monitoring task, the TRIPs Council plays a role as a forum “...in which any Member 
                                                 
29 This is a report of a panel established based on a complaint initiated by the EU regarding the US Section 301, 
see WTO (1999b).  67 
 
can raise any issue relating to compliance by other parties” (Otten, 1998, p.524). Under this 
system, each member has the obligation to provide notification of implementing legislation at 
the end of its transition period. After the submission, the legislation is examined by other 
members.  During  this  review  process,  other  members  are  entitled  to  assess  whether  the 
legislation has fulfilled the minimum requirements and commitments of the agreement. 
 
However, the TRIPs Council is not only responsible for monitoring member’s compliance 
with agreement’s obligations, but it can also offer consultation for members related to the 
TRIPs Agreement, as well as assisting them in dispute settlement (UNCTAD, 2002, p.40). 
Following  Otten’s  (1998,  pp.525–26)  argument,  such  a  detailed  scrutiny  process  can  be 
beneficial in terms of encouraging members to take great care in drafting legislation, related to 
IPR protection. It also can serve to ease misunderstanding about a country’s legislation, which 
may lead to disputes. In addition, a detailed scrutiny process has a function to identify, not 
only  in  terms  of  deficiencies  in  notified  laws  and  regulations,  but  also  to  identify  the 
differences  in  interpretation.  Lastly,  it  can  also  provide  information  related  to  the 
implementation of the agreement in each WTO member (Otten, 1998, pp.525–26).  
 
In addition, one of the most important outcomes of the negotiations is that, as can be seen 
from  Article  65,  the  agreement  sets  different  deadlines  according  to  the  WTO  members’ 
economic level of development. Developed countries were obliged to implement their TRIPs 
obligations  on  1  January  1996.  Developing  countries  were  given  an  extended  period  to 
implement the agreement. The initial deadline was until 2000 for developing countries and 
countries in transition, and 2006 for least developed countries, but under the Doha Round, 
least developed countries were granted a further transition period until 2013 (see table 2.2). 
Developing countries were also granted an additional transition period until 1 January 2005 to 
introduce  patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical  and  agricultural  chemical  products,  if  the 
protection  of  these  areas  were  not  available  in  their  national  legislation  by  the  time  the 
agreement  was  concluded.  However,  for  those  countries  that  chose  to  delay  the 
implementation until 2005, they were obliged to provide a means to accept patent applications 
for  pharmaceutical  and  agricultural  chemical  products  (TRIPs  Agreement  Article  70  (8)). 
During  this  transition  period,  they  also  had  to  provide  a  mechanism  called  Exclusive 
Marketing  Rights  (EMR)  as  contemporary  protection  for  these  specific  products  (TRIPs 
Agreement Article 70 (9)). 68 
 
Table 2.2 Deadlines for Implementing the TRIPs Agreement 
1996  Deadline for industrialised countries 
2000  Deadline for developing countries and economies in transition 
2005  Additional  deadline  for  developing  country  products  not  previously  patented 
(pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products) 
2006  Original deadline for LDCs (agreed at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations) 
2013  Revised deadline for LDCs to implement the general obligations except for Article 
3  (National  Treatment),  Article  4  (Most  Favoured  Nation),  and  Article  5 
(Multilateral Agreements on Acquisition or Maintenance of Protection) agreed by 
the TRIPs Council on 29 November 2005 
2016  Revised deadline for LDCs’ patent, test data protection, and exclusive rights for 
pharmaceuticals agreed on November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial 
 
Sources: The TRIPs Agreement 1994 and the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public 
Health 2001 (WTO, 2001c). 
Note: States acceding to the WTO after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round are not eligible 
for transition periods and must comply with the TRIPs Agreement by the time they 
accede. 
 
In conclusion, by establishing the minimum standards of terms and the scope of protection for 
a wide range of IPR categories, and obligating the members to enforce these standards in their 
domestic legislation, the TRIPs Agreement can be considered as the most comprehensive and 
enforceable multilateral agreement on IPR protection. Moreover, unlike previous international 
regulations  on  IP,  the  TRIPs  Agreement  is  strengthened  by  a  more  effective  and  binding 
dispute settlement mechanism to solve disputes among members.  The adoption of the TRIPs 
Agreement, therefore, can be seen as a milestone for global IPR protection, and a significant 
departure from the existing international regulations.  
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Table 2.3 Multilateral IP Agreements in Comparison: TRIPs and Its Predecessors 
Aspect  Treaties and Conventions 
under the WIPO 
The TRIPs Agreement 
Type of agreement  Individual convention/treaty for 
a specific type of intellectual 
property. The most important 
conventions are the  Paris 
Convention (1883)
30 and the 
Berne Convention (1886)
31  
A single multilateral agreement 
encompassing all types of 
intellectual property  
Membership coverage  Applied only to the signature of 
the convention/treaty 
Applied to all WTO members 
whether or not they are party to 
previous conventions  
Scope of protection  Protecting ‘moral right’
32 (the 
Berne Convention)  
No obligations with respect of 
the moral rights under the Berne 
Convention 
Covering only the protection of 
literary, scientific and artistic 
domain (the Berne Convention)  
Extending the scope of copyright 
protection to new areas such as 
software and databases. It also 
extends the provisions on rental 
rights
33  
Terms of protection  No minimum term of patent 
protection under the Paris 
Convention 
Minimum 20 year term of patent 
protection  
Provision on 
enforcement 
No effective standards for IPR 
protection under national laws 
Effective standards for IPR 
protection under national laws 
No effective monitoring 
mechanism for the 
implementation 
Effective monitoring mechanism 
for the implementation through 
the establishment of the TRIPs 
Council 
No effective dispute settlement 
provisions 
Effective dispute settlement 
provisions  
 
Sources: WIPO (1994) and the Text of the TRIPS Agreement (Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement) 1994.  
 
                                                 
30 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) (including patents, marks, industrial 
designs, utility models, trade names, geographical indications and the repression of unfair competition, as 
amended in 1979). 
31 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) (as amended in 1979). 
32 Moral right is defined as “…the right to claim authorship of the work,…[and] to object to any distortion or 
modification of the work, or other derogatory action in relation to a work, which would be prejudicial to the 
author's honor [sic] or reputation…” (WIPO, n. d. (b), p.12). 
33 Rental rights give the authors of computer programmes and producers of sound recordings the right to 
organisation or prohibit the commercial rental of their works to the public (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001, 
p.287). 70 
 
2.4.3.2 The TRIPs Agreement: Flexibilities Available 
 
As explained earlier, as part of the negotiations deal, considering the fact that implementing 
the  TRIPs  Agreement  requires  the  necessary  domestic  policy  reform,  which  involved 
administrative costs, especially for developing countries and the least developed countries, as 
demanded by developing countries the agreement provides several flexibilities that can be 
utilised by the WTO members that fall into these categories. According to Musungu and Oh 
(2006, p.8), the substantive flexibilities under the TRIPs Agreement are mostly related to the 
options in the scope of the obligations. These include exempting certain types of patentable 
products, such as plants and animals from patentability; allowing some of uses of copy-righted 
work and patents for government or non-commercial use; granting parallel imports through 
modifying  the  exhaustion  regime  to  suit  their  domestic  policy  objectives;  as  well  as 
authorising compulsory licensing of patented products in the public interests, or to protect 
public health, or the environment (South Center, 1997, pp.25–32; Deere, 2008, pp.68–9, p.75) 
(see table 2.4 for the summary of these flexibilities). The following discussions will explain 
each of these flexibilities and their implications for developing countries in more detail. 
 
The TRIPs Agreement grants flexibilities in the forms of both exceptions and exemptions of 
IPR from protection.
34 For patents, for instance, based on Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement, 
a member may exclude inventions which are necessary to protect public order or morality; 
plants and animals other than micro-organisms; and/or diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals. With regard to the flexibilities for copyright 
protection, based on Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement, “[M]embers shall confine limitations 
or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder”. Therefore, as long as they are fulfilling the criteria prescribed, in essence, members 
can interpret this provision to provide the exceptions to achieve their public policy objectives, 
and  for  non-commercial  purpose,  including  facilitating  dissemination  of  knowledge  and 
promoting education. Within this context, the TRIPs Agreement also permits exemptions for 
the  government’s  use.  Even  though  the  TRIPs  Agreement  does  not  explicitly  specify  the 
government’s  use  of  patents,  the  Article  31  (b)  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  recognises  the 
                                                 
34 According to Musungu and Oh (2006, p.58), the exceptions of IPR (particularly patents) apply where a right 
has been granted, whereas exemptions mean the exclusion from protection when the right has not been granted. 71 
 
concept  of  public,  non-commercial  use  of  patents  used  by  or  for  the  government.  In  this 
regard, governments in developing countries may use patents without granting a compulsory 
license (which will be explained later). According to Musungu and Oh (2006, p.35), the main 
difference between government-use provision and compulsory license is that, in the case of 
government  use,  it  should  be  strictly  to  public,  non-commercial  purposes,  while  for 
compulsory license, it can also be for private and commercial use. In this context, the use of 
patents by a government is subject to less procedural conditions than those under compulsory 
licensing,  including  no  requirement  to  seek  the  initial  consent  from  the  patent  holders 
(Musungu and Oh, 2006, pp.35–36).  
 
Another  form  of  flexibility  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement  is  the  so-called  ‘compulsory 
licensing’, which can be defined as a license authorised by a government to a third party to 
produce a patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner (WTO, n. d. 
(c)). The granting of patent rights enables the patent holders to prevent the use of a patented 
product or process by a third party without their consent. However, with justified reasons to 
protect  public  interest,  a  government  may  grant  a  compulsory  licensing  or  non-voluntary 
license. In this regard, a government may grant a compulsory license when ensuring a broader 
access to patented products or processes to meet public needs is more important than retaining 
patent  holders’  exclusive  rights  (Musungu  and  Oh,  2006,  p.27).  Article  31  of  the  TRIPs 
Agreement defines the conditions to be met in granting such licences, including in the case of 
a national emergency or situation of extreme urgency; for public or non-commercial use of 
patents; limited predominantly for the supply of the domestic market in a country which grants 
such use; as well as providing adequate remuneration for the right holders.  
 
Furthermore, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health in 2001 also 
reaffirmed this flexibility to grant a freedom for a member country to determine the conditions 
in which to adopt compulsory licensing, as stated in Paragraph 5(b), “[E]ach Member has the 
right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
licences are granted” (WTO, 2001c). Furthermore, Paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration on 
the  TRIPs  Agreement  and  Public  Health  also  states,  “[E]ach  Member  has  the  right  to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it 
being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 72 
 
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency” (WTO, 2001c). 
 
The TRIPs Agreement also provides flexibility in the form of so-called ‘parallel importation’, 
which can be defined as “…goods produced genuinely under protection of a trademark, patent, 
or copyright, placed into circulation in one market, and then imported into a second market 
without the authorization [sic] of the local owner of the intellectual property right”(Maskus, 
2001, p.2). Within this context, as the IP holder, a person is granted an exclusive right to 
manufacture the product and place the product in the market. However, due to the principle of 
exhaustion, when the product is placed on the market the IP holder has no further right over 
the product because its exclusivity has been exhausted by the act of selling it (Musungu and 
Oh,  2006,  p.47).  Article  6  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  provides  the  flexibility  to  a  member 
country to choose its own regime of exhaustion, since the decision by the member on this 
issue should not be a subject of dispute settlement. In this regard, the members have three 
options of the exhaustion regimes, international, regional, and national.  The choice of the 
exhaustion  regime  determines  the  use  of  parallel  importation.  Under  a  regime  of  national 
exhaustion,  parallel  import  is  prohibited,  but  under  a  regime  of  international  exhaustion, 
parallel  import  is  legal,  while  under  a  regime  of  regional  exhaustion,  parallel  import  is 
permitted  in  any  other  member  state  of  a  regional  trade  agreement  (Maskus,  2001,  p.2; 
Musungu and Oh, 2006, p.47). Furthermore, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement 
and Public Health reaffirmed the use of this flexibility as stated on Paragraph 5(d), “…each 
Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge…” (WTO, 
2001c). 
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Table 2.4 Flexibilities under the TRIPs Agreement 
Forms  Flexibilities Provided  Legal Justification 
Exceptions and 
exemptions to IPR 
protection 
Granting the exceptions and 
exemptions to IPR protection in order 
to achieve the member’s own public 
policy objectives and for non 
commercial purposes  
Article 13 and 27 of the TRIPs 
Agreement 
Compulsory 
licensing 
A license authorised by a government 
to a third party to produce a patented 
product or process without the 
consent of the patent owner 
Article 31 of the TRIPs 
Agreement; the Doha 
Declaration Paragraph 5(b) and 
5(c) 
Government use of 
patent 
Recognising the concept of public, 
non-commercial use of patent used 
by or for the government, to achieve 
public policy objectives 
Article 31 (b) of the TRIPs 
Agreement 
Parallel 
importation 
Granting the importation of goods 
produced genuinely under protection 
of a trademark, patent, or copyright, 
placed into circulation in one market 
into a second market without the 
authorisation of the local owner of 
the IPR 
Article 6 of the TRIPs 
Agreement; the Doha 
Declaration Paragraph 5(d) 
 
Note: Author’s assessment on Text of the TRIPS Agreement (Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement)  and  the  Declaration  on  the  TRIPs  Agreement  and  Public  Health  2001 
(WTO, 2001c). 
 
In  conclusion,  the  birth  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  has  marked  an  ambitious  international 
agreement, which aims to set a common floor for IPR protection in all WTO members, as 
promoted mainly by major developed countries. The TRIPs Agreement, which was agreed 
after  intense  negotiations  and  uneasy  compromise  between  developed  and  developing 
countries, reflects an unwelcome agreement for most developing countries. The availability of 
flexibilities integrated in the agreement can be seen as developing countries’ successful efforts 
to negotiate a degree of policy autonomy for its implementation (Musungu and Oh, 2006, 
p.8).
35 In this regard, the use of flexibilities granted under the agreement is one of the crucial 
indicators  to  assess  the  quality  of  legislation  adopted  by  developing  countries,  whether  it 
meets the minimum or goes beyond the TRIPs requirements. Considering that implementing 
the TRIPs Agreement exhibits heavy burdens for most developing countries, the fact that not 
many developing countries took full advantage of the use of these flexibilities in their national 
legislation thus demands further explanation.   
                                                 
35 Author’s interview with a counsellor of the WTO IP Division (Geneva, 19 November 2009) 74 
 
2.5 The TRIPs Agreement since the Uruguay Round: Dissatisfaction Continues  
 
Given the history of its birth, it is hardly surprising if the TRIPs Agreement is still one of the 
most contentious agendas in every WTO ministerial meeting after the Uruguay Round. The 
main  source  of  this  ongoing  dispute  is  developing  countries’  dissatisfaction  with  several 
aspects  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  implementation,  especially  during  their  transition  period. 
These  include  developed  countries’  reluctances  to  carry  out  their  commitments  to  reduce 
subsidies and lower the protection for both textiles and agricultural sectors, as part of the 
concessions  for  the  adoption  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  and  the  effect  of  strong  patent 
protection for the availability of affordable pharmaceutical products. The lack of consensus on 
TRIPs-related issues is also one of the reasons behind the failure of the Seattle Ministerial 
meeting in 1999. In addition, in recent years, TRIPs-related issues have also developed to 
include the discussion on expanding the scope of protection for geographical indications, the 
relationship  between  TRIPs  and  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity 
(CBD), as well as the need to protect indigenous or traditional knowledge. 
 
During  the  transition  period,  developing  countries’  dissatisfactions  regarding  TRIPs  were 
mostly  related  to  developed  countries’  difficulties  to  meet  their  commitments  to  reduce 
subsidy and lower the level of protection for both textiles and agricultural sectors (Jawara and 
Kwa, 2003, p.45). For instance, as can be found from the textiles sector, where, instead of 
facilitating to provide greater access for developing countries, the ATC allowed developed 
countries to hold on to most of their quantitative restrictions on textiles until 2005 (Jawara and 
Kwa, 2003, p.45).
36 Similarly, it took several years for the issue related to the agricultural 
sectors to be solved when, in 2005 at the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting, members finally 
agreed to end export subsidies in agriculture by 2013 (WTO, 2005c, p.2). Within this context, 
during its transition period, developing countries’ frustrations were mostly caused by the fact 
that, while they had to take the necessary steps to comply with the TRIPs Agreement, they still 
could not gain much from the concession as part of the Uruguay Round package deal.  
 
In addition to arguably unfulfilled commitments as part of the Uruguay Round concession, 
another  major  concern  of  most  developing  countries  in  the  post-Uruguay  Round  era, 
                                                 
36 The ATC has already expired on 1 January 2005, and since then, trade in textiles and clothing products is 
integrated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which covers international trade in goods in 
the post-Uruguay Round era (see WTO, n. d. (f)). 75 
 
especially during the transition period, is related to the devastating effect of the strong patent 
protection on the availability of affordable pharmaceutical products. Some studies indicate that 
strong  patent  protection  has  resulted  in  the  increased  price  of  medicines  and  diminishing 
public access to essential medicines in most developing countries (Matthews, 2002, p.113; 
Mayne, 2004, p.146; Sun, 2004, p.123). One widely cited example related to this issue is the 
cost of patented drugs in Africa, which has been a significant obstacle to the availability of 
AIDS treatment, which resulted in millions of people having died due to lack of access to 
affordable treatment (Sun, 2004, p.124). This situation then triggered wider public attentions, 
not only from governments in developing countries, but also NGOs from developed countries, 
to amend the TRIPs Agreement in order to address this concern (Das, 2005, p.41).  
 
Owing to wider public support, the WTO ministerial meeting in Doha in 2001 launched ‘the 
Declaration  on  the  TRIPs  Agreement  and  Public  Health’  (WTO,  2001c).
37  As  explained 
earlier, based on this declaration, least-developed countries were granted longer a transition 
period to implement provisions on pharmaceutical patents until 1 January 2016. In addition, 
developing countries that do not have sufficient manufacturing capacities are also allowed to 
use compulsory licensing for their domestic needs. This illustrates the explicit guaranty for the 
use  of  flexibilities  by  members  in  dealing  with  health  problems  (Sun,  2004,  p.123). 
Nevertheless, despite the progress made by the adoption of the Doha Declaration, there was 
also concern related to a permanent solution for providing access to vital medicines once the 
transition  period  is  over  (Gervais,  2003,  pp.49–50).  This  implies  that  even  the  Doha 
Declaration had still not fully rectified the essential problems of the implication of the TRIPs 
Agreement borne by developing countries. These unresolved issues were eventually settled 
during the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, when members agreed to allow developing 
countries greater access to needed categories of vital medicines, and to import generic drugs 
when they faced public health threats (WTO, 2003b; Das, 2005, p.47). 
 
The most recent disputes between developed and developing countries regarding TRIPs and 
health issues emerged when, in early December 2008, the Dutch customs authorities seized an 
Indian generic drugs shipment destined for Brazil while in transit in the Netherlands, for an 
alleged  violation  of  IPR  (Lynn,  2009).  During  2009,  several  other  Indian  generic  drugs 
                                                 
37 In addition to this declaration, among other things, the Doha ministerial meeting also agreed to establish the 
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (WGTTT) to facilitate the work on technology transfer 
from developed countries to developing ones (WTO, 2001b). 76 
 
shipments which were meant for Latin American countries were seized at various European 
ports, including Germany and France, for similar reasons (New, 2009; Unnikrishnan, 2009). 
The EU defended the seizures as part of the anti-counterfeiting policy under the EU laws, 
stating that they were in line with international trade rules (Mara and New, 2009).  While the 
Indian  and  Brazilian  governments  supported  by  NGOs—dealing  with  public  health 
advocacy—argued that the seizures were not only violations of the TRIPs Agreement, since 
generic  drugs  are  legitimate  under  the  agreement,  but  have  also  put  poor  patients  in 
developing countries at risk (ICTSD, 2009; Mara and New, 2009). As briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 1, in May 2010, the Brazilian and the Indian governments requested a consultation 
with the EU through the WTO DSB regarding the seizure of generic drugs in transit involving 
some EU member countries. At the time of writing, these two cases are still in progress. A 
series  of  these  events  exhibit  the  continuation  of  heated  debate  between  developed  and 
developing countries on the TRIPs Agreement, even after more than a decade since it became 
effectively in force in January 1995.  
 
Another debatable aspect on TRIPs-related issue since the Uruguay Round is regarding the 
extension of the scope of geographical indications to products other than originally prescribed 
under Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement, which grants a higher level of protection only for 
wines and spirits. As part of the mandate of the 2001 Doha Declaration, members decided to 
further  negotiate  a  mechanism  for  a  multilateral  register  for  wines  and  spirits,  as  well  as 
extending the higher level of protection beyond wines and spirits. The first draft on the first 
issue related to registration for wines and spirits was just recently achieved, on 13 January 
2011.  Nevertheless,  by  the  time  of  writing,  the  negotiations  on  the  issue  regarding  the 
extension of geographical indications are still ongoing, with no sign of consensus (WTO, n. d. 
(d)).
38  
 
In addition to those issues, recent negotiations on TRIPs-related issues include the relationship 
between  the  TRIPs  Agreement  and  the  United  Nations CBD,  the  protection  of  traditional 
knowledge  and  folklore,  as  part  of  the  mandate  of  the  2001  Doha  Declaration.  The  main 
                                                 
38 Members that advocate the extension of geographical indications protection include Bulgaria, the EU, Guinea, 
India, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia and Turkey (WTO, n. d. (d)). On the other hand, countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, New Zealand, Panama, 
Paraguay, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei, and the United States are against the proposal on the ground that the 
existing protection under the TRIPs Agreement is already sufficient (WTO, n. d. (d); WTO, 2005b, p.3). 77 
 
reason behind this issue, as argued by the proponent members from developing countries, is 
particularly because there is a growing concern regarding the detrimental effect of bio-piracy 
for  their  economic,  social,  and  cultural  interests.
39  The  focus  of  the  negotiations  is  on  a 
disclosure mechanism for patent applications on the commercial use of traditional knowledge 
and genetic materials (WTO, n. d. (e)). As can be found in the issue on the extension of 
geographical  indications  protection,  by  the  time  of  writing,  the  debate  on  the  relationship 
between TRIPs and CBD, traditional knowledge and folklore, is still in progress.
40  
 
Previous discussions indicated that after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the TRIPs 
Agreement can still be considered as one of the most contentious agendas in trade negotiations 
under WTO. The negotiations on the TRIPs-related issues since the Uruguay Round exhibit, 
not only the continuation of developing countries’ dissatisfactions with the agreement, but also 
indicate  developing  countries’  efforts  to  incorporate  their  specific  interests  in  order  to 
rebalance the TRIPs Agreement (Abbot, 2000, p.167; Cattaneo, 2000, p.627; Helfer, 2004, 
p.6).  Within  this  context,  recent  negotiations  on  TRIPs-related  issues  also  show  that 
developing  countries  are  more  aware  of  the  development  implications  of  the  TRIPs 
Agreement.
41  In  short,  continuing  tensions  concerning  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  therefore, 
display the puzzling nature of developing countries’ compliance with the agreement.  
 
                                                 
39 Countries that propose the inclusion of effective provisions to protect the traditional knowledge and folklore 
include Albania, Brazil, China, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, the EU, Georgia, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Liechtenstein, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group and the African Group 
(Albania, et al., 2008). Other members which also express their support for the proposal include Croatia, Georgia, 
and Moldova (Albania, et al., 2008). For the debate concerning the protection of traditional knowledge, see also 
Bolivia, et al., 2005. 
40 One of the difficulties in reaching a consensus on this issue is also because the US is not a party to the CBD. It 
also should be noted that, even though the CBD finally reached an agreement on Access and Benefit Sharing 
(ABS) on 30 October 2010, which is also one of the issues raised in the recent TRIPs-related issue negotiations, 
there is still no significant progress on the discussion concerning the relationship between TRIPs and CBD. For a 
detailed discussion on the relationship between the TRIPs Agreement and CBD see the final report of Centre for 
European Agricultural Studies (CEAS, 2000). See also ICTSD (2010) for the discussion related to the consensus 
on ABS under the CBD. For the discussion concerning traditional knowledge and IPR protection in general, see 
WIPO (n. d. (e)).  
41 Author’s interview with a representative from one of the leading Geneva-based research institutes dealing with 
IPR protection and developing countries (Geneva, 18 November 2009)  78 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The TRIPs Agreement’s substance and the process by which it was concluded make it an 
unlikely  case  for  developing  countries’  compliance.  Only  after  a  long  and  contentious 
negotiation  process,  which  was  characterised  by  a  mixture  of  a  newly  introduced  single 
undertaking principle, issue linkage, and the use of trade coercion, the agreement was finally 
concluded. The outcome, which involves both the approximation of national rules and the 
strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, does not only depart far beyond its predecessors, 
but it also largely reflected developed countries’ positions.  Due to its lack of legitimacy, and 
one-size-fits-all feature, as well as its unbalanced nature for the burden borne by developing 
countries and its uncertain long gains, it is hardly surprising if TRIPs, therefore, became the 
unwelcome agreement for most developing countries.  
 
Considering the history of its birth, a significant aspect to discuss further is to understand how 
developing countries would respond to their heavy obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. 
Intriguingly, however, as the next chapter demonstrates, despite their moral and economic 
objections,  and  the  foreseen  short  term  negative  implications  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement, 
including  the  high  cost  of  adjusting  their  domestic  laws,  most  developing  countries  have 
altered their domestic laws in response to the TRIPS Agreement. This is the puzzle that the 
rest of this thesis seeks to explain. 79 
 
Chapter 3 
The Change in Developing Countries’ Domestic IP Legislation: Results of the 
Survey and Contextualising Case Studies 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As explained in previous chapters, the underlying puzzle of this thesis is why, despite their 
rigorous  resistance  to  the  adoption  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  have  almost  all  developing 
countries, taken steps to reform their domestic IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs 
obligations.  Many  have  done  so  before  they  were  required  to,  and  many  adopted  more 
rigorous IP rules than outlined by TRIPs. This chapter presents the empirical evidence of the 
results of a survey on the change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation, to support 
the underlying puzzle, as well as the basis for the case studies selection.  
 
The  chapter  begins  by  explaining  how  to  measure  policy  change,  which  will  be 
operationalised by using two indicators of compliance, the timing of the adoption of the IP 
legislation  and  the  quality  of  the  legislation  adopted.  It  then  discusses  the  importance  of 
external  pressure,  which  is  crucial  to  both  the  neo-realist  and  neo-liberal  institutionalist’s 
accounts. To test the neo-realist account, the section pays particular attention to the role of US 
pressure as a proxy for the independent variable of great power coercion. It also then discusses 
the  role  of  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Mechanism  (DSM)  as  the  main  element  of  the 
enforcement under WTO, since it is essential for neo-liberal institutionalism. The last part of 
the chapter introduces the case studies selected (Indonesia and India) for further analysis. 
 
3.2 Measuring Policy Change: the Timing and Quality of Legislation 
 
Policy change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation will be assessed based on the 
timing and the quality of the legislation adopted. It should be noted that, as WTO has no 
formal definition of developing countries,
42 this thesis relies on the World Bank’s categories 
of  developing  countries,  upper  middle  income,  lower  middle  income,  and  low  income 
economies. Most of the World Bank’s low income economies are recognised as the WTO 
                                                 
42 Under the WTO practice, each member decides whether it wishes to be considered a developing country, even 
though other members can challenge that decision. Nevertheless, the WTO recognises the United Nations’ Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) List. As of 17 February 2011, there are 31 WTO LDC Members (WTO, n. d. (i)). 
See Appendix II for a complete list of WTO LDC Members. 80 
 
Least-Developed  Country  (LDC)  members  (see  the  note  of  Appendix  I  for  details  on  the 
exceptions). Based on the World Bank’s categories (World Bank, n. d.), therefore, this thesis 
seeks to survey the policy change of 102 WTO developing country members (as of January 
2011) as a basis for the case studies selection.  
 
3.2.1 The Timing of the Adoption of Major IP legislation 
 
Since  different  members  of  WTO  have  different  deadlines  according  to  their  respective 
economic level of development, the timing of the adoption of major IP law in developing 
countries is relative to the deadline for compliance for each country (see table 2.2 in Chapter 
2). To measure the timing of policy change, the timing of the adoption of the IPR legislation is 
based on the first legislation adopted by developing countries immediately prior to or after the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, as reported in official notifications to the TRIPs Council 
and  the  WIPO’s  country  profiles.  Additional  information  related  to  developing  countries’ 
adoption of legislation was also gathered from the USTR Special 301 Annual Reports from 
2001 to 2010. This thesis focuses on the timing of the adoption of legislation concerning three 
major types of IPR, patents, copyrights, and trademarks, which are of particular concern to the 
US.
43 As evident from the USTR Special 301 Report, it is clear that the US complaint on the 
implementation  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  in  developing  countries  is  mostly  related  to  the 
inadequate protection and ineffective enforcement of these three IPR categories.  
  
As summarised in table 3.1, based on the timing of the adoption of these three types of IPR, 
the  policy  change  in  developing  countries’  IP  legislation  can  be  categorised  into  five 
categories, early, on time, late, not yet and other: 
 
                                                 
43 In this exercise, I established a database on 102 WTO developing country members’ legislation concerning 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks to identify the first legislation adopted and the latest amendment as of 15 
January 2011. For a summary of the database on the timing of major IP legislation adoption in WTO developing 
country members from 1995 to 2010, see Appendix III. A complete database can be provided upon request. 81 
 
Table 3.1 The Timing of Policy Adoption Categories 
Categories  Measurement 
Early  IP  legislation  adopted  prior  to  the  deadline.  It  was  counted  starting 
from the year 1993 when the Uruguay Round was nearly concluded, 
assuming those countries that adopted their IP legislation during this 
period were fully aware of the content of what would be agreed under 
the TRIPs Agreement. 
On Time  IP  legislation  adopted  in  the  year  immediately  prior  to  or  of  the 
deadline. 
Late  IP legislation adopted after the deadline. A country on this category can 
be considered as ‘late-compliance’. This category does not apply to the 
WTO LDC members because at the time of writing, they are still in the 
transition period. 
Not Yet  IP legislation has not been adopted as required by the TRIPs at the time 
of writing. A country on this category can also be considered as ‘non-
compliance’. This category does not apply to the WTO LDC members 
because at the time of writing, they are still in the transition period. 
Other  IP legislation has not been adopted because at the time of writing a 
country is still in the transition period. This category only applies to the 
WTO LDC members.  
 
The point of departure with respect to the empirical evidence is to observe that, out of 102 
developing countries, the vast majority had adopted IP legislation by the end of their transition 
period.
44  As can be seen from figure 3.1, at least 41 out of 102 developing countries, or more 
than  40  percent  of  developing  countries,  adopted  IP  legislation  prior  to  the  deadline.  The 
evidence is even more striking for patents where 64 out of 102 developing countries, or more 
than 63 percent of developing countries, adopted their patent legislation earlier than they had 
to do so. 
 
                                                 
44 It should be noted however, after the adoption of the first IP legislation, most developing countries also still 
undertook a series of legislative reforms related to IP protection (for a more detailed information see Appendix 
III). The fact that, even after a decade of the end of their transition period, most developing countries still reform 
their IP legislation indicates that IP protection can still be considered as one of the most significant issues under 
the current international trade regime. 82 
 
Figure 3.1 The Timing of the Adoption of the First IP Legislation in the WTO 
Developing Country Members 
 
 
 
A  closer  observation  for  each  of  the  three  types  of  IPR  in  different  developing  country 
categories also confirmed the general findings. As can be seen from figure 3.2, more than 58 
percent  of  developing  countries  in  each  developing  country  category  had  already  adopted 
patent legislation prior to the deadline. More specifically, 21 out of 32 upper middle income 
economies (66 percent), 25 out of 39 lower middle income economies (64 percent), and 18 out 
of 31 low income economies (58 percent) adopted patent legislation earlier than they had to do 
so.  
 
Figure 3.2 The Timing of the Adoption of the First Patent Legislation based on 
Developing Country Categories 
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For copyright legislation, as can be seen from figure 3.3, at least 36 percent of developing 
countries in each developing country category adopted legislation prior to the deadline. In this 
regard, 17 out of 32 upper middle income economies (53 percent), 14 out of 39 lower middle 
income economies (36 percent), and 18 out of 31 low income economies (58 percent) enacted 
copyright legislation far before the end of their transition period. 
 
Figure 3.3 The Timing of the Adoption of the First Copyright Legislation based on 
Developing Country Categories 
 
 
 
In the case of trademarks, even though it is not as striking as the other two IP categories, the 
figure is still high, especially for low income economies, where 18 out of 31 countries, or 
more than 58 percent, had reformed their trademark legislation prior to the deadline. While, 
for the upper middle income economy category, 11 out of 32 (34 percent) and for the lower 
middle income economy category, 12 out of 39 (31 percent) had reformed their trademark 
legislation before the end of their transition period. 
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Figure 3.4 The Timing of the Adoption of the First Trademark Legislation based on 
Developing Country Categories 
  
 
 
The fact that most developing countries had already taken the necessary steps to reform their 
IP  legislation  prior  to  the  deadline  indicates  the  flaws  in  the  constructivist’s  explanation. 
Constructivists expected policy reform to be unlikely to take place, since international norms 
outlined under TRIPs contradicted the existing norms in most of the developing countries’ 
domestic norms. Both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism arguably would provide a 
better explanation by arguing that IP policy change in most developing countries could take 
place  due  to  external  pressures.  Nevertheless,  neo-liberal  institutionalism  also  expects 
developing countries to comply at the deadline, since there is no pressure to go either beyond 
the  obligations  or  make  the  reforms  earlier  than  the  deadline.  Later  discussions  on  the 
following sections, specifically on the role of external pressure, also demonstrate further flaws 
in both the neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists’ expectations. 
 85 
 
3.2.2 The Quality of the Legislation Adopted 
 
The adoption of legislation is an imperfect measure of policy change as it does not capture the 
quality of the law adopted, nor does it address issues of implementation and enforcement 
(Winanti and Young, 2009, p.64). Nevertheless, the adoption of legislation is a necessary (if 
not  sufficient)  step  to  assess  policy  change  as  a  response  to  developing  countries’  TRIPs 
obligations.    In  this  regard,  therefore,  it  is  important  to  observe  the  quality  of  legislation 
adopted, to measure whether they meet the minimum TRIPs requirements or not.  
 
The quality of the legislation is assessed with regard to whether the law adopted goes beyond 
the  standard  required  by  TRIPs.  For  this  purpose,  the  chapter  uses  Deere’s  (2008) 
classifications of a country’s IP legislation (see table 3.2).  This classification is based on a 
survey  of  the  extent  to  which  developing  countries took  advantage  of  TRIPs  options  and 
safeguards as reflected in their legislation (Deere, 2008, p.74). It pays particular attention to 
some of the most contentious flexibilities in the area of patent, copyright, and plant variety 
protection. It also covers the use of specific TRIPs flexibilities, including the choice of an 
exhaustion  regime  for  industrial  property;  the  use  of  exclusions  and  exceptions  of  patent 
rights; the use of compulsory licenses; the availability of data protection for new chemical 
entities; the scope, coverage, and protection term of plant variety protection; as well as the 
length of the copyright terms of protection (Deere, 2008, pp.74–98).
45  
 
Table 3.2 Classifications of the Quality of Developing Countries’ IP Legislation 
Classifications  Overall IPR protection 
TRIPs-Plus  Early implementation, standards go beyond minimum, adopt laws that 
supplement TRIPs standards, efforts to enforce IP standards that go 
beyond TRIPs. 
TRIPs-minimum  Comply by deadline, meet minimum standards, have effective 
enforcement. 
TRIPs-minus  Delayed implementation, lower that TRIPs standards, and weak 
enforcement. 
 
Source: Deere (2006; 2008, pp.68–69, p.75) 
 
                                                 
45 See also Chapter 2 particularly section 2.4.3.2 for further discussion of flexibilities under the TRIPs 
Agreement. 86 
 
By observing the quality of legislation, it can be identified that many developing countries 
have adopted more stringent IPR protection than required by TRIPs, or not made use of the 
flexibility arrangements available to them (see table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3 Variation in IP Standards of World Bank Country Classification 
  Upper middle 
income 
Lower middle 
income 
Low income 
TRIPs-Plus  Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican 
Republic, Gabon, 
Mexico, Peru 
Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Congo Rep, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jordan, 
Mongolia, Morocco, 
Senegal, Tonga  
Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, 
Togo  
TRIPs-
Minimum 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, Malaysia, 
South Africa, 
Venezuela 
Bolivia, China, 
Ecuador, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Thailand  
Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia  
TRIPs-Minus  Grenada, Namibia, 
Suriname  
Angola, Djibouti, 
Lesotho, Maldives, 
Papua New Guinea 
Burundi, Gambia, Haiti, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Zimbabwe  
 
Source: Adapted from Deere (2008, p.98). Some countries have been excluded because they 
are not WTO members (Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, and Sudan) or do not fall into 
the World Bank’s developing country criteria (Bahrain, Oman, South Korea, and 
Singapore). 
Note: Countries in bold are WTO LDC members that do not fall into the World Bank’s low 
income economy categories. Countries in italic are countries under the World Bank’s 
low income economy categories but are not recognised as WTO LDC members, and 
therefore should meet the deadline as developing countries in general. 
 
Figure 3.5 indicates that 28 out of 69 developing countries assessed, or more than 40 percent 
of them, adopted more rigorous rules than outlined by TRIPs. While 23 out of 69 (33 percent) 
of developing countries assessed meet the minimum TRIPs requirement and only 18 out of 69 
(26 percent) of developing countries adopted IP rules below the TRIPs requirement. 
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Figure 3.5 Variation in IP Standards of World Bank Country Classification 
 
 
 
The fact that many developing countries adopted more rigorous rules than required by TRIPs 
presents  a  particular  problem  for  neo-liberal  institutionalism.  Both  the  monitoring  and 
enforcement mechanisms of the TRIPs Agreement by the WTO, while providing incentives 
for meeting the obligations, provide no incentive to go beyond the minimum.  Neo-realism, 
however, arguably could explain better the anomalies associated with the adoption of national 
IP  legislation  beyond  the  TRIPs  obligations.    As  the  US  tends to  demand  IPR  protection 
beyond what is required by TRIPs, US pressure might be able to explain why developing 
countries have not taken advantage of flexibility mechanisms.  Moreover, neo-realism, given 
its emphasis on relative power, would expect the weakest (least developed countries) to be the 
most susceptible to US pressure. However, empirical evidence, as will be discussed in the next 
section  on  the  role  of  great  power  coercion,  undermines  neo-realists’  expectations  on  the 
correlation of US pressure and the quality of legislation. 
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3.3 External Pressures: Great Power Coercion and the Legalisation of 
International Institutions 
 
The empirical evidence, as explained previously, has confirmed the underlying puzzle of this 
thesis that why, despite their strong resistance during the negotiation process, most developing 
countries complied with the TRIPs Agreement and adopted more stringent IPR protection than 
required  by  TRIPs.  The  leading  IR  theories  derived  from  neo-realism  suggests  that  great 
power  coercion  is  the  main  reason  behind  such  an  anomaly.  In  this  regard,  this  thesis, 
therefore, uses pressure by the US as a proxy for the independent variable of great power 
coercion. In addition to the role of great power coercion, this research will also pay attention 
to the use of the WTO dispute settlement, since neo-liberal institutionalism offers that the 
legalisation of the international agreement under WTO plays a significant role in ensuring 
developing countries’ responses to meet their TRIPs obligations.  
 
3.3.1 Policy Change and US Pressure 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the existing literature, it is widely acknowledged that the US 
trade laws are well-equipped to exercise pressure on foreign trade partners, in order to protect 
IPR  (McIlroy,  1998;  Simons,  1999;  Drahos  and  Braithwaite,  2002).  As  briefly  explained 
earlier, one of the most obvious tools of US pressure is the USTR Special 301, which is 
designed to enhance the US’s ability to negotiate improvements in foreign IP regimes. This is 
done by identifying those countries that deny ‘adequate and effective protection’ of IPR, or 
that refute ‘fair and equitable market access’ to US IP holders (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002, 
p.89). As a result of the assessment on its IP acts, policies, and practices, a foreign country can 
be placed under the Watch List (WL), the Priority Watch List (PWL), the Priority Foreign 
Country  (PFC)  category,  or  another  category,  such  as  Section  306  (see  table  3.3).  In  this 
regard, in this thesis, in order to measure the degree of US pressure, a country is categorised 
according to how often it is placed on a certain category on the USTR Special 301 Report 
during and after the transition period.  89 
 
Table 3.4 The USTR Special 301 Report Categories 
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Categories  Explanations 
Watch List 
(WL) 
Countries  that  merit  bilateral  attention  to  address 
underlying IPR problems.  
Priority Watch 
List (PWL) 
Countries  that  do  not  provide  adequate  level  of  IPR 
protection  or  enforcement  or  market  access  for  persons 
relying on IPR protection.  
Priority Foreign 
Country (PFC) 
Countries whose acts, policies, or practices are ‘the most 
onerous or egregious’ and have the greatest adverse impact 
on relevant US products, and that have not entered into or 
made  significant  progress  in  negotiations  to  provide 
adequate and effective IPR protection. These countries are 
subject  to  accelerated  investigations  and  possible 
sanctions. 
Section 306  Countries are subject to immediate trade sanctions if there 
is slippage in the enforcement of bilateral IP agreement. 
 
Source: The USTR Special 301 Report. See also Grier (2005) for the explanation regarding 
the investigation procedures and action taken by the US government under the Special 
301. 
 
This  thesis  focuses  on  US  pressure  both  during  transition  and  after  the  transition  period. 
Unfortunately,  it  is  difficult  to  get  systematic  information  on  US  pressure  regarding  IPR 
protection prior to 2000.  Therefore, this thesis also surveyed the USTR’s National Trade 
Estimate Reports for 1996–1999 for all developing countries, searching for mentions of IPR 
violations and the USTR Special 301 reports, which assess countries’ IP policies and practices 
for 2001–2010, for mentions of IP concerns prior to 2000.  Additional information came from 
Deere (2008).  It is worth noting that the US demands a higher standard of IPR protection than 
that agreed in the TRIPs Agreement.   
 
As is evident from figures 3.6; 3.7; 3.8 and table 3.5, the pattern of variation in terms of the 
timing of the adoption of IP legislation and the quality of developing countries’ compliance, 
does not, as neo-realism would expect, map neatly with US pressure. In terms of the timing of 
the  adoption  of  IP  legislation,  most  countries  that  adopted  the  IP  legislation  prior  to  the 
deadline have done so even without US pressure. Meanwhile, despite being clearly subject to 90 
 
substantial pressure from the US,
46 most countries adopted legislation reflecting minimum 
compliance with TRIPs, according to Deere’s (2008) classification.  
 
3.3.1.1 The Timing of IP Legislation Adoption and US Pressure  
 
As can be observed from figure 3.6, 43 out of 64 developing countries that adopted patent 
legislation prior to the deadline were not subject to US pressure. In other words, 67 percent of 
developing countries that reformed their patent legislation earlier than they had to were not on 
the USTR Special 301 Report during the transition period from 1995 to 2005. On the other 
hand, only one developing country (Paraguay) that reformed its patent legislation prior to the 
deadline  was  placed  with  PFC/S306  status  on  the  USTR  Special  301  Report  during  the 
transition period from 1995 to 2005. While other countries, China and Ukraine, that were 
placed  with  PFC/S306  status  on  the  USTR  Special  301  Report  during  the  same  period, 
adopted their patent legislation at the deadline. It should be noted, however, that since both 
China and Ukraine became WTO members after the Uruguay Round, complying with the 
TRIPs  Agreement  was  part  of  the  conditions  for  these  two  countries  to  become  WTO 
members, so they were not eligible to have a transition period.  
 
Figure 3.6 Early Patent Legislation Adoption and the USTR Special 301 Report 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 In this survey, substantial pressure means being on the USTR Special 301 Report with PWL status for more 
than a single year and or listed as a PFC or subject to Section 306. 91 
 
Similarly,  as  figure  3.7  illustrates,  28  out  of  49 (57  percent)  of  developing  countries  that 
adopted copyright legislation prior to the deadline were not on the USTR Special 301 Report 
during the transition period from 1995 to 2000. As can also be seen in the case of patent 
legislation, only Paraguay, that adopted its copyright legislation prior to the deadline, was 
placed with PFC/S306 status on the USTR Special 301 Report during the transition period 
from 1995 to 2000. Other countries (China and Ukraine) that were placed with PFC/S306 
status during the same period adopted copyright legislation at the deadline. 
 
Figure 3.7 Early Copyright Legislation Adoption and the USTR Special 301 Report 
 
 
 
Correspondingly,  quite  a  significant  number  of  developing  countries,  25  out  of  41  (61 
percent), that adopted trademark legislation prior to the deadline, were also not on the USTR 
Special 301 Report during the transition period from 1995 to 2000 (see figure 3.8). As can be 
seen from the other two IP categories, only one developing country (Paraguay) that adopted 
trademark legislation prior to the deadline was placed with PFC/S306 status on the USTR 
Special 301 Report during the transition period.  Other developing countries (China, Ecuador, 
and Ukraine) that were placed with PFC/S306 status on the USTR Special 301 Report during 
1995 to 2000, adopted their trademark legislation at the deadline. As with China and Ukraine, 
Ecuador also became the member of WTO after the Uruguay Round.  
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Figure 3.8 Early Trademark Legislation Adoption and the USTR Special 301 Report 
 
 
 
A  closer  observation  reveals  that  most  countries  that  adopted  IP  legislation  prior  to  the 
deadline, that were not on the USTR list, belong to the low income economies category.
47  As 
can be seen from the following figures 3.9; 3.10; 3.11, 18 out of 31 low income economies or 
more than 58 percent of them adopted all legislation for all IPR categories earlier than they 
had to do, even though they were not on the USTR Special 301 Report.   
 
Figure 3.9 Developing Countries’ Compliance and the USTR Special 301 Report based 
on the Timing of Patent Legislation Adoption 
 
 
                                                 
47 For further analysis on the anomaly regarding low income economies’ responses to their TRIPs Agreement 
especially in Francophone African countries, see Deere (2008). 93 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Developing Countries’ Compliance and the USTR Special 301 Report based 
on the Timing of Copyright Legislation Adoption 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Developing Countries’ Compliance and the USTR Special 301 Report based 
on the Timing of Trademark Legislation Adoption 
 
 
 
The empirical findings as presented earlier demonstrated that most developing countries that 
adopted IP legislation prior to the deadline were not on the USTR Special 301 Report during 
the  transition  period,  1995  to  2000.  On  the  other  hand,  only  a  very  limited  number  of 
developing countries that adopted IP legislation earlier than they had to were subject to US 
pressure. Considering this fact, it can be argued, therefore, that neo-realists’ expectations on 94 
 
the  correlation  between  great  power  coercion  and  policy  adoption  are  unmet,  since  US 
pressure would not seem to be sufficient to cause policy change, and at the same time US 
pressure also does not appear to be necessary for policy change to take place either.   
 
3.3.1.2 The Quality of IP Legislation Adopted and US Pressure 
 
A  closer  observation  on  the  pattern  of  variation  in  the  quality  of  IP  legislation  adopted 
demonstrates  that  the  quality  of  IP  legislation  adopted  also  does  not  correspond  to  US 
pressure, as neo-realism would expect.  Most countries that can be identified as being clearly 
subject  to  substantial  pressure  from  the  US,  adopted  legislation  reflecting  the  minimum 
requirement of the TRIPs obligations, according to Deere’s (2008) classification (see table 
3.5).  Only  Chile,  the  Dominican  Republic,  Guatemala,  and  Peru,  that  received  such  a 
substantial  pressure,  adopted  TRIPs-Plus  protection.  Conversely,  at  least  24  developing 
countries  that  were  not  subject  to  significant  US  pressure  adopted  TRIPs-Plus  protection, 
according to Deere’s (2008) classification. This finding highlights the fact that US pressure 
does not appear to be necessary for developing countries to adopt more rigorous IP legislation.  
 
Table 3.5 Variation in IP Standards of World Bank Country Classification and US 
Pressure 
 
  Substantial Pressure  No Substantial Pressure 
TRIPs-
Plus 
Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Peru  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad,  Colombia, 
Congo Rep, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tonga  
TRIPs 
Minimum 
Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Ecuador, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, 
Thailand,  Venezuela 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cuba, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia 
TRIPs 
Minus 
N/A  Angola, Burundi,  Djibouti, Gambia, Grenada, 
Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Papua New 
Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands,  Suriname, Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Adapted from Deere (2008, p.98). There are some countries (Turkey, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, and Ukraine) that were subject to substantial pressure from the US but do 
not appear in Deere’s classification.  95 
 
Note: Underlined countries (upper middle income economies), countries in italic (lower 
middle income economies) and countries in bold (low income economies).  
 
Based on both the timing of the  IP legislation adoption and the quality  of the legislation 
adopted, it can be concluded therefore that US pressure would not seem to be sufficient to 
cause  policy  change.  Furthermore,  previous  discussion  also  demonstrated  that,  for  policy 
reform to take place, it appears that US pressure is unnecessary. If US pressure is neither 
necessary nor sufficient as the cause of policy change in developing countries’ IP legislation, 
it can be argued that neo-realists’ expectations are confounded. 
 
3.3.2 The Legalisation of International Institutions: The TRIPs Agreement and 
the WTO DSM  
 
In addition to US pressure, this thesis also considers WTO complaints, in order to get at the 
neo-liberal institutionalist’s explanations of change in developing countries’ IP legislation as a 
response to their TRIPs obligations.  This is important because such complaints may lead to 
binding third-party adjudication and ultimately to the imposition of sanctions in the event of 
non-compliance.  WTO  complaints,  thus,  represent  the  high-watermark  of  institutionalised 
enforcement  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement.  Strikingly,  as  briefly  stated  in  Chapter  1,  only  six 
developing countries—Argentina (twice), Brazil, India (two complaints regarding the same 
issue),  Pakistan,  Indonesia  (not  specifically  on  TRIPs  but  in  combination  with  the  Trade-
related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement), and China (twice for different aspects and 
one not specifically on TRIPs but in combination with the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS Agreement))—have been respondents in a TRIPs complaint as of the end of 
2010 (for a summary of the WTO TRIPs disputes involving developing country members as 
respondents between 1995 and 2010, see Appendix IV). Moreover, there has not been  an 
increase in the use of WTO DSM since the end of the transition period, as predicted by Otten 
(1998, p.527), with only two such complaints (both against China) having been filed since 
2000.    Why  so  few  complaints  have  been  brought,  given  that  there  has  been  some  non-
compliance or at least imperfect compliance, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
48 
Nevertheless, as can be observed from the following discussions, a state being specifically 
targeted in an adverse ruling, does seem to have an impact on the quality of IPR protection. 
 
                                                 
48 For a few possible explanations behind the limited use of the WTO disputes in TRIPs-related issues especially 
against developing countries, see Pauwelyn (2010).   96 
 
After being brought for the second time to the WTO dispute in 1999 and 2000, due to the US’s 
complaint related to Argentina’s failure to provide a system of Exclusive Marketing Rights 
(EMR) for pharmaceutical products, and patent protection for pharmaceuticals, and test data 
protection for agricultural chemicals, Argentina started to issue pharmaceutical patents for the 
first time in 2000 (USTR, 2001a). Furthermore, Argentina also amended its patent law to 
provide protection for products obtained from process patents in December 2003, to fulfil its 
obligation under the 2002 of the US–Argentina Agreement as part of the mutually agreed 
solution to solve the Argentina–US dispute (USTR, 2004).  
 
A similar example can be observed in the Brazil–US dispute. In 2000, the US initiated a WTO 
dispute on Brazil’s patent law, which requires all patent owners to manufacture their patented 
products in Brazil, or else be subject to the compulsory licensing of their patent. In June 2001, 
the United States and Brazil reached an agreement to transfer the dispute to a newly formed 
US–Brazil  Bilateral  Consultative  Mechanism.  As  a  response  to  its  obligation  under  this 
bilateral consultative mechanism, in December 2002, the Brazilian Congress passed a law in 
an  effort  to  comply  with  data  exclusivity  obligations  (USTR,  2003).  Furthermore,  in  July 
2003,  the  Brazilian  government  also  amended  the  criminal  code  in  order  to  increase  the 
minimum  penalty  for  copyright  violations  from  one  to  two  years’  imprisonment  (USTR, 
2004).  
 
Another  case  in  the  TRIPs  dispute  involving  developing  countries  is  the  dispute  between 
Pakistan and the US. As a response to its obligations under a mutually agreed solution to solve 
the  dispute  with  the  US,  the  government  of  Pakistan  issued  an  ordinance  in  1997.  This 
ordinance  intended  to  establish  a  system  for  the  filling  of  patent  applications  for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products as demanded by the US (WTO, 1997a).  
 
Somewhat different from previous cases, the disputes between India with both the US (in 
1996)  and  the  EU  (in  1997),  concerning  the  alleged  absence  of  patent  protection  for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, could not be solved with a mutually agreed 
solution during the consultation stage. The DSB ruling in the two cases found that India had 
failed to meet its obligations under the TRIPs Agreement, and requested India to bring its 
transitional regime for patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. As a response to the DSB 97 
 
ruling, a patent legislation (the Patent (Amendment) Ordinance of 1999), which was designed 
to meet India’s initial set of TRIPs obligations, was introduced in January 1999, prior to the 
April 1999 deadline established by the DSB ruling.
49 In addition, India's decision in August 
1998 to join the Paris Convention and the PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty), which took effect 
in December 1998, can also be regarded as India’s effort to fulfil its obligations under the 
TRIPs Agreement.
50 
 
Related to the most recent dispute between China and the US in 2007, on certain measures 
pertaining  to  the  protection  and  enforcement  of  IPR,  the  DSB  ruling  found  that  China’s 
copyright law and its customs measures were inconsistent with its obligations under the TRIPs 
Agreement.  Therefore,  the  DSB  ruling  recommended  that  China  put  its  legislation  into 
conformity with its obligations. As a response to this, the Chinese government approved the 
amendments of the Chinese Copyright Law on 26 February 2010, and adopted the decision to 
revise the Regulations for Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights on 17 March 
2010. By adopting these laws, the Chinese government had completed all necessary domestic 
legislative procedures for implementing the DSB recommendations and rulings (WTO, n. d. 
(h)).  
 
Based  on  these  findings,  it  can  be  concluded  that  there  is  evidence  of  institutionalised 
enforcement, which would suggest that neo-liberal institutionalism’s expectations are met. All 
the cases in which a developing country’s IP legislation was challenged before the WTO led to 
the reform of domestic legislation (Winanti and Young, 2009, pp.70–71). It should be noted, 
however,  since  neo-liberal  institutionalism  only  expects  developing  countries  to  meet  the 
minimum  requirement  of  the  TRIPs  obligations  and  at  the  deadline,  neo-liberal 
institutionalism is unable to explain developing countries’ early compliance and their TRIPs-
Plus approach.  
 
                                                 
49 India’s responses to the WTO ruling will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
50 For a more detailed explanation on this dispute see WTO (1997b, 1997d, 1998b, n. d. (n), (p)). For further 
information regarding the India–US dispute, see also the US National Trade Estimate Report (USTR, 1998, 
2001c). 98 
 
3.4 Assessment and Implications 
 
The empirical evidence of the change in developing countries’ IP legislation as a response to 
their TRIPs obligations reveals several different patterns of responses that are inconsistent 
with  the  expectations  of  neo-realism,  neo-liberal  institutionalism,  and  constructivism.  
Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  constructivism,  neither  the  questionable  legitimacy  of  the 
TRIPs  Agreement  from  developing  countries’  points  of  view  nor  the  incompatibility  of 
international norms under TRIPs with their domestic norms, have caused widespread non-
compliance by developing countries.  As neo-liberal institutionalism would expect, given that 
WTO  is  highly  legalised,  there  is  a  high  level  of  compliance.  Moreover,  as  neo-liberal 
institutionalism would expect, developing countries’ IPR protection has also improved in the 
wake of WTO complaints against them. Nevertheless, these are very rare compared to the use 
of the WTO dispute in non-TRIPs cases. In addition, neo-liberal institutionalism has done a 
poor job in explaining both the timing and the quality of developing countries’ IP legislation, 
particularly  because  neo-liberal  institutionalism  is  unable  to  explain  the  fact  that  many 
developing countries reformed their IP legislation before they had to, and/or adopted national 
legislation that was more stringent than that required by TRIPs. The empirical findings also 
exhibit the flaws in neo-realists’ expectations, because some states that have been targeted by 
US performed worse than some that have not been targeted. In other words, the adoption of 
TRIPs-Plus  protection  does  not  correspond  neatly  to  the  US’s  demands  for  stricter  IPR 
protection  in  specific  states.  Therefore,  contrary to  neo-realists’  expectations,  US  pressure 
would not seem to be sufficient to cause policy change, and at the same time, US pressure 
does not appear to be necessary for policy change to take place either.  
 
The unexplained variance among countries and across types of IPR indicates that systemic 
approaches in explaining the change in developing countries’ IP legislation are insufficient. 
This suggests that, in order to find other causes of compliance, it is therefore essential to 
analyse  politics  within  the  domestic  sphere.  By  emphasising  the  interaction  between  and 
aggregation of divergent interests among both domestic societal and political actors, domestic 
politics  of  compliance  analysis  contributes  to  explain  how  external  pressures  (both  in  the 
forms of great power coercion and collective enforcement) are perceived by domestic actors 
and translate into domestic policy outcome (Keohane, 1992; Guzman 2002; Raustiala, 2000). 
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external  pressures  translate  into  compliance.  Furthermore,  domestic  politics  of  compliance 
analysis  also  contributes  to  clarify  the  mechanisms  available  in  domestic  politics  for 
international norms to be accepted in the domestic sphere, and how they influence domestic 
policy outcomes. Within this context, by providing the necessary tools to locate other causes 
of  compliance  in  the  domestic  sphere,  the  domestic  politics  of  compliance  analysis  is 
expected, not only to explain the variance between two case studies but also within the case 
study. In this regard, therefore, the domestic politics of compliance analysis can complement 
major IR theories, in explaining the change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation as 
a response to their TRIPs obligations. However, establishing how well this approach actually 
explains the variance in developing countries’ IP policy change requires detailed case studies. 
 
3.5 Introducing the Case Studies: Indonesia and India 
 
As explained in more detail in Chapter 2, the TRIPs Agreement was concluded with a hard 
bargaining by major developed countries led by the US, the EU, and Japan.  However, the 
result of a survey on IP policy change in 102 WTO developing country members, discussed in 
previous explanations, showed that developing countries demonstrated unexpected responses 
when  the  TRIPs  Agreement  came  into  effect.  Despite  the  fact  the  incompatibility  of 
international norms under TRIPs with their domestic norms and their strong resistance during 
the TRIPs negotiations, most developing countries have taken steps to reform their domestic 
IP legislation to comply with the TRIPs Agreement.  In order to understand this puzzle, this 
thesis focuses on two developing countries, which represent unlikely cases in the change in 
developing  countries’  domestic  IP  legislation  which,  according  to  Keohane  (1992,  p.176), 
embodies an ‘inconvenient obligation’: Indonesia and India.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, India is well-known as one of the major developing countries that 
were  strongly  against  the  inclusion  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  during  the  Uruguay  Round. 
However, when the agreement came into force, by the end of its transition period, India had 
already fulfilled its TRIPs obligations, and even adopted copyright and trademark laws with 
more rigorous rules than those required by TRIPs. Indonesia was also considered an unlikely 
case, since IPR protection was essentially unknown in its legal traditions prior to TRIPs and it 
even  contradicted  its  domestic  norms.  Yet,  after  the  TRIPs  negotiations  were  concluded, 
Indonesia was among the WTO developing countries that fulfilled its TRIPs obligation by 100 
 
reforming its IP legislation earlier than required, and adopted more rigorous rules than those 
outlined by TRIPs, particularly for its trademark and patent legislation.  
 
Since both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism expect external pressures to play a 
significant role in determining developing countries’ responses to their TRIPs obligations, the 
degree of external pressure is one of the key variables in selecting the two case studies. As 
explained  earlier,  external  pressure  is  measured  by  both  as  being  a  subject  of  substantial 
pressure from the US, and by countries’ involvement in the WTO dispute as a respondent 
related  to  TRIPs.  India  and  Indonesia  are,  therefore,  also  selected  because  both  of  them 
received  substantial  external  pressure,  particularly  from  the  US,  even  though  they  each 
experienced a different degree of pressure for different types of IPR.  
 
The substantial external pressure received by India is reflected on its status on the USTR 
Special 301 Report, which has consistently been under PWL status since 1995 to 2010. In 
addition, as discussed earlier, India was also being a subject of the US and the EU complaints 
under the WTO TRIPs dispute. With regard to its ineffective judicial system, Indonesia has 
also been constantly on the USTR Special 301 Report, mostly with PWL status, during the 
same  period.  As  already  explained  earlier,  even  though  it  has  never  been  a  subject  of 
complaints exclusively related to the TRIPs issue, Indonesia once was challenged by the US, 
the EU, and Japan relating to its national car programme. In this sector, the US expressed 
concern  regarding  Indonesia’s  obligations  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  particularly 
concerning trademarks.   
 
Despite their similarities, Indonesia and India are also selected because the two have different 
features concerning their domestic politics, particularly the role of domestic actors in IP policy 
issues. The role of domestic actors is broadly defined by the degree of the domestic actors’ 
support concerning IPR protection. Domestic actors’ support is measured by the number of 
patent  applications  by  residents  which  can  be  considered  as  one  critical  indicator  for 
identifying the existence of domestic actors interested in IPR protection.
51 Based on the WIPO 
statistics database of patent applications by residents in 2000, India was the second top of the 
developing  countries,  accounting  for  23.3  percent,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  domestic 
                                                 
51 The point of departure to assess the domestic actors’ role is the year 2000, which was the end of the general 
transition period, even though developing countries were granted an additional transition period for products not 
previously patented. 101 
 
applicants  from  Indonesia  only  accounted  for  1.7  percent  of  total  patent  applicants  from 
developing countries (see figure 3.12).  
 
Figure 3.12 Patent Applications by Resident in Selected Developing Countries in 2000 
 
 
 
Note: Data is compiled by author from WIPO statistics database on patent applications by 
patent office (1883-2007) by resident and non-resident (WIPO, n. d. (f)). It should be 
noted that not all 102 WTO developing country members’ data is available from WIPO 
Statistics Database in 2000 (see also Appendix V for more detail data of patent 
applications by resident in selected developing countries).  
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The following table summarises the independent and dependent variables in the case studies 
selection: 
 
Table 3.6 Case Studies Selection 
Country  Independent Variables 
External Pressures  Domestic Factors 
US Pressure  WTO TRIPs Disputes  Domestic Actors’ Interest  
in IPR Protection 
India  Strong  Panel Adoption  Strong 
Indonesia  Strong  Panel Adoption
52  Weak 
  Dependent Variables 
Patent Policy Reform  Copyright Policy Reform  Trademark Policy 
Reform 
Timing  Quality  Timing  Quality  Timing  Quality 
India  Early  Minus  Early  Minimum  On Time  Plus 
Indonesia  Early  Plus  Early  Minimum  Early  Plus 
 
Note: As stated earlier, the timing and the quality of legislation in this table are based on the 
first adoption of the legislation by the case study countries immediately prior to or after 
the  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  However,  after  the  adoption  of  the  first 
legislation, both India and Indonesia still undertook a series of IP policy reforms.   
 
Based  on  previous  explanations,  both  India  and  Indonesia  are  selected  because  the  two 
represent unlikely cases for IP policy change in developing countries. However, as already 
outlined  before,  India  is  also  selected  as  a  representative  of  a  developing  country  with  a 
substantial number of domestic constituents for IPR protection, and is thus expected to have a 
higher  level  of  domestic  societal  actors’  involvement  in  the  IP  policy  making  process. 
Whereas, Indonesia is selected as a representative of a developing country with the limited 
number of domestic constituents for strong IPR protection, and is thus expected to have a 
lower level of domestic societal actors’ involvement in the IP policy making process. The 
variance in political process whether it is a bottom-up or a top-down process is important for 
the analysis to locate main domestic actors in IP policy process. In a more ‘top-down’ political 
process, domestic actors that is crucial to analyse further is among different domestic political 
actors (government officials or different government institutions to be more precise) but in a 
                                                 
52 As mentioned earlier, this is not specifically on the TRIPs issues but in combination with the TRIMs 
Agreement.  103 
 
more ‘bottom-up’ political process, in addition to domestic political actors it is also important 
to pay attention to the various domestic societal actors’ preference in policy making process. 
In  doing  so,  it  is  expected  to  elucidate  the  unexplained  variance  in  developing  countries’ 
response to their TRIPs obligations. As will be explained further in Chapter 5, the policy 
change in developing countries with the strong involvement of domestic societal actors, as 
reflected from the case study of India, is a result of the interaction of divergent domestic 
societal actors, and represents the interest of the strongest actors among domestic societal 
actors. On the other hand, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the policy change in developing 
countries with a limited level of domestic societal actors’ involvement in IP policy making, as 
in the case of Indonesia, can be explained as a result of the calculation (or pragmatism) of the 
dominant government institutions in order to respond to external pressures.  
 
It is worth mentioning that, in addition to India, Brazil can also be considered as a potential 
case study, since Brazil, along with India, was part of the G10 Developing Countries who 
strongly resisted the inclusion of the TRIPs Agreement during the Uruguay Round, and also 
adopted IP legislation earlier than it had to do so. However, for the purpose of this thesis, India 
is selected due to the availability of accessible information in English. Indonesia is also not the 
only developing country that had no IPR protection tradition in its historical tradition prior to 
the TRIPs. However, Indonesia is selected because, until recently, the analysis of IP policy 
change  in  Indonesia  was  still  limited.
53  Therefore,  analysing  Indonesia’s  IP  policy  reform 
contributes to fill the gap in the literature.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
By presenting the results of a survey of 102 WTO developing country members’ legislation 
concerning  patents,  copyrights,  and  trademarks,  this  chapter  has  fulfilled  its  purpose  in 
providing  empirical  evidence  of  the  change  in  developing  countries’  IP  legislation  as  a 
response  to  their  TRIPs  obligations.  The  results  of  the  survey  indicated  that  none  of  the 
established IR accounts adequately explain the variance in the change in developing countries’ 
IP legislation. The fact that the vast majority of developing countries took the necessary steps 
to reform their IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations, in particular challenges 
                                                 
53 To date, most literature on IP policy change in Indonesia is from a legal perspective and written by law 
scholars (see Antons, 2000, 2003b; 2006; Kusumadara, 2000a; Butt, 2008). The exception is work by Rosser 
(1999, 2002) which is a from political economy perspective.  104 
 
constructivists’  expectations  of  developing  countries’  non-compliance.  Furthermore,  the 
empirical findings also undermined both neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists’ accounts 
since external pressures, either in the form of great power coercion or international institution 
legalisation, would not seem to be sufficient to cause policy change, and at the same time, 
these  pressures  do  not  appear  to  be  necessary  for  policy  change  to  take  place  either.  By 
arguing this, the chapter proposes the need to make use of the domestic politics of compliance 
analysis,  which  emphasises  the  interaction  between  and  aggregation  of  divergent  interests 
among  domestic  actors,  in  explaining  the  change  in  developing  countries’  domestic  IP 
legislation, as a response to their TRIPs obligations. 
 
This chapter has also already carried out its second task of introducing two case studies for 
further  analysis.  Based  on  previous  explanations,  both  Indonesia  and  India  are  selected 
because the two represent unlikely cases for IP policy change in developing countries. Since 
the role of external pressure is essential for both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism 
accounts, Indonesia and India are also selected because the two received substantial external 
pressure, particularly from the US, even though it was with a different degree of pressure for 
different types of IPR. Despite their similarities, Indonesia and India are also selected because 
the two have different features concerning their domestic politics circumstance, particularly 
the role of domestic actors on IP policy issues. By focusing on IP policy reform in the three 
main IP areas, patents, copyrights, and trademarks, in each case study, the analysis is expected 
to  explain  the  variance,  not  only  between  these  two  case  studies,  but  also  to  understand 
different  approaches  taken  by  the  government  within  the  same  country  for  different  IPR 
categories.  In  doing  so,  the  subsequent  case  study  chapters  intend  to  illuminate  the 
unexplained variance among developing countries and across different IPR categories, as a 
response to their inconvenient obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. By analysing the case 
studies of Indonesia and India, this thesis also intends to contribute to the limited existing 
literature  utilising  domestic  politics  of  compliance  analysis,  in  explaining  developing 
countries’ responses to their TRIPs obligations. 
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Chapter 4 
Policy Change in Indonesia’s IP Legislation: Where Government Institutions 
Have a Dominant Role  
 
“Among the new obligations which we consider as a major concession is the agreement on 
intellectual property... As we make our adjustment, what we need most is technical 
cooperation and not legal harassment”  
(S.B. Joedono, a former Indonesian Minister of Trade, Statement at the Meeting at 
Ministerial Level Marrakesh 12 April 1994 – (Indonesia, 1994b, p.1)) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection was essentially an alien concept in Indonesia’s 
national laws prior to the TRIPs Agreement.  However, after the TRIPs negotiations were 
concluded,  Indonesia  was  among  the  WTO  developing  country  members  that  fulfilled  its 
TRIPs obligations by reforming its intellectual property (IP) legislation earlier than required, 
and adopted more rigorous rules than outlined by TRIPs, notably for its patent and trademark 
laws. For this reason, the Indonesian case study, therefore, represents a puzzle for IP policy 
reform  in  developing  countries,  since  the  IP  policy  reform  taken  by  the  Indonesian 
government  to  fulfil  its  TRIPs  obligations  deviated  from  the  expectations  of  the  leading 
International Relations (IR) theories. IP policy change in Indonesia in particular undermines 
constructivists’ expectations, which predicted that policy change would be unlikely to take 
place due to conflicting norms. Neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism arguably may 
provide better explanations by arguing the role of external pressures behind the change.  
 
This  chapter  however,  argues  that,  contrary  to  both  neo-realists  and  neo-liberal 
institutionalists’ expectations, IP policy change in Indonesia did not always correspond to the 
external pressures it received, since IP policy reform took place with the presence and in the 
absence of these pressures. The empirical findings demonstrate that IP policy reform took 
place in the absence of substantial external pressure, when there was a shift in some of the 
government institutions’ preference, from being sceptical to being either indifferent or more 
favourable  regarding  IPR  protection.  This  suggests  the  necessity  to  look  at  the  domestic 
politics in searching for other causes of compliance. A closer observation on domestic politics 
further reveals that, with relatively limited domestic societal actors’ involvement in the IP 
policy making process, government institutions play a critical role, and IP policy change is 106 
 
explained as a result of a change in the balance of the preferences of different government 
institutions.  
 
The chapter begins by briefly explaining the Indonesian political system, in order to identify 
the key domestic political and societal actors, and to understand the domestic policy making 
process. The next section discusses the historical and cultural background of IPR protection in 
Indonesia, in order to illustrate that IPR protection did not have strong roots in the history of 
Indonesia’s national laws prior to the TRIPs Agreement. Before discussing the development of 
IP legislation in Indonesia after TRIPs, the role of Indonesia in the TRIPs negotiations during 
the  Uruguay  Round  will  be  assessed.  This  section  essentially  presents  that  the  TRIPs 
Agreement was not on the Indonesian government’s priority trade agenda during the Uruguay 
Round. As the core of the chapter, the next section analyses the development of IP legislation 
in Indonesia, starting from prior to and during the TRIPs negotiations, until the time when the 
TRIPs Agreement came into force for developing countries. In doing so, it will analyse the 
role of external pressures and domestic actors (both societal and governmental) in shaping IP 
policy change.  
 
4.2 Indonesian Policy Making at a Glance  
 
To understand the policy making process in Indonesia, one needs to be aware of the fact that 
the  post-independence  Indonesian  political  system  can  be  divided  into  three  periods,  each 
associated with a different regime, that has a distinct character that influences how the policy 
making process operated. The first period is the Old Order (Orde Lama) under the Sukarno 
Administration from the independence until 1966, which is also known as ‘guided democracy’ 
(Demokrasi Terpimpin). The second period is the New Order (Orde Baru) under the Suharto 
Administration  from  1966  to  1998.  After  1998,  the  regime  is  mostly  known  as  the  post-
Suharto era (Era Reformasi). The first two regimes, under Sukarno and Suharto were both 
authoritarian.  Under  these  regimes,  policy  making  was  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the 
President  with  his  restricted  elite  circle,  and  there  was  neither  transparency  nor  public 
participation in the policy making process. After Suharto stepped down in 1998, Indonesia 
entered the transition to democracy. Even though the president still plays a key role, other 
political  institutions  have  started  to  have  a  more  significant  share  in  the  policy  making 107 
 
process.  In  addition,  a  steady  increase  of  the  public’s  involvement  in  the  policy  making 
process can also be seen.  
 
According to Soesastro and Soejachmoen (2007, p.1), under the Suharto Administration, the 
state’s policy was centralised at the president’s authority, which was supported by a powerful 
and united technocrat team. Suharto had the authority to appoint all key political positions, 
including the cabinet ministers, the senior ranks of the military, and the top levels of the 
judiciary (Rosser, 2002, pp.15–16). Suharto, at that time, also had the position as the head of 
the Board of Patron (Dewan Pembina) of the ruling party (Golongan Karya or Golkar), which 
granted him the power to also control the parliament. A control over both the executive and 
legislative  institutions  contributed  to  the  creation  of  a  solid  and  well-coordinated  policy 
making  mechanism  under  the  hand  of  presidential  authority  (Soesastro  and  Soejachmoen, 
2007, p.1).  
 
In  addition,  even  though  the  constitution  requires  the  approval  from  the  House  of 
Representatives, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), for a bill to become law, since the 
majority of the DPR members were also from the ruling party, most legislation initiated by the 
government  were  easily  passed,  and  got  the  parliament’s  approval.  In  other  words,  the 
parliament  during  the  Suharto  Administration  mostly  served  as  the  rubber  stamp  of  the 
government’s policy (Kusumadara, 2000a, p.221; Smith, 2001, p. 95; Aswicahyono, Bird, and 
Hill, 2008, p.6). In addition, due to the authoritarian characteristic of the regime, domestic 
societal actors were also forced to remain silent, and the room for public participation in the 
policy making process was virtually nonexistent. In short, since the access and participation in 
the  formulation  of  the  state’s  policy  was  mostly  absent,  consequently  there  was  no 
transparency in the state’s policy making under the Suharto Administration. 
 
This situation was extensively changed after 1998 when Suharto was forced to step down, and 
Indonesia entered the transition to democracy (Robison, 2005, pp.259–60). Under the latest 
amendment  of  constitution,  the  legislative  branch  is  empowered,  and  is  now  (almost)  as 
powerful  as  the  president  in  terms  of  creating  a  more  significant  check  and  balance 
mechanism.  Under  the  new  general  election  legislation,  political  parties  can  no  longer  be 
dissolved and controlled by the government. The survival of a political party depends solely 
on its achievement during the general elections. Political parties that do not fulfil the minimum 108 
 
seat requirement on the DPR are not eligible to run in the next general election (General 
Election of Members of the House of Representatives, the House of Regional Representatives, 
and the Regional House of Representatives Act No. 12/2003 last amended in 2008 with the 
adoption of Act No. 10/2008).  
 
The existence of new political parties created a more lively debate in DPR, and the parliament 
can  no  longer  be  considered  the  rubber  stamp  of  government  policy  (Bird,  Hill,  and 
Cuthbertson, 2008, p.5). In the post-Suharto era, as argued by Smith (2001, p.96), “...the DPR 
became  a  highly  politicized  [sic]  debating  chamber.  DPR  now  has  a  dynamic  multi-party 
environment where coalitions have to be constructed to get legislation passed”. Compared to 
previous regimes, most legislation proposed by the government received challenges from the 
members, and involved wider public participation through open public hearing. Nevertheless, 
even though there has been a significant change in the role of DPR in the post-Suharto regime, 
it should be noted that, compared to other domestic issues, IP-related issues still has not drawn 
significant debate in DPR. Based on Jhamtani and Hanim’s (2002, p.91) observations from 
public  hearings  during  the  amendment  process  of  IP  legislation  in  early  2000,  this  is 
essentially  because  not  many  members  of  DPR  have  a  sufficient  understanding  of  IPR 
protection and its consequences for Indonesia’s society. In this context, therefore, despite the 
fact that DPR has been more empowered since 1998 than previously, its role in IP policy 
change arguably remains irrelevant.  
 
In addition, recent development also shows that, in spite of the fact that Indonesia has become 
a more democratic country and there is a significant increase in the role of domestic societal 
actors in the policy making process, the public’s involvement is still uneven, depending on the 
targeted areas. As argued by an Indonesian NGO representative, the involvement of a wider 
public participation in the policy making process only concentrates on a few ‘high politics’ 
issues such as human rights violations, good governance, and freedom of expression, while it 
does  not  significantly  increase  in  other  ‘unfamiliar’  areas,  such  as  IPR  protection.  In  this 
regard,  he  further  argues  that  “...not  many  Indonesian  NGOs  have  a  comprehensive 
understanding  about  IPR  protection,  let  alone Indonesian  people  in  general”.
54  As  will be 
explained in more detail later, one of the reasons behind this is because domestic constituents 
for strong IPR protection remain limited. Furthermore, the absence of domestic constituents 
                                                 
54 Author’s interview with an Indonesian NGO representative (Jakarta, 25 August 2009). 109 
 
for strong IPR protection is also accompanied by a low level of domestic societal opposition to 
policy reform. In this regard, therefore, despite the change in the political regime, the role of 
domestic societal actors in the IP policy making process is still relatively absent. 
 
Previous discussions reveals that the executive played a dominant role in Indonesia’s domestic 
politics, whereas other political institutions, such as the DPR, to a large extent were politically 
weak and nearly absent in the decision making process, especially prior to 1998. Furthermore, 
with  its  long  tradition  under  the  authoritarian  regime,  domestic  societal  actors  were  also 
mostly  irrelevant  in  the  Indonesian  policy  making  process.  Since  other  domestic  actors 
arguably only have a limited role, in understanding IP policy reform in Indonesia, the analysis 
will focus more on the difference of preference among government ministries concerning IPR 
protection. Nevertheless, since prior to 1998, under the Suharto Administration a relatively 
solid  and  unified  voice  of  government  machinery  was  in  place;  the  analysis  of  different 
ministries’  preferences  becomes  more  useful  once  Indonesia  has  entered  the  transition  to 
democracy in 1998. In this context, after 1998, explaining IPR policy reform needs a deeper 
analysis on the involvement of newly engaged domestic political actors in IP-related issues, 
especially among different government ministries. As will be elaborated more in subsequent 
sections, the involvement of these new domestic political actors contributed to the change in 
the constellation in domestic actors in the IP policy making process.  
 
4.3 IPR Protection in an Indonesian Historical and Cultural Context  
 
This  section  is  crucial  for  providing  a  basic  historical  background  of  IPR  protection  in 
Indonesia, since IPR protection was mainly alien in Indonesia’s national legislation prior to 
TRIPs,  due  to  its  conflicting  nature  with  Indonesia’s  traditions  and  norms.  This  is  rather 
different  than  the  Indian  case  study,  which  has  a  long  historical  attachment  with  IPR 
protection. Despite the fact that IP legislation existed in Indonesia as early as 1844, those laws, 
which were introduced under the Dutch colonial rule, did not apply to native Indonesians.
55 
Under the Dutch colonial rule, the legal system for the indigenous Indonesians was adat (an 
extensive system of Indonesian customary norms), which did not recognise IPR protection. As 
a consequence, there was no Indonesian legal tradition of protecting IPR.  
                                                 
55 The Dutch colonial rule classified the population into three different legal groups (the Europeans, Foreign 
Orientals and indigenous Indonesians) each with its own legal system (Antons, 2003a, p.16).  
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Under  unwritten  adat  law,  individual  ownership  in  intellectual  works  or inventions  is  not 
recognised because knowledge is regarded as public property, and its main function is to serve 
the public benefit. Furthermore, since knowledge is also regarded as the common heritage of 
humankind, most traditions in Indonesian communities view that knowledge should be freely 
accessible and available to all (Butt, 2008, pp.623–24; Kusumadara, 2000b, pp.5–6, n. d., p.4). 
Such  a  notion  is  in  conflict  with  the  tradition  in  Western-industrialised  countries,  which 
acknowledges IPR as part of individual rights (Gutowksi, 1999, pp.744–45).  
 
In  addition,  unlike  Western-industrialised  countries’  traditions  which  regard 
commercialisation as the incentive for creativity, in most Indonesian traditional communities, 
the commercialisation of creative works is prohibited, because of the spiritual element of the 
works,  and  they  are  considered  to  be  a  symbol  of  dedication  and  contribution  to  the 
community (Butt, 2008, p.628). In this context, creative and innovative activities are regarded 
as part of the individual contribution to the cultural and economic development of the whole 
society. Adat also realises that creativity and invention can be developed through the social 
benefits of a creative work, instead of through the material benefits for individual owners. In 
this  regard,  creativity  and  innovation  are  encouraged,  not  through  intellectual  property 
protection, but through the rapid and free dissemination of the invention and knowledge to the 
society  (Kusumadara,  n.  d.,  pp.2–4).  This  kind  of  norm  is  also  contrary  to  the  common 
understanding in Western-industrialised societies, which believe that material benefits from 
strong IPR protection is necessary to foster creativity and innovation (Marron and Steel, 2000, 
p.166).  
 
Considering  this  background,  it  can  be  argued  that  IPR  protection  has  no  strong  roots  in 
Indonesian  society.  In  this  context,  therefore,  IP  policy  reform  taken  by  the  Indonesian 
government after the TRIPs Agreement, which is at odds with its existing domestic norms, 
requires further explanation.  111 
 
4.4 Indonesia during the TRIPs Negotiations: Not on Indonesia’s Priority Trade 
Agenda 
 
Unlike  India,  which  strongly  opposed  the  adoption  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  during  the 
Uruguay  Round,  Indonesia  did  not  have  a  clear  position  either  for  or  against  the  TRIPs 
Agreement. There are several reasons behind such an ambiguous stance. First of all, TRIPs 
was a new issue in the Uruguay Round. According to Kartadjoemena (2005, p.148), who was 
a  former  Indonesian  Ambassador  to  GATT  and  was  Indonesia’s  Chief  Negotiator  in  the 
Uruguay Round from 1987 to 1994, the Indonesian government was not well-equipped to deal 
with non-traditional trade issues like TRIPs. Since the Uruguay Round covered new issues 
beyond the traditional realm of trade, the negotiations became more complex, and required a 
better domestic arrangement involving inter-ministerial coordination beyond the Ministry of 
Trade.  In this regard, Kartadjoemena (2005, pp.146–48) argues that the Indonesian domestic 
institutional structure dealing with international trade issues during the Uruguay Round was 
not prepared to meet the challenge of the inclusion of IP-related issues. 
 
In addition, Indonesia’s unclear position was also due to the fact that IPR protection was not 
part of the Indonesian government’s priorities during the Uruguay Round. This argument is 
pointed out in the interview with a former Indonesian diplomat.
56 In line with this argument, 
Kartadjoemena (2005, p.149) states that the Indonesian government’s focus was on improving 
the  access  to  developed  countries’  markets  for  manufactured  and  processed  goods.  The 
assessment  on  the  official  statements  made  by  the  high  ranking  Indonesian  delegates, 
including the Indonesian Minister of Trade, during the Uruguay Round negotiation indicates 
that Indonesia’s main interest was on so-called ‘long-standing traditional areas of trade’, such 
as  textiles,  tropical  products,  and  agricultures.
57  A  closer  observation  on  the  documents 
submitted  by  the  Indonesian  government  during  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiation  (either 
submitted  as  individual  contracting  party  and/or  as  a  group  on  behalf  of  Association  of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)/other  developing  countries),  also  reveals  that  the 
Indonesian government submitted a number of submissions mostly to the Negotiating Group 
on Textiles and Clothing.
58 While the Indonesian government also submitted a number of 
                                                 
56 Author’s interview with a former Indonesian diplomat (Jakarta, 24 August 2009).  
57 For a more detailed explanation concerning Indonesia’s main interests during Uruguay Round negotiation, see 
ASEAN (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990) and Indonesia (1986a, 1988g, 1988h, 1990d, 1994a, 1994b).  
58 For a complete list of documents submitted by the Indonesian government to the Negotiating Groups during 
the Uruguay Round 1986–1994, see Appendix VII. 112 
 
submissions  to  the  other  negotiating  groups,  including  agriculture,  tropical  products,  and 
services, there were none to the Negotiating Group on TRIPs Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods.
59   
 
The  study  on  the  official  statements  submitted  by  the  Indonesian  government  during  the 
Uruguay  Round  also  indicates  that  the  topics  regarding  the  new  trade  issues  were  only 
mentioned briefly, and mostly related to concerns over their implications on the economic 
development. Based on these statements, the Indonesian government repeatedly expressed that 
Indonesia (including other ASEAN members) had taken an ‘open-minded attitude’, but also 
emphasised that these new areas should not undermine their long-term development needs 
(ASEAN,  1990,  pp.3–4;  Indonesia,  1988h,  pp.3–4,  1990d,  p.2,  1994b,  p.1).    The  specific 
mention of IPR protection occurred on the Indonesian government’s official statements after 
1990, which stressed the necessity of providing a more favourable condition for developing 
countries,  including  the  assurance  of  a  transitional  period  and  technical  assistance  to 
implement the agreement (ASEAN, 1990, pp.3–4; Indonesia, 1990d, p.2, 1994b, p.1). 
 
By the end of the Uruguay Round, the Indonesian government accepted the Uruguay Round’s 
package including the TRIPs Agreement. As can be seen from the statement by the Indonesian 
Minister of Trade on the ministerial meeting in Marrakesh on 12 April 1994, quoted in the 
beginning of this chapter, the Indonesian government emphasised the importance of technical 
assistance from developed countries, since the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement would 
be costly for developing countries (Indonesia, 1994b, p.1). 
 
It can be concluded that, due to its lack of negotiating and institutional capacity during the 
Uruguay Round, Indonesia only concentrated on the negotiations concerning its top priority 
trade agendas. Given the fact that IPR protection was not Indonesia’s main concern during the 
Uruguay  Round,  the  TRIPs  Agreement  represents  an  ‘inconvenient  obligation’,  in  that  it 
obliged the Indonesian government to adopt policies it would otherwise have not. Nonetheless, 
as a response to its TRIPs obligations, Indonesia took policy reform earlier and with more 
rigorous rules than required. Explaining policy reform taken by the Indonesian government as 
a response to its inconvenient obligation, therefore, is the main purpose of the subsequent 
sections. 
                                                 
59 See Appendix VII. 113 
 
 
4.5  Explaining  Policy  Change  in  Indonesia’s  IP  Legislation  and  TRIPs 
Compatibility 
 
Since the concept of IPR protection was essentially unknown in Indonesia’s traditions and 
norms prior to TRIPs, the IP laws in Indonesia therefore, had only a brief historical existence 
except for trademarks.
60 The existence of patent and copyright laws could only be traced back 
to the early 1980s, only a few years before the TRIPs negotiations were started. When the 
TRIPs negotiations were concluded, in order to meet the minimum standards as required by 
TRIPs, Indonesia was obliged to reform its existing IP laws.  Even though, along with other 
developing  countries,  Indonesia  was  granted  a  transition  period  to  comply  with  its  TRIPs 
obligations until January 2000,
61 Indonesia amended its existing IP legislation in 1997, while 
still in the transition period.  
 
4.5.1  Indonesia’s  Patent  Policy  Change:  Government  Pragmatism  and 
Economic Crisis  
 
As explained earlier, since Indonesia’s adat customary law does not recognise IPR protection, 
including patent protection, the swift decision taken by the Indonesian government to reform 
its existing patent legislation earlier than it had to, as a response to its TRIPs obligations, poses 
a  puzzle  that  this  section  seeks  to  explain.    Furthermore,  that  the  Indonesian  government 
introduced  more  rigorous  patent  rules  than  required  by  TRIPs  also  demands  further 
explanation. In understanding patent policy reform taken by the Indonesian government, the 
first part of the section discusses the compatibility of Indonesia’s patent law with the TRIPs 
Agreement, by assessing Indonesia’s patent legislation both prior to and after TRIPs. The next 
section focuses on explaining the reason behind the policy change by analysing the role of 
external  pressures,  as  well  as  looking  at  the  preferences  of  domestic  actors  (societal  and 
governmental) and how they interact in shaping domestic policy outcomes. 
 
                                                 
60 As explained earlier, this does not count the existence of IP legislation during the Dutch colonial period since 
those laws did not apply to native Indonesians (Antons, 2003, p.16). 
61 As mentioned in Chapter 2, as a developing country Indonesia was granted an additional transition period until 
2005 to introduce patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products (see table 2.2 in 
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4.5.1.1 Assessing Indonesia’s Patent Legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
After independence, the Indonesian government kept maintaining all the existing laws, which 
were adopted under the Dutch colonial rule, except patent law. While the Trademark Act of 
1912  and  the  Copyright  Act  of  1912  were  still  in  force,  the  Patent  Act  of  1910  was 
deliberately abolished by the Indonesian government in the beginning of the 1950s, because it 
was regarded as conflicting with Indonesia’s sovereignty, as it required the patent council in 
the  Netherlands  to  issue  patents  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.28;  Kusumadara,  2000a,  p.55;  Antons, 
2003b, p.397, 2004b, p.112). Revoking the Patent Act of 1910 also  fitted with Sukarno’s 
nationalist  economic  policies,  and  his  strong  resistance  towards  the  influence  of  Western-
industrialised countries.  
 
After the abolishment of the Patent Act of 1910, the Sukarno Administration only passed 
several regulations under the Ministry of Justice,
62 to accommodate provisional registration for 
domestic and foreign patents (Kusumadara, 2000a, pp.55–56). Even though these regulations 
were only intended as interim protection, they lasted for more than three decades, until 1989, 
when the Indonesian government finally enacted its first national legislation on patents. As 
table 4.1 illustrates, Indonesia’s existing patent law under the Patent Act of 1989 did not meet 
with the minimum standards of protection under TRIPs. One of the reasons is because, under 
the Patent Act of 1989, the duration of protection was only 14 years, while the agreement 
requires a minimum of 20 years of protection. As a TRIPs Agreement signatory, therefore, 
Indonesia had to reform its patent legislation in order to meet the minimum standards required.  
 
Even though Indonesia was granted an additional transition period to implement its TRIPs 
obligations  for  patent  protection  until  2005,  the  Indonesian  government  did  not  take  full 
advantage  of  this  transitional  period,  and  instead it  amended  its  patent  law  in  1997.
63  As 
clearly stated in its preamble, the Patent Act No. 13/1997 was intended to improve some 
provisions that were incompatible with Indonesia’s obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. It 
basically increased the minimum duration of protection to 20 years as required, extended the 
                                                 
62 Starting from 2000 the Indonesian Ministry of Justice had become the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. It 
should be noted that the main government agency dealing with the administration of IPR—the Indonesian 
Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights (DGIPR)—works under the Ministry of Justice and Human 
Rights’ auspices. 
63 In addition to the adoption of the Patent Act of 1997, Indonesia also ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) through the adoption of the Presidential Decree No. 16/1997. 115 
 
scope  of  patentable  areas,  redefined  the  scope  of  implementation,  and  established  the 
exclusive rights of patent holders. In terms of the scope, the Patent Act of 1997 retained the 
provisions from the previous act, relating to the exclusion of methods of examination, care 
treatment and surgery for humans and animals, as well as theories and methods in science and 
mathematics from being patentable. However, the act also extended the scope of patentable 
areas to include the invention of foods and beverages. Under the Patent Act of 1997, the 
Indonesian  government  also  eliminated  provision  relating  to  the  exclusion  of  plants  and 
animals other than micro-organisms from being patentable. By eliminating this provision, it 
meant that, under its first Patent Act after TRIPs, the Indonesian government adopted more 
rigorous rules than those required by TRIPs. Under the Patent Act of 2001, however, this 
provision was introduced again, and, by inserting this provision, Indonesia’s patent regime 
still met the minimum requirements under TRIPs.  
 116 
 
Table 4.1 The Indonesian Patent Acts and TRIPs Compatibility 
Aspect  TRIPs Obligation  During TRIPs 
Negotiations 
(No.6/1989) 
After TRIPs (During 
Transition Period) 
(No.13/1997)  (No.14/2001) 
Subject 
matter 
coverage 
Products and processes 
for any inventions in all 
fields of technology, 
involving an inventive 
step, and that are 
capable of industrial 
application 
Excluded the 
manufacturing process 
or products of foods and 
beverages, chemically 
processed products of 
foods and beverages for 
human or animal 
consumption 
Protected 
both process 
and 
products 
Protected 
both process 
and products 
Flexibility   May exclude 
inventions which  are 
necessary to protect 
public order or 
morality 
Excluded inventions that 
were in conflict with 
effective legal 
provisions, religious or 
moral issues, public 
security or ethics 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
May exclude plants and 
animals other than 
micro-organisms 
Excluded plants and 
animals other than 
micro-organisms 
Exclusion 
eliminated 
Exclusion 
included 
May exclude 
diagnostic, therapeutic 
and surgical methods 
for the treatment of 
humans or animals 
Excluded diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the 
treatment of humans or 
animals 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Permitted parallel 
importation 
Permitted parallel 
importation 
Permitted 
parallel 
importation 
Permitted 
parallel 
importation 
Permitted compulsory 
licensing 
Permitted compulsory 
licensing 
Permitted 
compulsory 
licensing 
Permitted 
compulsory 
licensing 
Duration of 
protection  
20 years  14 years 
 
20 years 
 
20 years 
 
Exclusive 
rights of 
patent 
holders 
Protects exclusive 
rights of patent holders 
Not granted  Granted  Granted 
Enforcement  Requires civil and 
criminal enforcement 
but no minimum 
requirements 
Included provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
TRIPs 
compatibility 
--  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-plus  TRIPs-
minimum 
 
Note: Author’s assessment on the Indonesian Patent Act No. 68/1989 [in Indonesian], the Indonesian 
Patent Act No. 13/1997 [in Indonesian], and the Indonesian Patent Act No. 14/2001. The first 
Indonesian Patent Act was adopted during the TRIPs negotiations (the Patent Act of 1989) and 
the subsequent Acts were adopted during its transition period with the latest Act being the Patent 
Act of 2001. After the end of the transition period, the Indonesian government had not adopted 
any other patent acts (as of January 2011). 117 
 
4.5.1.2 Indonesia’s Patent Legislation: Explaining Policy Change 
 
This section argues that the role of external pressures, particularly in the form of great power 
coercion, as argued by neo-realists, can only provide a partial explanation in understanding 
patent  policy  reform  in  Indonesia.  The  empirical  evidence  demonstrates  that  Indonesia 
experienced pressures mainly from the US to improve its patent regime. Nevertheless, these 
pressures  only  became  significant  in  influencing  the  Indonesian  government’s  decision  to 
reform its patent law after Indonesia’s position as an energy producer was declining. During 
the  oil  boom,  despite  receiving  the  same  level  of  pressures  from  the  US,  the  Indonesian 
government did not take any sufficient steps to reform its patent regime, since the government 
did not regard a strong patent protection as necessary for its development needs. In this regard, 
therefore, in order to fully understand patent policy change in Indonesia, it is essential to 
analyse how the government perceived and responded to these pressures. 
 
4.5.1.2.1 Patent Policy Change prior to and during the TRIPs Negotiations 
 
As briefly stated earlier, the first Indonesian patent law was adopted in 1989, nearly four and a 
half decades after independence. The extensive length of the adoption of the first patent law 
after its independence can be understood, since the indigenous Indonesian tradition did not 
recognise  IPR  protection.  Furthermore,  according  to  Uphoff  (1991,  p.30),  the  absence  of 
patent law in Indonesia after its independence was also due to the wide division among the 
ministries involved with regard to patent protection. On one hand, the Ministry of Industry
64 
viewed  strong  patent  protection  as  being  beneficial  for  Indonesia’s  business  community, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Ministry  of  Health,  which  had  a  close  connection  with  the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry, resisted the insertion of the pharmaceutical area on patent 
protection  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.30).  In  between,  the  Ministry  of  Justice’s  indifferent  position 
regarding IPR protection can be identified, which argued that adopting international standards 
was  necessary  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.30).  This  divergent  policy  preference  among  domestic 
political actors was difficult to reconcile, which in turn contributed to the absence of patent 
legislation in Indonesia after the independence.       
 
                                                 
64 Uphoff (1991, p.30) also identifies that there were nationalist and internationalist factions within the Ministry 
of Industry. 118 
 
In addition, the absence of patent law until the late 1980s, was also due to Indonesia’s position 
as an energy producer, particularly of oil and gas, at least until the mid-1980s. According to 
Djaic (2000, p.457) from 1973 to 1974 the price of Indonesia’s oil soared significantly, from 
US$12.60 per barrel to US$34.50 in 1983, while, between 1974 and 1984, revenue from oil 
occupied approximately two-thirds of Indonesia’s budget and export earnings.  During this 
period, Indonesia was able to implement trade protectionist policies, and was even considered 
to  be  the  most  nationalistic  government  in  the  region  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.28).
65  The 
protectionists policies were implemented without worrying too much about providing other 
important conditions, including ensuring an adequate IPR protection as necessary to attract 
FDI (Antons, 2003b, 402). In this regard, according to Rosser (2002, p.147), prior to the mid-
1980s, the Indonesian government did not put any effort into protecting IPR which was both 
weak, according to international standards, and had no sufficient enforcement.  
 
Furthermore, unlike in the case of copyright protection which will be explained later, domestic 
industry  support  for  strong  patent  protection  was  relatively  absent  (Rosser,  1999,  p.109; 
Uphoff, 1991, p.30). This can be seen particularly from a low-level of domestic applicants for 
patent  protection.  According  to  Rosser  (2002,  p.148),  domestic  applicants  only  occupied 
around 4 percent of patent applications between 1953 and early 1989. In addition, during the 
1980s,  there  were  only  a  few  Indonesian  pharmaceutical  industries  that  were  engaged  in 
scientific research activities. The Indonesian pharmaceutical industries were mostly engaged 
in  generic  drugs  production,  which  benefitted  from  a  low-level  of  patent  protection. 
Furthermore,  they  were  also  part  of  the  domestic  business  of  politically  well-connected 
conglomerates in Indonesia (Rosser, 1999, p.109). In this regard, since patent policy reform 
would threaten the interest of conglomerates in Indonesia, the government did not have any 
incentives to take any steps to improve the patent regime. In a later development, however, the 
opposition from domestic pharmaceutical industries was decreasing, since, compared to their 
interests and investment in other business sectors such as petrochemical, automobiles, and 
other capital intensive industries, their interest in the pharmaceutical industry was relatively 
small (Rosser, 2002, p.163).  
 
                                                 
65 As part of its protectionist economic policy to protect its domestic industry, Indonesia pursued an import-
substitution policy and protected its import regime by imposing both high tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(Kartadjoemena, 2005, p.143).  Foreign direct investment was controlled through a compulsory of partnership in 
joint ventures and a requirement of minimum 51 percent equity participation for domestic partners (Antons, 
2009, p.116). 119 
 
A  substantial  change  occurred  in  the  late  1980s.  When  Indonesia’s  position  as  an  energy 
producer  was  declining,  Indonesia’s  trade  policies  shifted  to  a  more  liberal  approach  and 
opened the market to foreign companies in order to attract revenues from other sectors than oil 
and gas (Uphoff, 1991, p.34; Rosser, 2002, p.147; Vanzetti, McGuire, and Prabowo, 2005, 
p.5; Bird, Hill, and Cuthbertson, 2008, pp.3–4). Furthermore, after the collapse of oil prices in 
the mid-1980s, and with the emergence of new competitors for FDI, Indonesia’s dependence 
on the US market, as one of its major trading partners, was also increasing. During this period, 
Indonesia’s economy relied on exports to the US market, and enjoyed the Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP), which granted a beneficiary country the permission to export qualified 
products into the US market on a duty-free basis.
 In 1985, for example, Indonesia used this 
GSP privilege to export duty-free goods to the US that valued up to US$28 million (Gielen, 
1988, p.102). Furthermore, the US was also one of the biggest foreign sources of FDI in 
Indonesia with US$758 million in 1988 alone (Kusumadara, 2000a, pp.156–57). As can be 
seen from the following table, Indonesia was the main destination of US FDI in developing 
East Asia from 1982–1988. In this regard, when Indonesia’s position as an energy producer 
weakened, Indonesia was no longer able to sustain its protectionist trade policy, nor was it 
immune from the escalating demand from the US government to improve its IPR protection 
during this period.  
 
Table 4.2 United States Foreign Direct Investment to Developing East Asia 1982–1988 (in 
US$ millions) 
 
Country  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  Total 
Indonesia  2,281  2,051  1,337  1,176  1,178  999  758  9,780 
Hong Kong  2,928  482  428  443  342  266  301  5,910 
Malaysia  1,199  498  440  357  336  541  491  3,862 
Singapore  1,745  282  243  245  226  246  416  3,403 
Thailand  777  413  373  192  95  94  217  2,161 
Philippines  1,308  194  156  114  126  119  140  2,157 
Taiwan  521  125  140  154  147  133  254  1,474 
South Korea  641  88  105  76  78  74  185  1,247 
  
Source: Modified from Guisinger (1991, p.34). 
 
Considering this background, when the Indonesian government finally adopted its first patent 
law  in  1989,  the  existing  literature  mainly  considers  that  the  enactment  of  this  Act  was 
intended  to  accommodate  external  pressures  (Gielen,  1988,  p.102;  Rosser,  1999,  p.103; 120 
 
Antons, 2000, p.134; Kusumadara, 2000a, p.133). Such an argument is not unjustified. During 
the process of the enactment of the new patent act, for instance, the US embassy constantly 
lobbied the Indonesian government to ensure that the new patent act would provide sufficient 
protection (Rosser, 1999, p.111).  
 
As a response to these constant lobbies, on 30 July 1986, President Suharto announced the 
establishment  of  a  Working  Team  on  IP,  which  consisted  of  representatives  from  all  the 
ministries  involved,  to  assess  the  condition  of  IPR  protection  in  Indonesia.
66  A  study  by 
Uphoff  (1991,  p.33)  reveals  that,  within  the  Working  Team,  there  was  the  disagreement 
among the ministries. Strong supporters for the adoption of new patent legislation were the 
Ministry of Research and Technology and the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry of Trade was 
also more responsive to US demands on the IPR protection issue expecting trade privileges 
and market access to the US market as the concession. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Health
67  opposed  the  inclusion  of  the  pharmaceuticals  as  patentable,  and  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture opposed the inclusion of plant and animal varieties as patentable. Nevertheless, 
due to the nature of the authoritarian regime at that time, this disagreement was reconciled by 
the decision from the  Minister of State Secretariat, who held a powerful control over the 
Working Team, authorised directly by President Suharto (Uphoff, 1991, p.33), who tended to 
be  more  sceptical  concerning  IPR  protection.  This  can  be  seen  from  the  statement  of  the 
Minister of State Secretariat during the process of the enactment of the first Indonesian patent 
act, arguing that Indonesia’s effort to enact the new patent act was not driven by Indonesia’s 
economic needs:   
“...the enactment of the Patent Act in Indonesia was not concerned with 
technological development or the protection of existing patent, but rather 
was  about  the  politics  of  law.  [Moreover]  The  Patent  Act  was  not 
necessarily important for Indonesian economic development because a 
good  patent  system  did  not  guarantee  the  effective,  optimal,  and 
substantive  transfer  of  technology”  (the  statement  of  the  Minister  of 
State Secretariat, as quoted by Kusumadara (2000, pp.64-65).  
                                                 
66 This Working Team worked under the coordination of the Minister of State Secretariat, who was appointed as 
the President’s deputy and had a powerful control (Uphoff, 1991, pp.30–32). Uphoff (1991, p.34) further argues 
that by appointing the Minister of State Secretary as his deputy, Suharto had a critical role in the working team, 
which also meant full control of the outcome. As will be explained later, due to a substantial pressure to improve 
copyright regime compared to that on patent, the main task of the Working Team was to provide a 
recommendation to amend the existing copyright act.   
67 As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Health has a strong connection with the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry. In addition, according to Rosser (2002, pp.159–60) among these domestic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are state-owned enterprises such as PT Kimia Farma, PT Indonesia Farma, PT Bio Farma, and 
Phapros which also engaged in the production of copied drugs. 121 
 
 
Kusumadara (2000, pp.64–65) further argues that key decision makers at that time, including 
members of the Indonesian parliament and the Minister of Justice, also admitted that the main 
reason behind the enactment of the Patent Act of 1989 was not driven by the concern of 
encouraging  innovation  in  Indonesia,  but  more  to  respond  to  foreign  business  and  trade 
partners complaints.  
 
Previous discussions demonstrated that Indonesia indeed received external pressures, mainly 
from the US, in the forms of diplomatic pressures to improve its patent regime. This may lead 
to the conclusion that patent policy reform in Indonesia can be explained as a result of great 
power coercion as argued by neo-realists. Nevertheless, a closer observation on patent policy 
reform across time does not appear to support the neo-realist’s account. The empirical findings 
revealed  that  great  power  coercion  only  played  a  significant  role  in  influencing  the 
government’s decision concerning IP policy reform after the decline of Indonesia’s position as 
an energy producer. Prior to the oil crisis, however, since the Indonesian government did not 
find any advantage to having a strong patent protection, the government did not put any effort 
into  reforming  its  patent  regime,  despite  receiving  similar  pressures.  In  this  regard,  since 
patent policy reform in Indonesia does not correspond neatly with the external pressures it 
received,  therefore  the  external  pressure  explanation,  as  argued  by  neo-realists,  can  only 
provide a partial explanation to understanding the patent policy reform prior to and during the 
TRIPs negotiations.  
 
4.5.1.2.2 Patent Policy Change during the Transition Period  
 
After the TRIPs negotiations were concluded and Indonesia entered its transition period, the 
Indonesian government proposed a bill to amend the existing patent legislation. Responding to 
government’s plan to introduce a new patent act, the head of the Indonesian Pharmaceutical 
Association as the official representative body of the domestic pharmaceutical industry, urged 
the government to delay the amendment of Patent Act until 2000, to give more time for the 
domestic companies to adjust themselves to the stringent rules as required by TRIPs (Rosser, 
1999, p.113, 2002, p.163–64). In response to this objection, the Minister of Justice stated that 
Indonesia  could  no  longer  tolerate  IPR  violations,  because  of  its  damaging  effect  on 
Indonesia’s reputation and its quest for foreign investment (Rosser, 1999, p.114). It should be 122 
 
noted, however, domestic pharmaceutical industries’ objection during this period was not as 
strong as their opposition back to the 1980s. This was not only because the interests of the 
conglomerates in the pharmaceutical industry were relatively small compared to their interests 
in other business sectors, but also, in the early 1990s, many of them had already established a 
licensing agreement and developed a new marketing and strategic partnership with the foreign 
pharmaceutical industry (Rosser, 2002, 163; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2011, p.296). According 
to Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, p.296), knowing that the government would adopt a new 
patent  act  as  a  response  to  Indonesia’s  TRIPs  obligations,  one  of  the  leading  Indonesian 
pharmaceutical  companies,  Kalbe  Farma,  developed  a  new  marketing  strategy  involving 
foreign companies, in order to secure marketing rights in Indonesia. Given the fact that there 
was  no  solid  opposition  from  the  domestic  pharmaceutical  industry,  the  government 
successfully amended the patent legislation in 1997. 
 
In  addition,  during  1997–1998,  Indonesia  was  also  hit  by  a  financial  crisis  which  was 
accompanied by political instability and social unrest. As could be seen during the oil crisis in 
the mid-1980s, in order to deal with the financial crisis, the Indonesian government had to 
reform its economic policy again (Vanzetti, McGuire, and Prabowo, 2005, pp.5-6). This can 
be  seen,  for  example,  when  the  Indonesian  government  was  forced  to  sign  the  extensive 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions, including more deregulation and privatisation 
of  state-owned  companies  (Hadiz  and  Robison,  2005,  p.221).  Furthermore,  according  to 
Rosser (2002, p.147), among other policies that were under strong pressure to introduce liberal 
economic reform during this period was IP legislation. In this regard, with the need to recover 
from  the  crisis,  the  Indonesian  government  then  also  perceived  that  improving  its  patent 
regime would provide a better environment in which to attract FDI.  
 
In order to meet its TRIPs obligations, the Patent Act of 1997 omitted the provisions relating 
to the importation of patented products without the consent of the patent holders.  According 
to Jhamtani and Hanim (2002, p.87), the removal of the provision relating to the rights of 
patent  holders  was  demanded  primarily  by  US  pharmaceuticals  industries,  as  mainly 
represented  by  the  Pharmaceutical  Research  and  Manufacturers  of  America  (PhRMA).
68 
PhRMA  considered  the  provision  under  previous  patent  acts  which  allowed  domestic 
                                                 
68 The PhRMA represents US leading pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies (see PhRMA, n. d. 
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pharmaceutical companies to import patented materials without the patent holders’ consent, as 
unfair to their business, since the domestic pharmaceutical companies were able to supply the 
domestic market with cheaper non-patented medicine. Nevertheless, despite the fact that under 
the  Patent  Act  of  1997,  the  patent  regime  in  Indonesia  was  already  beyond  the  TRIPs 
requirements,  PhRMA  still  expressed  their  dissatisfaction  regarding  ambiguity  in  the 
legislation  wording,  which  in  their  opinion,  would  make  it  difficult  to  deal  with  patent 
infringement cases (PhRMA, 1998).
69 For this reason, PhRMA urged the US government to 
classify Indonesia with Priority Watch List (PWL) status on the USTR Special 301 Report in 
1998.
70 As can be seen from the USTR Special 301 Report, Indonesia was placed with PWL 
status in 1998 and 1999. After being lowered to WL status shortly in 2000, Indonesia was 
placed again with PWL status in 2001 until 2006, and also in 2009 and 2010. It should be 
noted, however, even though during this period Indonesia received pressure from the US to 
improve its patent regime, as explained earlier, external pressures started to play a crucial role 
only after Indonesia was hit by the crisis. In this regard, great power coercion can only provide 
a partial explanation in understanding patent policy change in Indonesia. This suggests the 
need to search for other causes of compliance in the domestic sphere.  
 
A  closer  observation  on  domestic  actors’  preference  reveals  that  there  was  no  significant 
change  in  the  percentage  of  domestic  applicants  compared  to  foreign  applicants  in  patent 
applications in Indonesia even after the improvement of patent regime through the adoption of 
several  patent  legislations.  Based  on  the  data  from  the  Indonesian  Directorate  General  of 
Intellectual Property Rights (DGIPR), foreign applicants for patent applications in Indonesia 
constantly occupied more than 89.93 percent of applications from 1991 to 2010 (see figure 4.1 
and  Appendix  VI  (table  VI.1)).  Furthermore,  despite  a  steady  improvement  in  domestic 
applicants, the high percentage of foreign applicants compared to the domestic ones still did 
not change significantly even after a decade of the adoption of the first Indonesian patent act 
in 1989.  
                                                 
69 For a more detailed explanation see PhRMA’s report on Indonesia in 1998 (PhRMA, n. d. (c)). 
70 This is reflected from their documents submitted both to USTR for 301 Special Report in 2000 and National 
Trade Estimate in 1998 and 1999. For the full documents see PhRMA, n. d. (c), (e), (k). 124 
 
Figure 4.1 Patent Applications in Indonesia (1991–2010) 
 
Source: The Indonesian Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights (DGIPR, n. d. (a)) 
[as of 15 January 2011]. 
 
In this regard, given the fact that there was only a low number of domestic constituents for a 
strong patent regime, the Indonesian government’s decision to reform its patent legislation 
prior to the deadline, and also with more rigorous rules, is better explained by looking at the 
shift in the preferences of some government institutions regarding patent protection, which 
had  started  to  develop  when  the  Indonesian  government  reformed  its  patent  legislation  in 
1997.  A  more  favourable  preference  for  strong  IPR  protection  among  the  Indonesian 
government  officials  in  recent  years  was  also  pointed  out  by  an  Indonesian  NGO 
representative  in  the  interview  with  the  author.
71  The  change  in  government  institutions’ 
preference concerning patent protection is mostly noticeable from the Ministry of Justice and 
Human Rights’ preference. Contrary to its IP-indifferent position during the adoption of the 
first  patent  act  in  1989,  during  the  amendment  process  of  IP  legislation  (patents  and 
trademarks) in the early 2000s, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights had shifted to a Pro-
IP position. In this context, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights stated that the enactment 
of a series of IP laws in the early 2000s was mainly to regain international trust in Indonesia, 
to  promote  international  trade,  to  attract  foreign  investment,  to  encourage  the  transfer  of 
technology,  as  well  as  to  fulfil  the  Indonesian  obligations  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement 
(Lindsey et al., 2006, pp.70–71). In other words, the adoption of patent (and also trademark) 
laws in 2001 was intended to accommodate both national interests and international demands:  
                                                 
71 Author’s interview with an Indonesian NGO representative (Jakarta, 25 August 2009)   125 
 
“[T]he main purpose of these bills is to accommodate both national and 
international  requirements  and  to  incorporate  each  respective  field  of 
intellectual  property  rights,  including  patents  and  trademark...With  the 
endorsement of the bills we hope to create a more favourable climate for 
the public to pursue new creations, innovations and inventions. The bills 
are also expected to enhance trade, foreign investment and the holistic 
system of the intellectual property rights” (Statement by the Indonesian 
Minister of Justice and Human Rights at the House plenary session after 
the House of Representatives, Jakarta Post, 3 July 2001).
72 
 
The above statement from the Minister of Justice and Human Rights can be considered as the 
evidence of the shift in the Ministry’s preference regarding patent protection, from being IP-
indifferent to having a more favourable preference concerning IPR protection. With this shift, 
the preference of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights is now in line with the Ministry of 
Research and Technology as well as the Ministry of Industry as the long-established pro-IP 
actors  in  Indonesia.  Within  this  context,  in  the  interviews  with  the  author,  Indonesian 
government officials argued that the IPR protection is needed, not only to provide a suitable 
condition for attracting foreign direct investment, but also to improve domestic creativity and 
innovation,  which  in  the  long  term  will  be  beneficial  for  Indonesia’s  technological 
development. Furthermore, they argue that “...improving IPR regime would be beneficial for 
Indonesia’s reputation and therefore Indonesia could gain the trust from foreign investors to 
invest in Indonesia...”
73 The shift in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights’ preference 
regarding patent protection has contributed to the change in domestic actors’ constellation on 
patent policy reform, and thus also, provided a more conducive condition for patent policy 
reform to take place.  
 
It should be noted, however, that one significant change under the new Patent Act of 2001 is 
the reinsertion of the provision to exclude living creatures of any kind, with the exception of 
microorganisms, as well as all biological processes essential for the production of plants or 
animals, with the exception of non-biological processes and microbiological processes, from 
patentability, which was removed under the Patent Act of 1997. By inserting this provision 
again,  Indonesia’s  patent  regime  under  the  Patent  Act  of  2001,  is  utilising  the  flexibility 
available  on  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  and,  therefore,  can  be  considered  as  TRIPs-minimum 
instead of TRIPs-plus, as under the previous act. A closer observation on the domestic politics 
                                                 
72 It should be noted that the Patent Act of 2001 and the Trademark Act of 2001 were adopted at the same time on 
1 August 2001. 
73 Author’s interview with Indonesian government officials (Jakarta, 26 August 2009). 126 
 
suggests that this roll back was possible mainly due to the demands from newly engaged 
domestic actors in IP-related issues. As Indonesia entered its transition to democracy, new 
constituents on IP-related issues, particularly from wider government institutions, started to 
play significant roles in influencing the decision making process. In this regard, the Ministry 
of Environment, which had a limited role in previous policy reform, began to actively engage 
in the IP policy making process. Due to the fear of negative implications of having strong IPR 
protection,  including  the  misappropriation  of  traditional  work  and  knowledge,  and  bio-
piracy,
74  the  Ministry  of  Environment—which  were  also  supported  by  the  Ministry  of 
Agriculture  and  local  NGOs—perceived  the  necessity  of  having  safeguards  in  Indonesian 
patent law (Jhamtani and Hanim, 2002, p.91).
75 The engagement of these new domestic actors 
made the insertion of the safeguards into the Patent Act of 2001 become possible, and the 
flexibilities available in TRIPs were able to be accommodated. This signified the roll back in 
Indonesia’s patent act from adopting a commitment going farther than TRIPs to only meeting 
the  minimum  TRIPs  requirements.  Within  this  context,  the  decision  of  the  Indonesian 
government to roll back its patent legislation depicts the flaw in the neo-realist’s account of 
the role of great power coercion. Since adopting more rigorous rules is in line with the interest 
of the dominant state, neo-realism is unlikely to expect a weaker state to roll back its domestic 
policy. 
 
4.5.1.2.3 Patent Policy Change after the end of the Transition Period 
 
Even  though  developing  countries  were  granted  a  longer  transition  period  to  reform  their 
patent legislation, until 2005, as explained earlier, Indonesia did not take full advantage of this 
transition period by reforming its patent legislation while still in its transition period, in 1997 
and  2001.  Since  after  the  last  amendment  in  2001  (as  of  January  2011),  the  Indonesian 
government has not adopted any other patent legislation; the patent protection in Indonesia is 
still  governed  under  the  Patent  Act  of  2001,  which  already  met  the  TRIPs  minimum 
requirements.  
 
                                                 
74 For a bio-piracy definition, see Chapter 1.  
75 Some of the local NGOs involved in the campaign against bio-piracy include the Indonesian Consumers 
Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia–YLKI) and the Pesticide Action Network (Jakarta Post, 
2000b).   127 
 
To conclude, empirical findings demonstrate that external pressures can only provide a partial 
explanation for understanding patent policy reform in Indonesia. Indonesia did indeed receive 
external pressure, mainly from the US, in the forms of diplomatic and industry pressures, as 
well  as  being  on  the  USTR  Special  301  Report,  mostly  with  PWL  status.  Nevertheless, 
empirical findings also indicate that external pressures only played a significant role after the 
crisis  which  intensified  Indonesia’s  dependence  on  foreign  markets  and  investments. 
Responding  to  external  pressures  to  improve  patent  was  in  line  with  the  need  of  the 
government  to  recover  from  both  the  oil  and  financial  crises  in  order  to  attract  foreign 
investment.  Prior  to  the  crisis,  despite  receiving  similar  level  of  pressure,  the  Indonesian 
government did not put any effort into protecting IPR, since the government did not regard a 
strong  patent  protection  as  necessary  for  its  development  needs.  In  this  regard,  to  fully 
understand the patent policy reform in Indonesia, it is important to understand the way in 
which domestic actors responded to external pressures.  
 
The empirical findings also demonstrate that when there was no significant change in external 
pressures, policy reform took place because there was a shift in the preferences, particularly 
among government institutions, concerning IPR protection. Previous discussion indicates that, 
by  the  end  of  the  1990s,  there  were  more  government  institutions  that  displayed  a  more 
favourable preference concerning patent protection. This is noticeable from the shift in the 
preference of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights from IP-indifferent to being more 
favourable  regarding  IP  protection.  With  the  shift  in  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  Human 
Rights’ preference, there were more Pro-IP actors among government institutions, which thus 
contributed  to  provide  a  more  favourable  condition  for  IP  policy  change  to  take  place. 
Previous discussion also showed that the newly engaged government institutions for IP-related 
issues, such as the Ministry of Environment, during the last patent amendment process, has 
made reversing patent legislation, from more rigorous rules to only meeting the minimum 
TRIPs requirements, possible.   
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4.5.2  Indonesia’s  Copyright  Policy  Change:  An  Extensive  Effort  of  Policy 
Reform 
 
As can be seen from the patent policy reform, policy reform in copyright protection, taken by 
the  Indonesian  government  after  TRIPs,  also  deviates  from  the  expectations  of  major  IR 
theories, particularly concerning the role of external pressures. The copyright policy reform in 
Indonesia took place both with the presence and in the absence of external pressures. A closer 
observation  on  domestic  politics  indicates  that,  unlike  in  the  patent  policy  reform,  the 
existence of significant domestic constituents for a strong copyright protection contributes 
towards shaping the policy reform process. 
 
4.5.2.1 Assessing Indonesia’s Copyright Legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
Unlike  the  Dutch  Patent  Act  of  1910,  which  was  formally  abolished,  the  Indonesian 
government retained the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 after the independence. However, due 
to unstable economic and political situations, this law had never been effectively implemented. 
Furthermore, considering the Indonesian government’s inability to fulfil its obligations due to 
the severe economic situation, the Indonesian government formally withdrew its membership 
of the Berne Convention in 1958. The government argued that, as a newly independent poor 
country, if it retained its membership of the Berne Convention, Indonesia would not be able to 
pay royalties to foreign copyright holders (Suwanto, 1993, p.267). In addition, the government 
also argued that, considering its poor condition, to improve the quality of education it was 
essential for the society to be able to copy expensive books freely (Antons, 2000, p.49). This 
means that, in reality, after the independence until the early 1980s, Indonesia did not have any 
effective regulations concerning copyright protection, nor did it commit to any international 
obligations to provide such purpose.  
 
It  took  almost  four  decades  for  the  government  to  enact  its  first  copyright  law  after  the 
independence, when, in 1982, the Indonesian government under the Suharto Administration 
finally replaced the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 with the Copyright Act no. 6/1982. As table 
4.2 illustrates, under this act, the Indonesian government drastically reduced the duration of 
copyright protection from the life of the author plus 50 years, under the Dutch Copyright Act 
1912, to the author’s lifetime plus 25 years. Also, the Act did not provide copyright protection 
to foreign works, unless the author of the foreign work published his/her work for the first 129 
 
time in Indonesia. With this provision, the government intended to protect the national interest 
of ensuring the availability of foreign works for education and development. Consequently, 
almost  all  creations  or works  made  by  foreigners  and  published  for  the  first  time  outside 
Indonesia,  could  be  published,  reproduced  and  translated  in  Indonesia  without  the 
authorisation of the creators (Gielen, 1988, p.101; Kusumadara, 2000a, p.151).  
 
After the enactment of its first copyright law in 1982, the Indonesian government adopted 
another Copyright Act in 1987. As summarised in table 4.2, under the new legislation, the 
Indonesian government removed controversial appropriation provisions, extended the duration 
of  copyright  protection,  expanded  the  scope  of  protection  to  new  areas,  and  included  the 
protection for foreign works, as well as increased the sanctions for piracy. The Copyright Act 
of  1987  increased  the  duration  of  copyright  protection  for  original  works  to  the  author’s 
lifetime plus 55 years, and 25 years of protection for adaptations. The scope of the copyright 
protection was extended to include video recording, sound recording, computer programmes, 
and the Indonesian traditional batik art. Nevertheless, the Copyright Act 1987 still maintained 
several safeguard provisions to allow for limited copying or duplicating of copyrighted works 
by public libraries, scientific and educational institutions, and documentation centres for non-
commercial purposes only. It also allowed the making of a back-up of computer software, by 
the owner of the software, for personal use only. The Copyright Act 1987 also retained some 
provisions under the Copyright Act 1982, which were related to the restrictions of the freedom 
of expression for reasons of political stability, which reflected the authoritarian character of 
Suharto’s regime.  
 
As a response to its TRIPs obligations, the Indonesian government amended its copyright law 
again in 1997. The amendment of this copyright law was mainly intended to further extend the 
scope  of  the  copyrighted  works,  and  increase  the  duration  of  protection  for  certain  areas. 
Under  this  law,  the  scope  of  copyright  protection  is  extended  to  rental  rights  for 
cinematographic  works,  and  neighbouring  rights  that  cover  protection  for  performers, 
producers  of  sound  recordings,  as  well  as  broadcasting  institutions  (see  table  4.2).  The 
Copyright Act of 1997 also contains provision on copyright protection for unknown authors or 
creators. In this regard, for unpublished works, the state will become the copyright holder on 
behalf of the unknown author, while the copyright will be granted to the publishers if the 
works have been published. To complement the enactment of the Copyright Act 1997, the 130 
 
government also issued the Presidential Decree No. 18/1997 to ratify and rejoin the Berne 
Convention, reversing its withdrawal in 1958 (Kusumadara, 2000a, pp.226–27). Furthermore, 
in  the  same  year,  the  Indonesian  government  became  the  first  nation  to  ratify  the  WIPO 
Copyright Treaty by Presidential Decree No. 19/1997 (Antons, 2008b, p.238). 
 
Even though, by adopting a new Copyright Act in 1997, Indonesia arguably had already met 
its  TRIPs  obligations,  the  Indonesian  government  once  again  amended  the  copyright  law, 
through  the  enactment  of  the  Copyright  Act  No.  19/2002.  It  extended  the  scope  of  the 
copyrighted works to include databases and optical discs. The Copyright Act of 2002 clearly 
prohibited  parallel  importation  for  copyrighted  work.  However,  it  still  maintained  some 
safeguard provisions, such as the rights of the government to hold the copyright for works 
from prehistoric remains, historical and other national cultural objectives and folklores. It also 
used the flexibility granted under the TRIPs Agreement to exclude copyright infringement for 
education, research, and scientific purposes, as long as the sources are properly cited. It also 
retains the provision related to the authorisation of back-up copies of computer programmes 
for personal use.  131 
 
Table 4.3 The Indonesian Copyright Acts and TRIPs Compatibility 
Aspects  TRIPs 
Obligations 
Prior to and during TRIPs 
Negotiations 
After TRIPs 
Prior to 
Negotiations 
(No.6/1982) 
During 
Negotiations 
(No.7/1987) 
During 
Transition 
(No.12/1997) 
After in force  
(No.19/2002) 
Subject matter 
coverage 
Scientific, 
literary, and 
artistic works 
Protected  Protected  Protected  Protected 
Computer 
programmes, 
video recording, 
sound recording 
Not protected  Protected  Protected  Protected 
Rental rights   Not protected  Not 
protected 
Protected  Protected 
Related rights   Not protected  Not 
protected 
Protected   Protected 
Database and 
optical discs 
Not protected  Not 
protected 
Not protected  Protected 
Duration of 
protection 
other than 
photographic 
work and 
applied art 
Life of author 
+50 years 
Life of author  
+25 years 
Life of 
author +50 
years 
 
Life of author 
+50 years  
Life of author 
+50 years  
Duration of 
protection for 
performers and 
producers of 
phonograms 
50 years  Not protected  Not 
protected 
50 years  50 years 
Duration of 
protection for 
broadcasting 
organisations 
20 years  Not protected  Not 
protected 
20 years  20 years 
Duration of 
protection for 
computer 
programmes 
50 years  Not protected  15 years  50 years  50 years 
Eligible 
copyright 
holders 
National 
treatment and 
MFN principles 
Only for 
Indonesian 
citizens and 
foreign works 
where the first 
publication of the 
creation took 
place in Indonesia 
Granted 
national 
treatment 
and MFN 
principles 
 
Granted 
national 
treatment and 
MFN 
principles  
Granted 
national 
treatment and 
MFN 
principles  
Enforcement  Requires civil 
and criminal 
enforcement but 
no minimum 
requirements 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
TRIPs 
Compatibility 
--  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-
minimum 
TRIPs-
minimum 
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Note: Author’s assessment on the Indonesian Copyright Act No. 6/1982 [in Indonesian], the 
Indonesian Copyright Act No.7/1987 [in Indonesian], the Indonesian Copyright Act 
No.12/1997 [in Indonesian], and the Indonesian Copyright Act No.19/2002. It should be 
noted that related rights include performers, producers of phonograms, and broadcasting 
organisations rights. 
 
4.5.2.2 Indonesia’s Copyright Legislation: Explaining Policy Change 
 
As explained previously, even though it took several decades for the Indonesian government 
to  adopt  its  first  copyright  legislation  after  independence,  the  Indonesian  government 
extensively altered its existing copyright policy reform after the adoption of its first copyright 
act.  Within  less  than  5  years  after  the  adoption  of  its  first  Copyright  Act  in  1982,  the 
Indonesian government amended that act in 1987. Furthermore, as a response to its obligations 
under the TRIPs Agreement, Indonesia amended the copyright law in 1997, and again in 2002. 
The  rapid  and  extensive  response  of  the  Indonesian  government  in  fulfilling  its  TRIPs 
obligations on copyright protection is puzzling, since, like other aspects of IPR protection, 
copyright protection also has no historical roots in Indonesian society, nor had it become the 
priority  of  the  Indonesian  government’s  development  plan.  In  addition  to  the  mounting 
external pressures, other explanations can be traced from the fact of the existence of several 
significant  Pro-IP  domestic  societal  actors  who  were  in  favour  of  a  strong  copyright 
protection.  
 
4.5.2.2.1 Copyright Policy Change prior to and during the TRIPs Negotiations 
 
Since the intention of the Copyright Act of 1982 was to accommodate mostly the needs of 
domestic actors, it can be understood if the act did not provide similar treatment to protect 
foreign works. Furthermore, despite the fact that the US government had already expressed its 
concern  regarding  the  lack  of  copyright  protection  for  foreign  works  in  Indonesia  during 
bilateral trade negotiations, the Indonesian government did not take any action to respond to 
such pressures. The demand from the US government in the mid-1980s to revise the Copyright 
Act  of  1982,  to  include  a  foreign  works  protection  as  a  condition  for  US  investment  in 
Indonesia, was rejected by the Indonesian government (Rosser, 1999, p.104). In this regard, 
responding to the proposal from the US trade official, the Head of the Indonesian National 
Development  Planning  Agency  (Badan  Perencanaan  Pembangunan  Nasional–Bappenas) 
stated that the  Indonesian government was willing to take the necessary  steps to simplify 133 
 
investment  and  procedures  as  requested  by  the  US  government,  however,  the  Indonesian 
government  was  not  willing  to  introduce  a  new  copyright  law  (Uphoff,  1991,  pp.28–29; 
Rosser,  1999,  p.104).  As  explained  earlier,  as  with  patents,  during  the  first  period  of  the 
copyright policy reform, Indonesia’s economy still relied on its high revenue from oil and gas 
(Lindsey et al., 2006, p.67), which permitted the Indonesian government to be more sceptical 
towards external pressures.  
 
In this regard, when the government amended the Copyright Act in 1987, as can be seen in the 
case of patents, the existing literatures also pointed out that external pressure, particularly 
from the US and the EU, was the main reason behind the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1987 (Gielen, 1988, p.102; Rosser, 1999, p.103; Antons, 2000, p.134; Kusumadara, 2000a, 
p.133). The pressures took several forms, including being on the USTR list mostly with PWL 
status,  being  criticised  in  the  reports  of  US  business  lobby  groups,  and  threat  of  trade 
sanctions.  According  to  Rosser  (2002,  p.152),  one  senior  US  Department  of  Commerce 
official,  stated  that  IPR  protection  issues  constituted  more  than  half  the  duties  of  USTR 
officials’ visits to Indonesia throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. As with the patent policy 
reform, after the collapse of oil prices in the global market in the mid-1980s, the Indonesian 
government  could  no  longer  be  immune  from  external  demand  to  improve  its  copyright 
protection (Lindsey et al., 2006, p.67; Rosser, 1999, p.102). In this regard, as can also be 
observed from the patent policy reform, a previous government’s sceptical response to these 
external pressures changed extensively with the deterioration of Indonesia’s position as an 
energy producer.  
 
In addition to the collapse of oil prices, there were two significant events in late 1985 which 
also contributed to add international pressure to the Indonesian government to improve its 
copyright regime (Uphoff, 1991, p.29; Rosser, 1999, p.104, 2002, pp.153–54). First, the world 
wide publicity of the production and sale of pirated recordings of the Live Aid charity concert 
by Indonesian producers. Second, the arrest of an Indonesian businessman who was using a 
diplomatic pouch for breaking US customs and copyrights, through the arrangement of the 
shipment of pirated cassettes to a US firm (Uphoff, 1991, p.29; Rosser, 1999, pp.104–105, 
2002, pp.153–54).  These two events, which put Indonesia in the international spotlight, had 
made the Indonesian government become more aware of the need to improve its copyright 134 
 
protection.
76 According to Uphoff (1991, pp.30), after these incidents, President Suharto gave 
a direct order to the involved ministries to deal with ‘the embarrassment’ promptly. The order 
from the President to deal with this issue had also contributed to the shift in the preference of 
some  government  institutions  concerning  copyright  protection  from  IP-sceptics  to  IP-
indifferent  due  to  their  growing  concern  not  only  over  avoiding  trade  sanctions  but  also 
regarding  Indonesia’s  damaging  reputation  as  a  haven  of  pirated  products.  This  shift  was 
mainly  evident  from  the  position  of  the  Ministry  of  State  Secretariat  as  the  direct 
representative of the President in the Working Team on IP. 
 
Following these events, US pressure to the Indonesian government to improve its copyrights 
regime was also intensified. Based on the USTR findings on IPR protection in Indonesia, the 
US government threatened to reconsider Indonesia’s benefits under the GSP due to lack of its 
copyright protection. The US government gave the Indonesian government until March 1987 
to improve its law concerning copyright protection (Gielen, 1988, p.102). Similarly, in May 
1987, the EU
77 declared that there would be an investigation into the Indonesian copyright 
law, to see whether it provided sufficient protection for sound recordings or not (Rosser, 1999, 
p.106; Antons, 2000, p.54; Gielen, 1988, p.102; Kusumadara, 2000a, p.160). In this context, 
based  on  the  complaint  from  the  International  Federation  of  Phonogram  and  Videogram 
Producers  (IFPI),  the  European  Commission  initiated  an  investigation  into  the  copyright 
protection condition in Indonesia (Gielen, 1988, p.102).  
 
Furthermore, the diplomatic appeal can also be seen from the fact that the IPR violation in 
Indonesia  was  one  of  the  issues  raised  by  US  President  Ronald  Reagan,  when  he  visited 
Indonesia and met with Indonesian President Suharto in 1986 (Uphoff, 1991, p.30; Rosser, 
1999,  p.106).  Following  to  this  visit,  the  US  government  sent  several  US  delegates  to 
Indonesia,  in  order  to  deal  particularly  with  IPR  protection  issue  (Rosser,  1999,  p.106). 
Through a constant flow of meetings, the US embassy was also trying to persuade top-level 
officials in various ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Research and Technology to 
emphasise  the  need  for  the  Indonesian  government  to  improve  its  copyright  law  (Uphoff, 
                                                 
76 It should be noted that, by the mid-1980s, Indonesia had a reputation as one of the havens of pirated products 
countries in the world (Rosser, 2002, p.149). 
77 As Gielen (1988, p.102) argues, “[U]nder Regulation (EC) 2641/84 of the Council of the European 
Communities, trade policy measures can be taken against third countries on the basis of unfair trade practices in 
such countries”. 135 
 
1991,  p.29).  Furthermore,  the  US  Ambassador  to  Indonesia  at  that  time  also  constantly 
appealed to the Indonesian government to improve its IPR protection and emphasised that no 
improvement would jeopardise the relationship of the two countries (Rosser, 1999, p.106). 
 
As explained in the section on patents, as a response to these pressures, on 30 July 1986, in 
order to prepare the new IP laws, President Suharto announced the establishment of a Working 
Team on IP, which consisted of representatives from all the ministries involved, to assess the 
condition of IPR protection in Indonesia (Uphoff, 1991, pp.30–31). Even though it was not as 
striking as in the case of patent policy reform, there was also the disagreement among the 
ministries involved in the Working Team regarding copyright policy reform. Nevertheless, as 
briefly mentioned earlier, due to the world wide publicity incidents in 1985, the preference of 
the Ministry of State Secretariat on copyright protection has shifted to IP-indifferent, even 
though the Ministry still displayed an IP-sceptic preference regarding patent protection.  
 
The Working Team recommended a bill to amend the existing copyright act, which was then 
approved  by  the  parliament  on  9  September  1987  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.31).  Under  the  new 
legislation,  the  Indonesian  government  inserted  several  provisions,  including  a  provision 
related  to  the  protection  of  foreign  works,  extending  the  duration  of  copyright  protection, 
expanding the scope of protection to new areas, as well as increasing sanctions for piracy 
(Antons, 2003b, p.398, 2008b, p.237).  
 
In this regard, based on Article 48c, the Copyright Act of 1987 granted a protection for foreign 
works even if the first publication did not take place in Indonesia, with a bilateral treaty, or 
from members of an international organisation in which Indonesia is a member. Following the 
adoption of this act, a bilateral treaty was concluded in April 1988 with the EU on sound 
recordings  (Uphoff,  1991,  p.31;  MacLeod,  1992,  p.366;  Antons,  2000,  p.54).  A  similar 
bilateral agreement was also concluded with the US in March 1989, to provide copyright 
protection in books, sound recordings, films, computer software, and other creative works 
(MacLeod,  1992,  p.366;  Antons,  2000,  p.54).  After  the  conclusion  of  this  bilateral  treaty, 
USTR then recommended that Indonesia’s GSP status would be maintained (Kusumadara, 
2000a, p.162). 
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Previous explanations illustrated that, prior to and during the TRIPs negotiations, Indonesia 
experienced substantial external pressures, mainly from the US, in the form of threats of the 
withdrawal  of  GSP  benefits,  to  improve  its  copyright  regime.  The  empirical  findings, 
however, also demonstrated that, prior to the oil crisis, the Indonesian government did not take 
any of the necessary steps to reform its existing copyright, despite receiving these pressures. In 
this regard, external pressures only played a significant role in influencing the government’s 
decision, when Indonesia’s position as an energy producer was declining and the Indonesian 
government was forced to accommodate foreign demands to improve its copyright regime. 
Previous discussion also demonstrated that, by the end of the 1980s, the preference of some of 
government institutions regarding IPR protection had started to shift from IP-sceptics to IP-
indifferent,  because  of  a  growing  concern  over  avoiding  trade  sanctions  and  Indonesia’s 
damaging  reputation  as  a  haven  of  pirated  products.  The  shift  in  some  of  government 
institutions’ preferences regarding copyright protection, therefore, also contributed to creating 
a more favourable condition in which copyright policy reform could occur.     
 
4.5.2.2.2 Copyright Policy Change during the Transition Period 
 
As can be seen from previous discussions, prior to and during the TRIPs negotiations, the 
Indonesian government had already reformed its existing copyright legislation. However, due 
to the continuation of dissatisfaction amongst the US business community at the lack of an 
improvement  in  copyright  protection  in  Indonesia,  even  after  the  adoption  of  the  new 
legislation  in  1987,  external  pressures  did  not  reduce  significantly.  During  the  1990s,  the 
International  Intellectual  Property  Alliance  (IIPA)
78  and  the  Business  Software  Alliance 
(BSA) demanded that the US government impose trade sanctions, in order to pressurise the 
Indonesian government to initiate further improvements in IP laws (Rosser, 1999, p.107).  The 
US government responded to this demand by lowering Indonesia’s status from Watch List 
(WL) status to Priority Watch List (PWL) status in the USTR Special 301 Report in 1996, and 
put Indonesia as a subject for further investigation, as well as increasing the surveillance level 
(Rosser, 1999, pp.107–8).  
 
                                                 
78  The  IIPA,  which  was  established  in  1984,  is  a  private  sector  coalition  of  seven  trade  associations 
representing U.S. copyright-based industries including publishers, businesses and entertainment software 
producers, music publishers, and the recording industry (IIPA, n. d.). 
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As a response to both diplomatic and industry pressures, mainly from the US, the Indonesian 
government amended the copyright law in 1997, by enacting the Copyright Act No. 12/1997. 
As  explained  earlier,  the  amendment  of  this  law  is  mainly  intended  to  accommodate  the 
demands from the US to extend the scope of the copyright protection. Nevertheless, despite a 
series of the amendments of the copyright legislation, Indonesia’s status on the USTR Special 
301 Report did not change significantly. Indonesia has been constantly on the USTR Special 
301  Report  mostly  with  Priority  Watch  List  (PWL)  status,  essentially  due  to  its  lack  of 
copyright protection, which resulted in a high instance of the piracy of software and other 
copyrighted products.  
 
4.5.2.2.3 Copyright Policy Change after the end of the Transition Period 
 
Despite the fact that under the Copyright Act of 1997, Indonesia already met the minimum 
TRIPs  requirements,  the  Indonesian  government  once  again  amended  the  copyright  law 
through  the  enactment  of  the  Copyright  Act  No.  19/2002.  Much  of  the  existing  literature 
considers that a considerable external pressure, mainly from the US and the EU, again, can be 
seen as one of the reasons behind the enactment of this new copyright act. Haryanto (n. d.) 
argues  that  extensive  pressure  from  the  US  is  the  main  reason  behind  the  amendment  of 
Copyright Act, particularly because it is Indonesia’s only national legislation that has been 
amended more than 3 times within 20 years. Furthermore, being on the list, mostly with PWL 
status is considered to  be a problem by the  government, since the US is still  Indonesia’s 
biggest export market, accounting for around 16 percent of total export sales (Witular, 2002). 
As  stated  by  the  Deputy  Director  of  the  Indonesian  Directorate  of  Copyright,  Industrial 
Designs, Integrated Circuit, Layout Designs, and Trade Secret, “[B]eing on the their [USTR] 
priority watch list, Indonesia risks facing punitive measures from the US such as export bans, 
embargo, and other penalties” (quoted by Setiogi, 2004).  Similarly, the Deputy Recording of 
Anti-Piracy Association of Indonesia stated that if the Indonesian government was not able to 
reduce the high level of piracy rate from 500 percent to 30 percent within the next few months, 
the US government threatened to boycott Indonesia’s export to the US market (GATRA, 7 
February 2002).  
 
As can be seen from the following table, the IIPA Report estimated that the level of motion 
pictures piracy from 1995 to 2004 in Indonesian market was continuously above 90 percent, 138 
 
with the estimated trade losses around US$15 million to US$30 million per year.  Meanwhile, 
the level of business software piracy from 1995 to 2009 was also constantly above 80 percent, 
with estimated annual trade losses starting from US$33.2 million to US$482 million. In total, 
the estimated annual trade losses since 1995 has never been less than US$134 million per year.  
 
Table 4.4 Estimated Trade Losses and Level of Piracy in Indonesia 1995–2009 (in US$ 
millions) 
 
Sources: IIPA Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement on Indonesia 
(2001–2009) and IIPA 2010 “Special 301” 
Industry  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level 
Motion 
Pictures 
15.0  98%  19.0  85%  19.0  85%  25.0  90%  25.0  90% 
Records & 
Music  
2.0  9%  12.0  15%  9.0  12%  3.0  12%  3.0  20% 
Business 
Software  
117.3  98%  170.3  98%  139.6  93%  47.3  92%  33.2  85% 
Entertainment 
Software 
82.6  80%  86.0  82%  87.2  89%  81.7  95%  80.4  92% 
Books  45.0  NA  47.0  NA  47.0  NA  30.0  NA  32.0  NA 
TOTALS  261.9    334.3    301.8    187.0    173.6   
Industry  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level 
Motion 
Pictures 
25.0  90%  27.5  90%  28.0  90%  29.0  92%  32.0  92% 
Records & 
Music  
21.6  56%  67.9  87%  92.3  89%  44.5  87%  27.6  80% 
Business 
Software  
55.7  89%  63.1  88%  109.6  89%  94.0  88%  100.0  87% 
Entertainment 
Software 
NA  99%  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Books  32.0  NA  30.0  NA  30.0  NA  30.0  NA  32.0  NA 
TOTALS  134.3    188.5    259.9    197.5    191.6   
Industry  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level 
Motion 
Pictures 
NA  87%  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  N/A  N/A 
Records & 
Music  
13.8  88%  17.2  91%  20.2  92%  20.0  95%  24.7  95% 
Business 
Software  
153.0  87%  191.0  85%  226.0  84%  299.0  85%  487.3  86% 
Entertainment 
Software 
NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  N/A  N/A 
Books  32.0  NA  32.0  NA  32.0  NA  NA  NA  N/A  N/A 
TOTALS  198.8    240.2    278.2    319.0    512   139 
 
 
Nevertheless, external pressure is not the only reason behind the copyright policy reform in 
Indonesia. Unlike in the case of patents, where the existence of domestic constituents for 
strong  patent  protection  is  generally  limited,  there  can  be  found  a  significant  number  of 
domestic constituents for strong copyright protection in domestic societal actors. These actors 
advocate the policy reform for adequate copyright protection, either because they are driven 
by material benefits, or due to the concern for Indonesia’s reputation in the international arena. 
These domestic societal actors include publishers, authors, musicians, music directors and a 
newly born domestic IT business.
79 In recent years, domestic actors’ supports for a strong 
copyright  protection  regime  include  the  establishment  of  the  Indonesian  Creative  Act 
Foundation,  the  Indonesian  Intellectual  Property  Rights  Society,  and  the  Society  against 
Piracy and Pornography (Jakarta Post, 2000a). It should be noted, however, even though a 
number  of  organisations,  mainly  representing  the  publishers  and  authors,  have  been 
established  to  promote  copyright  protection  in  Indonesia  since  the  1960s,  due  to  the 
authoritarian nature of the political regime, it took almost two decades for these domestic 
societal actors to be able to endorse the enactment of the first Indonesian Copyright, which 
was finally adopted in 1982 (Antons, 2004a, p.33; Uphoff, 1991, p.35). As Antons (2003b, 
p.400)  argues,  the  existence  of  these  actors  can  even  be  traced  back  to  the  role  of  the 
Indonesian Publishers Association (Ikatan Penerbit Indonesia–IKAPI), which had been trying 
to demand adequate copyright protection since the 1960s.  
 
In addition, in recent years, the newly emerging business community, particularly in the IT 
sector  also  contributed  to  the  demands  for  a  more  adequate  IPR  protection.  Their  main 
concern was related to Indonesia’s bad reputation as an illegal software haven, which had a 
detrimental effect for the IT business in Indonesia (Gunadi, 2003). The lack of IPR protection 
also resulted in unfair competition among the business community. Copyrighted computer 
programme is generally beyond the purchasing power of the majority of Indonesian society; 
meanwhile, illegal software is widely accessible at a very low price. Therefore, in order to 
encourage and to ensure fair competition in Indonesia, the IT business community argued that 
it is imperative to have strong legal protection for IPR (Gunadi, 2003). 
                                                 
79 Compared to the other domestic societal actors, domestic IT business in Indonesia is relatively new. This can 
be observed from the Indonesian Directorate General of IPR data, prior to 2004 there were no domestic 
applications for copyright of computer programme. On the other hand, the role of other domestic societal actors 
in copyright protection could be traced back to the 1960s when a number of publishers and authors organisations 
were established to promote copyright protection (Antons, 2003a, p.400). 140 
 
 
The  domestic  support  for  strong  copyright  protection  is  also  reflected  in  the  significant 
number of domestic copyright applicants compared to foreign applicants. As can be seen from 
the  following  figure,  the  domestic  copyright  applications  constantly  reached  above  95.85 
percent from 1991 to the end of 2010 as opposed to foreign applicants, which on average, only 
accounted for less than 4.15 percent (see figure 4.2 and Appendix VI (table VI.2)). In addition, 
unlike in the case of patent, domestic opposition for strong copyright protection mainly came 
from  small-medium  producers  of  counterfeit  products,  which  had  no  strong  political 
connection, compared to that of the pharmaceutical industry as in the case of the patent policy 
reform.
80 As Rosser argues (2002, p.156), in the illegal production of copyrighted products, 
the involvement of large, politically well-connected conglomerates could not be found. 
 
Figure 4.2 Copyright Applications in Indonesia (1991–2010) 
 
Source: The Indonesian Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights (DGIPR, n. d. (b)) 
[as of 15 January 2011]. 
 
In conclusion, as can be seen from the patent policy reform, the role of external pressure only 
provides  a  partial  explanation  in  understanding  the  copyright  policy  reform  in  Indonesia. 
Empirical findings demonstrate that Indonesia experienced pressure to improve its copyright 
regime, in the form of threats of withdrawal of its GSP benefits and other trade sanctions. 
However, prior to the oil crisis in the mid-1980s, copyright policy reform did not take place, 
                                                 
80 These small-medium industries include internet café providers using illegal software to run their business. By 
using illegal software they can reduce the cost and are able to provide affordable internet access in a low income 
level of Indonesian society (Magdalena, 2005). 141 
 
despite these substantial pressures. A closer observation suggests, as can be seen from the 
patent policy reform, the shift in the preference of some of government institutions (as mainly 
evident  from  the  preference  of  the  Ministry  of  State  Secretariat),  from  IP-sceptic  to  IP-
indifferent, also played a crucial role in the copyright policy reform. Some significant events 
in the mid-1980s, including the worldwide publication of the production and sale of pirated 
recordings of the Live Aid charity by Indonesian producers, contributed to a growing concern 
regarding Indonesia’s damaging reputation as a haven of pirated products among government 
officials.  In  addition,  unlike  in  the  case  of  patents,  a  significant  number  of  domestic 
constituents for strong copyright protection can be found, while opposition mainly comes from 
small-medium counterfeit goods producers, without strong political support. Along with the 
shift in the government’s preference towards copyright protection, the existence of domestic 
constituents  for  strong  copyright  protection,  therefore,  also  contributed  to  the  extensive 
process of copyright policy reform in Indonesia.    
 
4.5.3 Indonesia’s Trademark Policy Change: An Easy Case of Policy Reform 
 
Compared to the other two IP categories, trademark protection can be considered as having the 
longest historical existence in Indonesia. Unlike the other two IP categories, which had to wait 
for decades to be protected under national legislation, the Dutch Trademark Act of 1912 was 
promptly  adopted  into  national  legislation  through  the  enactment  of  the  first  Indonesian 
Trademark  Act  in  1961.  The  swift  effort  of  the  newly  established  government  on  the 
trademark  issue  reflects  the  fact  that,  compared  to  the  other  two  IP  categories,  trademark 
protection has a sounder basis in Indonesian values and was a widely accepted concept in 
Indonesian society (Kusumadara, 2000a, p.90). Furthermore, as can be found in the case of 
copyright, domestic constituents for strong trademark protection is considerably high, while 
the opposition is mainly coming from politically poorly-connected producers of counterfeit 
products. 
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4.5.3.1 Assessing Indonesia’s Trademark Legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
Unlike patent and copyright legislation, which were adopted in 1980s, the first Indonesian 
trademark law was adopted much earlier, in 1961. The enactment of this act was intended to 
protect the Indonesian public from being misled by counterfeited goods (Kusumadara, 2000a, 
90). This intention is rooted in the principle of communalism in Indonesian culture, which is 
reflected in adat, to put public interest first over private interests. In this regard, the concept of 
trademark  protection  relatively  corresponds  to  the  underlying  principle  of  adat,  since  the 
primary purpose of trademark protection is not to protect the trademark owners but to protect 
public interest. Since the main purpose is to protect public interest, the protection of well-
known  trademark  is  not  recognised  under  the  Trademark  Act  of  1961,  because  the 
acknowledgement  of  well-known  trademark  is  regarded  as  giving  the  privilege  to  the 
trademark owners instead of protecting wider public interests. Furthermore, under this act, the 
government adopted the principle of first use, and granted the protection period for ten years, 
which  can  be  extended  for  another  ten-year  period  upon  application  (Antons,  1991,  p.81; 
2003b, p.396; 2008a, p.186).  
 
In 1992, the Indonesian government enacted a new trademark act to amend the considered 
outdated  Trademark  Act  of  1961.  The  new  Act,  which came  into  force  on  1  April  1993, 
indicated a major change in the underlying principle of trademark protection in Indonesia. 
Unlike the previous act, which was designed to protect Indonesian consumers, the Trademark 
Act of 1992 put emphasis more on protecting the trademark owners (Kusumadara, 2000a, 
pp.117–18). The Trademark Act of 1992 also granted a protection for well-known trademarks. 
As table 4.3 illustrates, the Trademark Act of 1992 also extended the scope of protection, not 
only  for  goods,  but  also  for  service  marks,  and  collective  marks.
  81    Under  this  act,  the 
Indonesian  government  also  maintained  the  duration  of  protection  for  10  years.  By 
maintaining the duration of the protection, therefore, Indonesia is enforcing a more stringent 
rule than necessary, since TRIPs only requires 7 years for trademark protection. 
 
                                                 
81 Based on Article 1 (4) Trademark Act No. 15/2001 collective mark (merk kolektif) is defined as, “...a Mark that 
is used on goods and/or services having the same characteristics that are traded jointly by several persons or legal 
entities to distinguish the goods and/or services from others of the same kind”. 
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In 1997, the government amended the Trademark Act of 1992 with the Trademark Act No. 
14/1997.  Compared  to  the  previous  trademark  laws,  the  only  significant  difference  is  the 
inclusion of a provision related to geographical indication and appellations of origin, which 
were unknown in the previous laws. Together with the enactment of the Trademark Act of 
1997, the government also ratified the Trademark Law Treaty with the Presidential Decree 
No. 17/1997.  
 
However, even though, under the Trademark Act of 1997, Indonesia had already adopted more 
rigorous rules than required by TRIPs, the Indonesian government adopted a new trademark 
act in 2001. The major difference this had with the previous acts is only in terms of the 
criminal provisions, through the increased jail terms and fines.  It also introduced separate 
criminal provisions for the violation of geographical indication. As will be explained later, in 
response to the demands by the owners of foreign well-known trademark, the Trademark Act 
of 2001 also introduced a new provision that prohibits the renewal of the registration for well-
known trademark by an unauthorised individual or company. 
 
Table 4.5 The Indonesian Trademark Acts and TRIPs Compatibility 
Aspect  TRIPs 
Obligations 
Prior to and during TRIPs 
Negotiations 
After TRIPs 
Prior to 
Negotiations 
(No.21/1961) 
During Negotiations 
(No.19/1992) 
During 
Transition 
(No.14/1997) 
After in 
force  
(No.15/2001) 
Subject 
matter 
coverage 
Goods  Protected  Protected  Protected  Protected 
Services  Not protected  Protected  Protected  Protected 
Well-known 
trademark 
Not protected  Protected  Protected  Protected 
Duration of 
protection 
7 years  10 years   10 years   10 years  10 years  
Enforcement  Requires 
civil and 
criminal 
enforcement 
but no 
minimum 
requirements 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
Included provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
TRIPs 
compatibility 
--  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-Plus  TRIPs-Plus  TRIPs-Plus 
 
Note: Author’s assessment on the Indonesian Trademark No.21/1961, the Indonesian Trademark Act 
No.19/1992 [in Indonesian], the Indonesian Trademark Act No. 14/1997 [in Indonesian], and the 
Indonesian Trademark Act No.15/2001. Since the Indonesian Trademark Act No. 21/1961 is not 
publicly available, the assessment of this Act is based on Antons (2000) and Kusumadara (2000). 144 
 
4.5.3.2 Indonesia’s Trademark Legislation: Explaining Policy Change 
 
As can be found in the case of patent and copyright policy reforms, the external pressures 
explanation  can  only  provide  a  partial  explanation  in  understanding  the  trademark  policy 
reform in Indonesia. Despite the fact that Indonesia did not receive a substantial pressure to 
reform its trademark regime as it can be found in the case of copyright, Indonesia adopted 
trademark laws earlier than it had to do so, and also with more rigorous rules than required by 
TRIPs. As in the case of copyright, however, empirical findings suggest that the shift in some 
of  government  institutions’  preference  regarding  IPR  protection,  and  the  existence  of  a 
significant number of domestic constituents for strong trademark protection, determine the 
course of the trademark policy reform in Indonesia.  
 
4.5.3.2.1 Trademark Policy Change prior to and during the TRIPs Negotiations 
 
Compared  to  the  other  two  IP  categories,  trademark  legislation  has  the  longest  historical 
existence in Indonesian history since the independence. Unlike the other two IPR categories, 
which had to wait for decades to be enacted, the Dutch Trademark Act of 1912 was promptly 
adapted into national legislation through the enactment of the first Indonesian Trademark Act 
in 1961. As briefly explained earlier, since the enactment of the Trademark Act of 1961 was 
mostly intended to protect consumers rather than to protect the trademarks itself (Lindsey et 
al., 2006, p.69), the concept of well-known trademarks was not recognised. The absence of the 
protection of well-known trademarks had become the main source of external pressure, mainly 
from the US and EU’s business communities. In this regard, as can be seen in the case of the 
patent policy reform, during the 1980s Indonesia experienced industry pressure and threats 
from multinational companies, particularly from the US and EU’s business communities to 
improve its trademark regime. This can be seen, for example, during the early to mid-1980s, 
when there were several cases involving the owners of foreign well-known trademarks such as 
‘Levis’ of Levi Strauss & Co. from the US, and ‘Pierre Cardin’ who took legal actions against 
domestic producers who first registered those trademarks in Indonesia (Kusumadara, 2000a, 
pp.108–10). In addition, the owners of these trademarks also directly visited top Indonesian 
officials, including the Minister of Justice, to demand a trademark policy reform (Antons, 
2000, p.205).   
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In  response  to  the  pressure  from  US  and  EU  business  communities,  the  Indonesian 
government then adopted several ministerial decrees, which were intended to deal with the 
protection of well-known trademark (Antons, 2000, p.205). In June 1987, for example, the 
Minister for Justice issued a ministerial decree concerning well-known trademark even though 
it was only limited to the use in  Indonesia of similar goods. The decree stipulated that a 
trademark can be regarded as well-known if it was known and used in the Indonesian territory 
for a certain period of time, and, therefore, the registration of such a trademark by another 
party for the same kind of goods must be rejected (Antons, 2000, p.205). Since it was limited 
only  to  its  use  in  Indonesia,  and  only  covered  the  same  kind  of  goods,  major  developed 
countries, in particular the US and the EU, still considered the decree inadequate to protect 
their well-known products.
82 Since then, Indonesia has constantly received mounting pressures 
from the business community, which was reflected by repeated visits from Pierre Cardin, the 
owner of the Sarl De Gestion Pierre Cardin, and his direct representation to the Indonesian 
Minister for Justice in the late 1980s, to demand an improvement in trademark protection 
(Kusumadara, 2000a, p.111). According to Rosser (2002, p.151), in the early 1990s, a number 
of foreign companies, including well-known trademark manufacturers, cancelled their plan to 
invest in Indonesia, due to inadequate IPR protection. After receiving these constant pressures, 
the Indonesian Minister for Justice, in 1991, issued another Ministerial Decree, to extend the 
protection of well-known trademark to goods not of the same kind (Antons, 2008a, p.186), and 
also gave protection to well-known trademarks which were used, not only in Indonesia, but 
also overseas (Kusumadara, 2000a, p.111).  
 
Following the adoption of these ministerial decrees, the Indonesian government adopted a new 
Trademark  Act  in  1992  which,  as  explained  earlier,  introduced  the  provision  that  give 
protection for well-known trademark. Nevertheless, the adoption of the Trademark Act of 
1992  was  not  followed  by  a  decrease  in  the  external  pressure  demanding  an  adequate 
trademark protection in Indonesia. Complaints from foreign companies continued coming in, 
mainly because trademark registrations made under the previous acts were still valid, as long 
as they had not expired by the time the new legislation was adopted. In this regard, therefore, 
many local producers of counterfeit goods were still able to use well-known trademarks, even 
after the adoption of this law (Rosser, 2002, p.166). One of the high profile cases in late 1993 
                                                 
82 The investigation by the owner of ‘Pierre Cardin’ Paris found that the ‘Pierre Cardin’ trademark had been 
registered by sixteen Indonesian companies for a variety of goods (Kusumadara, 2000a, p.111) 
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was a legal action taken by a local producer of counterfeit goods against the foreign owners of 
well-known trademarks including Pierre Cardin (Rosser, 2002, p.166). As a response to this, 
as  can  be  seen  during  the  dispute  in  the  1980s,  Cardin  with  the  support  of  the  French 
Ambassador and Trade Attaché for Indonesia, made another visit to the Indonesian Minister of 
Justice, and threatened to withdraw his investment from Indonesia if there was no significant 
improvement for trademark protection in Indonesia (Rosser, 2002, p.167). In response to this 
complaint, the Minister of Justice gave an assurance that the government would introduce a 
new legislation, which would not grant a renewal of registration for well-known trademarks by 
an unauthorised individual or company (Rosser, 2002, p.167). It should be noted, however, 
that the new trademark law which was adopted in 1997, did not incorporate any provision 
regarding this issue. The new provision to prohibit the renewal of a registration for well-
known  trademarks,  by  an  unauthorised  individual  or  company  was  introduced  in  the 
Trademark Act of 2001 (Article 37 (a)).   
   
4.5.3.2.2 Trademark Policy Change during the Transition Period  
 
As  explained  earlier,  by  adopting  the  Trademark  Act  in  1992,  essentially  Indonesia  had 
already  fulfilled  its  TRIPs  obligations.  However,  due  to  the  lack  of  enforcement,  foreign 
governments  and  companies  still  pressurised  the  Indonesian  government  to  improve  its 
trademark  regime.  In  addition  to  a  continuation  of  a  foreign  companies  lobby,  in  1996, 
Indonesia was challenged by the US, the EU, and Japan in the WTO dispute regarding its 
national car programme. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, the dispute was not exclusively 
related to the TRIPs issues but in combination with the Trade-related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs) Agreement. One of the US concerns was that, Indonesia’s policy on ‘national motor 
vehicle’ benefited only to motor vehicles bearing a unique Indonesian trademark, owned by 
Indonesian nationals. The US contended that, this policy discriminated against foreign-owned 
trademarks and their owners, and therefore, was inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement, in 
particular under Article 3 (national treatment); Article 20 (the use of trademarks); and Article 
65 (5) (member’s obligation to avoid adopting legislation that lower than TRIPs during its 
transition period) (WTO, 1998a, n. d. (o)). Based on the Panel Report circulated on 2 July 
1998, even though the Panel concluded that Indonesia violated most of its obligations under 
the  TRIMs  Agreement  as  the  main  issue  of  the  dispute,  the  Panel,  however,  found  that 
Indonesia did not violate its obligations under the TRIPs Agreement (WTO, 1998a, n. d. (o)).  147 
 
 
In 1997, the government amended the Trademark Act of 1992 with the Trademark Act No. 
14/1997. As already explained earlier, under the Trademark of 1997, the provision relating to 
geographical indication and appellations of origin was introduced. Since under the previous 
act, Indonesia’s trademark regime was already in line with the TRIPs Agreement, the adoption 
of this act did not have much affect on Indonesia’s obligations under TRIPs. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia still received pressures, due to its inadequate enforcement. 
 
4.5.3.2.3 Trademark Policy Change after the end of the Transition Period 
 
Despite  the  fact  that  Indonesia  had  already  fulfilled  its  TRIPs  obligations,  in  2001,  the 
Indonesian  government  enacted  a  new  trademark  act  again.  Furthermore,  unlike  previous 
periods, during the adoption process of this new legislation, Indonesia did not receive any 
external  pressures.  In  this  regard,  therefore,  the  external  pressure  account  cannot  provide 
satisfactory  explanation  for  understanding  the  trademark  policy  change  taken  by  the 
Indonesian government after its transition period ended. A closer observation on domestic 
actors’ preference reveals that during this period, the preference of the Ministry of Justice and 
Human Rights had shifted from IP-indifferent to being more favourable concerning trademark 
protection  (see  the  statement  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  Human  Rights  during  the 
amendment process of IP legislation in 2001 as quoted earlier). 
 
In addition, similar to copyright, the existence of domestic constituents for strong trademark 
protection  can  be  found.  As  figure  4.3  illustrates,  the  domestic  trademark  applications 
increased  from  around  67.61  percent  in  2001  to  90.53  percent  by  the  end  of  2010  while 
foreign applicants decreased from 32.39 percent in 2001 to only 9.47 percent by the end of 
2010 (see also Appendix VI (Table VI.3)). The significant rise in the number of trademark 
applications can be understood because, compared to the other two IPR categories, trademark 
protection is the only IP category that suits the Indonesian society’s norms and tradition.  It 
should be noted that the opposition to reform trademark law also existed. Nevertheless, as can 
be found in the case of copyright, the opposition was mainly coming from small-medium 
producers of counterfeit products, which had no strong political connections.
83 
                                                 
83 These small-medium producers of counterfeit products usually are home-based garment industries, involving in 
the unauthorised production of well-known trademark. Imran (2003) reported that, many of these small-medium 148 
 
Figure 4.3 Trademark Applications in Indonesia (2001–2010) 
 
Source: The Indonesian Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights (DGIPR, n. d. (c)) 
[as of 15 January 2011]. 
 
To sum up, as can be seen from the other two  IP laws, both neo-realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism cannot provide a satisfactory explanation in understanding trademark policy 
reform in Indonesia. Despite only receiving a moderate level of external pressure in the form 
of pressure from foreign companies, the Indonesian government fulfilled its TRIPs obligations 
for  trademark  protection  earlier  than  it  had  to  do  and  adopted  more  stringent  rules  than 
required. A deeper analysis of the domestic politics demonstrates that, compared to the other 
IPR  categories,  particularly  patents,  the  protection  of  trademark  has  a  sounder  basis  in 
Indonesian traditions. Furthermore, as can be seen in copyrights, the domestic societal actors 
interested in trademark protection are also high. The shift in the preference of the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights from IP-indifferent to being more favourable concerning trademark 
protection notably also played a critical role behind trademark policy reform in Indonesia. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
producers were not fully aware of the fact that their business was illegal until recently, when the Indonesian 
government enacted the new regulations on trademark protection in 2001. According to Rosser (2002, p.150), 
however, some of them also have the capacity to export their products.  149 
 
4.6 Analysing IP Policy Change in Indonesia: Competing Perspectives 
 
The  empirical  evidence  presented  in  the  case  study  of  Indonesia  reveals  the  flaws  in  the 
existing expectations of developing countries’ compliance particularly regarding the role of 
external  pressures,  as  argued  by  both  neo-realism  and  neo-liberal  institutionalism.  While 
Indonesia indeed received significant external pressures especially from the US—threats of 
trade sanctions, diplomatic and industry pressures, being on the USTR Special 301 Report 
mostly with PWL status, as well as being brought to the WTO dispute—the most tangible 
pressure  in  the  form  of  trade  sanctions  had  a  noticeable  impact  primarily  on  copyright 
protection (see table 4.6). Yet, IP policy reform taken by the Indonesian government as a 
response to its TRIPs obligations did not correspond neatly with pressures it received. For 
instance, despite repeated US threats to withdraw GSP benefits unless Indonesia improved its 
copyright legislation prior to the TRIPs negotiations, Indonesia did not substantially reform its 
copyright  legislation  until  the  mid-1980s.  By  contrast,  despite  only  receiving  relatively 
moderate pressure in the forms of industry and diplomatic pressure, Indonesia adopted more 
stringent rules for its trademark legislation during the TRIPs negotiations and also adopted 
more rigorous rules for its patent legislation during its transition period.  
 
Indonesia’s  experience  also  indicates  that  the  legalisation  of  international  institutions  as 
represented by the WTO DSB cannot provide sufficient support for neo-liberal institutionalist 
account.  This  is  because  Indonesia  was  brought  to  the  WTO  dispute  which  was  not 
exclusively related to a TRIPs issue. Furthermore, neo-liberal institutionalism is also unable to 
explain early compliance and TRIPs-Plus approaches taken by the Indonesian government for 
its patent and trademark legislation, since neo-liberal institutionalism would suggest policy 
reform should all be both on time and to minimum for all different IP categories. In this 
context, the empirical evidence in Indonesia’s case study is insufficient to support neo-liberal 
institutionalists’  arguments  regarding  the  role  of  authoritative  international  institutions  in 
influencing the change in developing countries’ IP legislation. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that the  IP policy reform taken by the  Indonesian government as a response to its TRIPs 
obligations  cannot  adequately  be  explained  by  focusing  solely  on  the  role  of  external 
pressures, as argued by both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism.  150 
 
Table 4.6 Indonesia’s IP Policy Change and External Pressures 
The Timing of 
Policy Change 
IPR 
Categories 
External Pressures  Policy Change 
Forms  Degree 
Prior to and 
during the 
TRIPs 
negotiations 
Patents  Diplomatic and 
industry 
pressures  
Moderate  Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
Copyrights  Threats of trade 
sanctions in the 
form of the 
withdrawal of 
GSP benefits 
Strong  Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
Trademarks  Diplomatic and 
industry 
pressures 
Moderate  Substantial (adopted more 
rigorous rules than TRIPs) 
During the 
transition period 
 
Patents 
 
Diplomatic and 
industry 
pressures as well 
as the USTR 
Report with 
PWL status 
Moderate  Substantial (adopted more 
rigorous rules than TRIPs  
and rolled back the rules 
from more rigorous to only 
meeting the minimum 
TRIPs requirements) 
Copyrights  Threats of trade 
sanctions, 
diplomatic and 
industry 
pressures, as 
well as the 
USTR Report 
with PWL status 
Strong  Substantial (into 
compliance with TRIPs) 
Trademarks 
 
Diplomatic and 
industry 
pressures as well 
as WTO 
complaint
84 
Moderate  Not substantial (already 
beyond TRIPs 
requirements) 
After the end of 
the transition 
period  
 
Patents
85 
 
No pressure  None  No policy reform  
Copyrights  Threats of trade 
sanctions, 
diplomatic and 
industry 
pressures, as 
well as the 
USTR Report 
with PWL status 
Strong  Not substantial (already in 
compliance with TRIPs) 
Trademarks  No pressure  None  Not substantial (already 
beyond TRIPs 
requirements) 
 
                                                 
84 As explained previously, Indonesia was brought to the WTO dispute on a matter not exclusively related to the 
TRIPs issue. 
85 As can be seen from earlier explanation, the last amendment of patent legislation was taken by the Indonesian 
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As external pressure is neither sufficient nor necessary for policy change to take place, it is 
necessary  to  analyse  the  interaction  among  pro-IP,  IP-indifferent,  and  IP-sceptic  domestic 
actors  both  societal  and  governmental.  Tables  4.7;  4.8;  4.9  summarise  the  preferences  of 
domestic actors regarding IPR protection and its implications to policy taken by government 
in each type of IPR categories.  
 
Table 4.7 Indonesia’s Patent Policy Change and Domestic Politics Analysis 
The 
Timing of 
Policy 
Change 
Preferences of Domestic Actors  Policy Change  
Preferences  Actors 
Prior to and 
during the 
TRIPs 
negotiations  
Pro-IP   Ministry of Research and 
Technology, Ministry of Industry  
Not substantial 
(adopted below the 
minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Trade 
IP-Sceptics   Ministry of State secretariat, 
Ministry of Health,  Ministry of 
Agriculture, pharmaceutical 
industry  
First 
amendment 
during the 
transition 
period  
Pro-IP   Ministry of Research and 
Technology, Ministry of Industry 
Substantial (adopted 
more rigorous rules 
than TRIPs)   IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of State Secretariat, 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Trade  
IP-Sceptics  Ministry of Health, Pharmaceutical 
industry  
Second 
amendment 
during the 
transition 
period  
Pro-IP   Ministry of Research and 
Technology, Ministry of Industry, 
Ministry of Justice and Human 
Rights, 
Substantial (rolled 
back the rules from 
more rigorous to only 
meeting the minimum 
TRIPs requirements)  IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of State Secretariat, 
Ministry of Trade 
IP-Sceptics  Ministry of Environment, Ministry 
of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, 
Pharmaceutical industry, NGOs  
 
Note: As explained in the previous sections, the last amendment of the patent policy reform 
was taken by the Indonesian government during the transition period. However, even 
though both acts were adopted during the transition period, the domestic actors involved 
in the amendment process of each act are different.    152 
 
Table 4.8 Indonesia’s Copyright Policy Change and Domestic Politics Analysis 
The Timing 
of Policy 
Change 
Preferences of Domestic Actors  Policy Change 
Preferences  Actors 
Prior to and 
during the 
TRIPs 
negotiations  
Pro-IP   Publishers and musicians   Not substantial 
(adopted below the 
minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of Justice 
IP-Sceptics   Ministry of State Secretariat,
86 
producers of counterfeit products  
During the 
transition 
period  
Pro-IP   Ministry of Industry, publishers and 
musicians, IT industry  
Substantial (into 
compliance with 
TRIPs)   IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of State Secretariat, Ministry 
of Justice, Ministry of Trade 
IP-Sceptics  Producers of counterfeit products  
After the 
end of the 
transition 
period  
Pro-IP  Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights, publishers 
and musicians, IT industry  
Not substantial 
(already in 
compliance with 
TRIPs)  IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of State Secretariat, Ministry 
of Trade 
IP-Sceptics  Producers of counterfeit products  
 
Table 4.9 Indonesia’s Trademark Policy Change and Domestic Politics Analysis 
The Timing 
of Policy 
Change 
Preferences of Domestic Actors  Policy Change 
Preferences  Actors 
Prior to and 
during the 
TRIPs 
negotiations  
Pro-IP   Ministry of Industry  Substantial (adopted 
more rigorous rules 
than TRIPs)  
IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of State secretariat, Ministry 
of Justice  
IP-Sceptics  Producers of counterfeit products  
During the 
Transition 
period  
Pro-IP  Ministry of Industry   Not substantial 
(already beyond 
TRIPs requirements) 
IP-
Indifferent  
Ministry of State Secretariat, 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Trade 
IP-Sceptics  Producers of counterfeit products  
After the 
end of the 
transition 
period  
Pro-IP  Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights 
Not substantial 
(already beyond 
TRIPs requirements)  IP-
Indifferent 
Ministry of State Secretariat, 
Ministry of Trade 
IP-Sceptics   Producers of counterfeit products  
 
A closer observation on the domestic politics also reveals that IP policy reform took place in 
the absence of substantial external pressure, when there was a shift in some of the government 
                                                 
86 As explained earlier, the preference of the Ministry of State Secretariat on copyright protection has started to 
shift during the amendment process of the Copyright Act of 1987. 153 
 
institutions’ preferences from being sceptical of IPR protection to being either indifferent or in 
favour of IPR protection. In particular, in contrast to government statements during IP policy 
reform  in  the  1980s,  which  indicated  that  IPR  protection  was  not  seen  as  crucial  for 
Indonesia’s development, by the end of the 1990s, the need of IPR protection to improve 
Indonesia’s technological development is commonly seen as a necessity among government 
officials. The change in some government institutions’ preferences regarding IPR protection, 
as evident for instance, from the change in the preference of the State Secretariat (from IP-
Sceptics to IP-indifferent) and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (from IP-indifferent 
to Pro-IP), therefore, contributed to providing a more favourable condition for policy change 
to take place.  
 
The existing literature offers a few possible explanations for finding the reasons behind the 
change  in  the  government’s  preference.  From  a  rationalist  perspective,  the  change  in  the 
government’s preference can be understood as the government’s response to the ‘inducement’ 
through  various  IP-related  support  programmes,  provided  by  developed  countries  and 
international  institutions  to  improve  the  IP  regime.
87  Alternatively,  the  change  in  the 
government’s  preferences  regarding  IPR  protection  could  be  due  to  ‘policy  learning’ 
(Freeman,  2006,  p.376).  Within  this  context,  the  change  in  the  government’s  preference 
concerning IPR protection can also be a result of the government’s learning process, from the 
outcomes  of  the  implementation  of  previous  IP  policies  when  adopting  the  new  ones. 
Following sociological constructivists’ approach regarding the role of socialisation and the 
internalisation of international norms in the domestic sphere, the change in the government’s 
preference  concerning  IPR  protection,  therefore,  can  also  be  explained  as  a  result  of 
socialisation and the internalisation of IPR norms under TRIPs. Within this context, various 
IPR-related  support  programmes,  provided  by  international  institutions  and  developed 
countries, did not only provide material incentives for developing countries, but, at the same 
time, these activities also contribute to create what May (2004, p.822) refers to a ‘TRIPs mind-
set’ among  government officials in developing countries. The fact that  Indonesia received 
numerous IP-related support programmes including training for government officials on IP 
issues was also pointed out by Indonesian researchers in the interviews with the author.
88 
                                                 
87 As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, as with many other developing countries, Indonesia also received numerous 
IP-related support programmes provided by developed countries and various international institutions (Finger and 
Schuler, 2000, p.522; May, 2004, p.826).  
88 Author’s interview with Indonesian researchers (Jakarta, 01 September 2009). 154 
 
 
However, locating the answer as to whether the shift in preference among Indonesian policy 
makers  regarding  IPR  protection  was  as  a  result  of  socialisation,  policy  learning,  or 
‘inducement’ requires a deeper analysis. While explaining the reason behind the shift in the 
Indonesian government’s preference is beyond the scope of this thesis, the shift itself indicates 
that  domestic  actors’  preferences  are  a  dynamic  and  critical  factor.  The  chapter  therefore 
argues that analysing domestic actors’ preferences over time, for different IPR categories, is 
essential in order to explain IP policy change in developing countries.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Previous discussions illustrated that policy change in Indonesia’s domestic IP legislation as its 
response to its TRIPs obligations revealed the flaws in the major IR theories’ expectations on 
developing countries’ compliance with the TRIPs Agreement. IPR protection had no historical 
attachment in its national legislation prior to TRIPs and it even contradicted its norms and 
traditions, as reflected in its adat customary laws. Yet,  after the TRIPs negotiations were 
concluded, Indonesia took the necessary steps to reform its IP domestic policy earlier than it 
had to, and for trademark and patent legislation (at least before the adoption of the last Patent 
Act in 2001) Indonesia even adopted more rigorous rules than required.  
 
This chapter demonstrated that external pressure is not irrelevant, but neither is it necessary 
nor sufficient to explain policy change. A closer observation of IP policy reform in Indonesia 
also suggests that in order to understand fully the implications of great power coercion to 
policy change, other important factors such as  economic crisis also need to be taken into 
account. Only during the economic crisis did the Indonesian government become sensitive to 
external pressures. Moreover, this chapter has established that Indonesia strengthened aspects 
of  IPR  protection  even  in  the  absence  of  external  pressures,  where  the  government’s 
preferences became more favourable to IPR protection. In addition, this chapter also argued 
that, based on the experience of Indonesia, there was no sufficient evidence to support the neo-
liberal institutionalist’s argument regarding the role of authoritative international institutions 
in influencing policy change. This is particularly because, neo-liberal institutionalism, which 
would suggest the timing and the quality of reforms and variance in both across different IP 
categories should all be on time and to minimum, is unable to explain early compliance and 155 
 
TRIPs-Plus  approaches  taken  by  the  Indonesian  government  for  its  patent  and  trademark 
legislation.  In  this  regard,  earlier  discussions  suggested  the  importance  of  analysing  the 
interests  of  various  domestic  actors,  both  societal  and  governmental,  and  how  they  shape 
policy outcomes, in order to understand IP policy change in Indonesia. 
 
By looking at domestic politics, the Indonesian case study also revealed that, with relatively 
limited domestic societal actors’ involvement in the policy making process, domestic political 
actors,  particularly  the  executive,  played  a  crucial  role  in  determining  IP  policy  reform. 
However,  a  deeper  analysis  also  showed  that  the  executive  cannot  be  treated  as  a  single 
unitary  actor  since  it  consists  of  different  ministries,  which  represent  divergent  interests, 
according to the specific roles they hold. A comprehensive understanding of policy change in 
Indonesia, as a response to its TRIPs obligations, therefore, requires a deeper analysis of the 
preferences of different government institutions concerning IPR protection. By doing so one 
can identify that the shift in some of government institutions’ preference, from sceptical to 
being either indifferent or more favourable concerning IPR protection, contributes to creating 
a more conducive condition for a policy reform to take place, particularly when there was no 
significant  change  in  external  pressures.  This  chapter,  therefore,  has  demonstrated  the 
importance of domestic politics of compliance analysis in understanding IP policy change in 
Indonesia, as a response to its TRIPs obligations.  
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Chapter 5 
Policy Change in India’s IP Legislation: Where the Domestic Societal Actors 
Take the Lead  
 
“...My idea of a better aided world is one in which medical discoveries would be free of patent and 
there will be no profiteering from life or death...”  
(Indira Gandhi, World Health Assembly in Geneva, 6 May 1981)
89  
 
5.1 Introduction 
   
The above quotation, from former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, represents India’s 
long and strong resistance against having a robust international patent system, which would be 
considered  damaging  for  the  vast  majority  of  Indian  citizens.  Such  a  resistance  was  also 
evident during the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations, when India strongly opposed 
the  adoption  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement.  After  the  conclusion  of  the  TRIPs  negotiations, 
however, India was among the developing countries that took the necessary steps to reform its 
existing  IP  legislation,  in  order  to  fulfil  its  TRIPs  obligations  by  the  end  of  its  transition 
period,  and  adopted  more  stringent  rules,  notably  for  both  copyright  and  trademark 
legislations. Considering its strong resistance during the TRIPs negotiations, India’s IP policy 
change  as  a  response  to  its  TRIPs  obligations  is  puzzling,  since  it  deviated  from  the 
expectations of the leading IR theories. As can be seen in the case of Indonesia, India’s policy 
reform  particularly  poses  a  challenge  to  constructivist  expectations,  which  predicted  that 
policy change would be unlikely to take place, because the TRIPs Agreement is seen as a lack 
of legitimacy in the eyes of India. The role of external pressures, as argued by both neo-
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism plausibly offer a better explanation.    
 
The  chapter,  however,  argues  that  IP  policy  reform in  India  did  not  correspond  neatly  to 
external pressures. As in the case of Indonesia, India’s IP policy reform took place both with 
the  presence  and  in  the  absence  of  these  pressures.  Moreover,  the  external  pressure 
explanation is unable to capture the difference in India’s responses to its TRIPs obligations for 
different  IPR  categories.  In  the  case  of  the  patent  policy  reform,  despite  receiving  strong 
external pressure since the end of the TRIPs negotiations, the Indian government did not make 
a substantial policy reform until the end of its transition period, and India also exploited most 
                                                 
89 As quoted by a member of parliament in Lok Sabha during the debate on the patent (amendment) bill, 1999 on 
10 March 1999 (Lok Sabha, 1999b, p.21) 157 
 
of  the  flexibilities  available  under  TRIPs.  Whereas,  in  the  case  both  of  copyrights  and 
trademarks, in spite only receiving low to moderate levels of external pressures, policy reform 
was done rather easily. Empirical findings demonstrate that India’s responses to its TRIPs 
obligations across IPR types correlate strongly with the relative strength of the IP domestic 
constituency  for  different  IPR  categories.  This  chapter  argues,  therefore,  that  the  role  of 
external pressures can only provide a partial explanation in understanding India’s responses to 
its TRIPs obligations.   
 
The chapter develops this argument, first by providing the basic background information of 
the  Indian  political  system,  in  order  to  identify  key  domestic  actors,  and  describe  the 
interaction of these actors in the decision policy making process. The chapter then discusses 
India’s role during the TRIPs negotiation process, highlighting India’s leading role in resisting 
the TRIPs Agreement. The elaboration on India’s IP policy reforms and TRIPs compatibility 
is the main focus of the subsequent section, which focuses on the role of external pressures, 
and the role of domestic actors, in influencing policy making in each type of IPR protection. 
The  last  part  concludes  the  discussion,  by  underlying  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical 
contributions from analysing the case study of India. It basically affirms the limitation of the 
external pressures explanation in explaining change in developing countries’ IP legislation, 
and  the  necessity  of  analysing  the  government’s  different  responses  in  correlation  to  the 
variation in domestic actors’ preferences for the different IPR categories.  
 
5.2 Indian Policy Making at a Glance 
 
Under the parliamentary system, the central political actor in India is the prime minister, and 
his/her  cabinet.  Most  legislation  drafts  introduced  to  parliament—which  consists  of  two 
Houses the Lok Sabha (the  Lower House/House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (the 
Upper  House/Council  of  States)—are  initiated  by  the  prime  minister  and  the  cabinet 
(Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008, p.84).
90 In some cases, particularly on important issues, such 
as in the case of the patent policy reform, as will be explained later, the bill can be referred to 
a Select Committee, or can be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses (Hardgrave and 
                                                 
90 The Lok Sabha or House of the People is the most essential political body and much more politically 
significant than the Rajya Sabha or Council of States. The ultimate control of the Lok Sabha over the executive 
rests in its power to set the motion of no confidence that can bring down the government, while on the other hand 
the Rajya Sabha has no power to set a motion to bring down the government (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008, 
pp.86–87; Thakur, 1995, p.147). 158 
 
Kochanek, 2008, p.88). To become an act, the bill must be passed by both Houses and needs 
the president’s approval in order for it to finally be adopted. If the two Houses cannot reach an 
agreement  regarding  the  bill,  the  president  may  intervene  by  appointing  a  joint  sitting  of 
parliament, and the disputed provision is decided on by a simple majority vote (Thakur, 1995, 
p.148; Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008, p.88).  
 
Even though under the parliamentary system, the president’s role is mostly symbolic (Thakur, 
1995, p.101; Kohli, 2000, p.266; Kohli and Basu, 2009, p.174), under political instability and 
an emergency situation, the president has a vital role, which include appointing the prime 
minister and dissolving parliament (Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008, pp.75–76). Furthermore, 
under exceptional circumstances, which require a swift response from the government, when 
parliament is not in session, on the advice of the prime minister, the president may adopt an 
ordinance (Thakur, 1995, p.105; Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008, p.78). However, to become 
an act, an ordinance requires parliament’s approval within six weeks. As will be explained 
later, when parliament failed to pass the patent law, the president took a decision to enact the 
ordinance several times on patent protection. 
 
Even though most legislation was initiated primarily by the prime minister and the cabinet, 
with its democratic nature, the Indian political system also allows wide public participation in 
the  policy  process,  through  open  hearings  and  public  consultations,  particularly  on  major 
domestic  issues  (Hardgrave  and  Kochanek,  2008,  p.89).  During  public  consultations, 
interested domestic societal actors have a chance to submit their suggestions on the proposed 
bill.  In  order  to  gather  information  from  various  groups  in  society,  particularly  on  a 
controversial  bill,  the  government  can  also  appoint  a  specific  commission  consisting  of 
prominent  citizens.  Based  on  its  findings,  the  commission  provides  the  government  with 
policy  recommendation  which  then  can  be  used  by  the  cabinet  in  drafting  the  legislation 
(Hardgrave and Kochanek, 2008, p.89).  
 
Given the fact that India adopts a parliamentary system, in understanding IP policy change in 
India, it is necessary to scrutinise the parliamentary debates during the amendment process, in 
order  to  grasp  the  domestic  political  actors’  preference,  particularly  political  parties’ 
preferences, concerning IPR protection.  In addition, with its democratic nature, the  Indian 
political system provides a considerable means for domestic societal actors to play an active 159 
 
role in the policy making process. For this reason, understanding IP policy change in India 
also  requires  a  deeper  analysis  on  the  interaction  between  domestic  political  actors  and 
domestic societal actors in the policy making process, particularly to illuminate how domestic 
political actors respond to domestic societal actors’ demands concerning IPR protection. As 
can be seen in the subsequent explanations, the analysis of the interaction between domestic 
political and societal actors helps to explain the reason behind the different approaches taken 
by the Indian government concerning the different IPR categories.  
 
5.3  India  during  the  TRIPs  Negotiations:  A  Leader  of  Developing  Country 
Opposition
91 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, along with Brazil, India was on the forefront to resist the adoption 
of  the  TRIPs  Agreement  during  the  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
(UNESCAP, 2001, p.2). Based on the official submissions of the Indian government during 
the  Uruguay  Round,  there  were  several  main  issues  raised  by  the  Indian  government 
concerning  IPR  protection  during  the  TRIPs  negotiations.  These  include  opposing  to  any 
negotiations on IPR protection beyond the discussion of trade in counterfeit goods; proposing 
limited coverage of both of patentable subject matter and the duration of patent protection; 
demanding the necessity to take the country’s development stage into consideration; opposing 
to a uniform standard for IPR protection; and questioning GATT as the appropriate venue for 
the TRIPs negotiations (India, 1989).  
 
India insisted that the scope of the negotiations agendas should be limited to the restrictive and 
anti-competitive practices of the owners of IPR, since these practices can be considered to be 
trade-related, and they can distort or impede international trade (India, 1989). Furthermore, 
India  also  made  the  clear  point  that  other  aspects  of  IPR  need  to  be  placed  in  a  wider 
developmental and technological context. India also argued that the protection of IPR should 
be governed by the concerns and public policy objectives underlying the national systems. In 
this  regard,  by  taking  into  consideration  its  own  socio-economic,  developmental, 
technological, and public interest needs, the Indian delegation then argued that every country 
should be free to determine both the general categories and the duration of patent protection 
under  its  national  legislation  (India,  1989).  Therefore,  given  the  enormous  economic  and 
                                                 
91 See also the discussions in Chapter 2 particularly on the G10 developing countries’ position during the 
Uruguay Round. 160 
 
technological gap between industrialised and developing countries, India opposed the uniform 
standard for IPR protection. In this context, India also requested more favourable treatment for 
developing countries. India also strongly opposed the suggestion from developed countries to 
integrate the national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment principles on TRIPs, since 
these principles are only related to trade in goods (Gervais, 2003, p.15). In addition to the 
scope of IPRs protection, India also questioned GATT as the venue for the IPR protection 
negotiations.  This  is  not  only  because  the  protection  of  IPR  has  no  direct  or  significant 
relationship to international trade, but also considering the existence of a more competent and 
appropriate  international  organisation  under  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organisation 
(WIPO), which would be better suited for dealing with this issue (Matthews, 2002, p.31). 
 
India was still persistent in its strong position against developed countries’ proposals until 
almost the end of the Uruguay Round, even after some other developing countries that were 
initially against TRIPs started to change their position due to US pressure. India, in fact, also 
received considerable pressure from the US during the negotiation process. As explained in 
chapter 2, like many other developing countries, such as Mexico and Thailand, in 1992 India 
also came in for Generalised System Preference (GSP) losses of US$80 million (Henderson, 
1997, p.652; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002, p.88). Nevertheless, India was the only country 
that  kept  maintaining  its  strong  opposition  to  accepting  the  final  draft  of  the  TRIPs 
Agreement, until nearly the end of the Uruguay Round. As Drahos and Braithwaite (2002, 
p.146) argue, “[I]f any country could have mustered the will power to resist the US agenda on 
TRIP[S] to the end it would have been India”.  
 
India finally accepted the TRIPs Agreement, for several reasons. First of all, as can be found 
from  Indonesia’s  acceptance,  the  single-undertaking  principle  played  a  significant  role  in 
India’s final decision to accept the TRIPs Agreement as part of the Uruguay Round result. In 
addition, as mentioned earlier, India’s acceptance to the TRIPs Agreement is also due to its 
inability to resist constant pressure, particularly from the US. Furthermore, India eventually 
accepted  the  TRIPs  Agreement  also  because  the  final  draft  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement 
accommodated the flexibilities that were proposed by the Indian government. These included 
the  transition  period  for  developing  countries,  a  provision  on  compulsory  licensing,  and 161 
 
parallel import.
92 India was also willing to accept TRIPs in exchange for concessions on other 
trade objectives, such as market access to developed countries in significant areas particularly 
agriculture  and  textiles  (Gutowski,  1999,  p.756;  Sell,  2000,  p.176;  Capling,  2004,  p.188; 
Richards, 2004, pp.133–38).  
 
It can be concluded, therefore, that, due to India’s strong resistance against its adoption, the 
TRIPs Agreement evidently also represented an ‘inconvenient obligation’ for India, as was the 
case for its Indonesia counterpart.  Nevertheless, also similar to the case of Indonesia, in order 
to fulfil its TRIPs obligations, India had already reformed its IP legislation by the end of its 
transition period, and even adopted more rigorous rules for some of its IP laws. Explaining 
India’s unexpected responses to its inconvenient obligations, therefore, is the main purpose of 
the rest of the chapter. 
 
5.4 Explaining Policy Change in India’s IP legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
This section explains policy change in India’s IP legislation as a response to India’s TRIPs 
obligations.  As  explained  earlier,  the  IP  policy  reform  taken  by  the  Indian  government  is 
puzzling,  since  it  was  at  odds  with  major  IR  theories  expectations  regarding  developing 
countries’ responses to their TRIPs obligations. As can be seen from the case of Indonesia, the 
external pressures explanation, as argued by both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, 
can only provide a partial explanation in understanding India’s IP policy reform, since it is 
unable to explain the difference in India’s responses to its TRIPs obligations for different 
types of IP category. Empirical evidence reveals that the variety of approaches taken by the 
Indian  government  for  different  types  of  IPR  was  consistent  with  the  divergence  in  the 
domestic actors’ preferences regarding corresponding IPR categories. 
 
                                                 
92 The accommodation of some flexibilities as proposed by India as one of the reasons behind India’s acceptance 
to the TRIPs Agreement was also pointed out by a counsellor of the WTO IP Division in the interview with the 
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5.4.1 India’s Patent Policy Change: Reconciling International Obligations and 
Domestic Opposition 
 
Patent protection is the most controversial issue in India’s IP policy reform (Shiva, 2001, 
p.38).  Despite the fact that India received substantial external pressures from both the US and 
the EU to improve its patent regime, due to strong opposition from major domestic societal 
actors, represented mainly by the national pharmaceutical industry, the Indian government did 
not  make  any  substantial  effort  to  reform  its  existing  patent  laws.  Furthermore,  due  to 
persistent domestic opposition in patent protection, unlike in other types of IPR, India not only 
took full advantage of its transition period to reform its existing patent law, but also exploited 
most of the flexibilities available under TRIPs. In this regard, empirical findings demonstrate 
that substantial policy reform only took place when there was a shift in the preferences of 
major domestic societal actors regarding patent protection.  
 
5.4.1.1 Assessing India’s Patent Legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
Unlike many other developing countries, IP laws have a long history in India, which can be 
traced back to 1856, when India was still under the British colonial rule. India’s first patent 
law was adopted in 1856, and then replaced by the 1911 Indian Patent and Design Act (Baldia, 
2003, pp.434–35). India’s first patent law after the independence was enacted in 1970. This 
law granted limited terms of protection for 14 years for most products, and only 5 to 7 years 
for process patent for food, drugs, and medicines (see table 5.1). This act also obliged the 
patent owners to manufacture as well as to use the patented products in India. In this regard, 
the importation of patented products registered in other countries could not be considered as a 
working patent in India, and, therefore, did not enjoy patent protection. 
 
After the conclusion of the TRIPs negotiations, the Indian government adopted several patent 
laws as a response to its TRIPs obligations.  In 1999, the Indian government adopted a new 
patent act, which was mainly intended to fulfil the obligations required by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement  Body  (DSB)  ruling,  to  provide  the  necessary  procedures  related  to  Exclusive 
Marketing Rights (EMR). Under this new act the government also introduced a provision to 
grant exclusive rights of patent holders (see table 5.1). Nevertheless, since India was still in its 
transition period, this act did not incorporate other important provisions under TRIPs, such as 163 
 
setting  the  minimum  20-year  duration  of  protection,  or  granting  a  patent  protection  for 
pharmaceutical products.  
 
The minimum 20 years protection as required by TRIPs was then introduced in 2002 when the 
government amended the previous Patent (Amendment) Act of 1999. Under this new act, the 
Indian government accommodated a uniform period of 20 years, which would be applicable to 
all inventions. The Patent (Second Amendment) Act of 2002 also removed several provisions 
under the Patent Act of 1970, relating to the requirement of working of patent, which were 
aimed  at  ensuring  that  the  manufacture  of  the  patented  product  took  place  in  India. 
Accordingly,  following  the  requirement  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement,  the  Patent  (Second 
Amendment) Act of 2002 extended the right of the patentee to include the importation of the 
patented product or process, through the recognition that the importation of the product into 
India is treated as the working of the patent (Chaudhuri, 2002, p.3354). However, this act still 
did not incorporate patent protection for pharmaceuticals, foods, and chemical products, since 
India was still within the transition period, and had until 2005 before it had to grant protection 
for these areas (see table 5.1).  
 
By the end of its transition period, the Indian government introduced another patent act in 
order to fulfil the remaining obligation under the TRIPs Agreement. Under the Patent (Third 
Amendment)  Act  of  2005,  the  Indian  government  finally  granted  patent  protection  for 
pharmaceuticals, foods, and chemical products. In addition, this act also clarified that both 
parallel importation and compulsory licensing were now permitted. By adopting this act, the 
Indian government completely fulfilled its TRIPs obligations, and the Indian patent regime 
met the minimum standards as required by TRIPs. It should be noted, however, as will be 
explained later, in addition to these main legislations, the Indian government also adopted 
several ordinances, under the authority of the president, to serve as temporary regulations 
whenever parliament failed to enact a new law. 164 
 
Table 5.1 The Indian Patent Acts and TRIPs Compatibility 
Aspect  TRIPs Obligation  Prior to 
TRIPs  
No 39/1970 
During Transition Period  By the end of 
Transition 
No. 17/1999   No.38/2002  No. 15/2005 
Scope  Products and 
process for any 
inventions in all 
fields of technology 
involve an inventive 
step, and are capable 
of industrial 
application 
Excluded 
patent 
protection 
for foods, 
medicines, 
drugs, and 
chemical 
products 
Excluded 
patent 
protection for 
foods, 
medicines, 
drugs, and 
chemical 
products 
Excluded 
patent 
protection for 
foods, 
medicines, 
drugs, and 
chemical 
products 
Protected 
patent for 
foods, 
medicines, 
drugs, and 
chemical 
products 
Flexibility in 
the scope 
May exclude 
inventions which  
are necessary to 
protect public order 
or morality 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
May exclude plants 
and animals other 
than micro-
organisms 
-  -  Utilised this 
flexibility  
Utilised this 
flexibility  
May exclude 
diagnostic, 
therapeutic and 
surgical methods for 
the treatment of 
humans or animals  
Utilised this 
flexibility  
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Utilised this 
flexibility 
Permitted parallel 
importation 
-  -  -  Permitted 
parallel 
importation 
Permitted 
compulsory 
licensing  
-  -  -  Permitted 
compulsory 
licensing  
Duration of 
protection  
20 years  14 years (for 
general 
patent) 
 
5 or 7 years 
(for process 
patent for 
food, drug, 
medicine) 
14 years (for 
general 
patent) 
 
5 or 7 years 
(for process 
patent for 
food, drug, 
medicine) 
20 years (for 
all patented 
inventions) 
 
20 years (for all 
patented 
inventions) 
 
Exclusive 
rights of 
patent holders 
Protects exclusive 
rights of patent 
holders 
Not granted  Granted  Granted  Granted 
Enforcement  Requires civil and 
criminal 
enforcement but no 
minimum 
requirements 
Included 
provisions 
for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
TRIPs 
compatibility 
--  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-
minimum 
 
Note:  Author’s  assessment  on  the  Indian  Patent  Act  No.  39  of  1970,  the  Indian  Patent  (First 
Amendment) Act No. 17 of 1999, the Indian Patent (Second Amendment) Act No. 38 of 2002, 165 
 
and the Patent (Third Amendment) Act No. 15 of 2005. It should be noted that the table only 
presents the main patent laws adopted by parliament. In addition to these acts, as mentioned 
earlier, there were several other temporary laws, in the form of ordinances adopted by the 
president,  the  1994  Patent  Ordinance  (31  December  1994),  the  1999  Patent  Ordinance  (8 
January 1999), and the 2004 Patent Ordinance (26 December 2004). 
 
5.4.1.2 India’s Patent Legislation: Explaining Policy Change  
 
The history of India’s patent policy reform demonstrates the Indian government’s effort to 
reconcile  both  its  obligations  under  the  international  agreement,  and  the  persistence  of 
domestic societal actors’ opposition for patent policy reform. On the one hand, as a signatory 
of the agreement, the  Indian government obliged to fulfil its obligations under the TRIPs 
Agreement to reform its patent legislation. On the other hand, the Indian government’s effort 
to fulfil its TRIPs obligations faced a serious challenge from domestic societal actors, who 
benefitted from the existing patent legislation. In this regard, due to strong domestic societal 
actors’ opposition, external pressures in the form of great power coercion had less impact on 
patent  policy  reform  in  India.  However,  the  empirical  findings  also  show  that  collective 
external pressure, represented by the WTO DSB played a crucial role, since it was used by the 
government to overcome domestic societal actors’ opposition. This was particularly evident 
after India had to comply with the WTO DSB ruling, after it lost its case in the dispute with 
the US and the EU.  
 
5.4.1.2.1 Patent Policy Change prior to and during the TRIPs Negotiations 
 
India’s meticulous consideration on the patent issue can be traced back to its initial attempt in 
reforming the patent policy soon after the independence, through the establishment of the Tek 
Chand  Committee  in  1948.  This  committee  was  responsible for  assessing  India’s  existing 
patent system, in order to ensure that the patent system under new patent act would reflect the 
Indian national interests (Baldia, 2003, p.439; Mathur, 2007, p.33). In their report submitted in 
1950, the Tek Chand Committee concluded that the existing patent system was insufficient to 
promote  industrial  development  and  suggested  the  importance  of  compulsory  licensing  to 
address the problem (Garde, 2009, p.59). Nevertheless, the Lok Sabha was dissolved before it 
was able to introduce the new patent act.  
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In 1957 the Indian government established another committee, the Ayyangar Committee, to 
perform a similar task (Baldia, 2003, p.439; Mathur, 2007, p.33; Garde, 2009, p.59). One of 
the  most  significant  results  of  the  Ayyangar  Committee’s  assessments  indicated  that  the 
existing patent system in India was mainly exploited by foreign companies. This can be seen 
from the fact that, during the time when the assessment was being conducted, not only up to 
90 percent of the patent granted in India were owned by foreigners, but also more than 90 
percent  of  these  patent  were  not  utilised  in  India  (Henderson,  1997,  p.658;  Baldia,  2003, 
p.439;  Mukherjee,  2006,  p.132;  Rammana,  n.  d.,  p.3).  In  addition,  since  the  patent  for 
medicines were mostly owned by foreign companies, the price of medicines was extremely 
high (Mukherjee, 2006, p.132). The report also found that India’s existing patent system failed 
to stimulate invention among Indians, let alone served the benefits of the Indian public (Garde, 
2009, p.59). Based on these findings, the committee recommended the government adopt a 
regime of patent protection which should be beneficial for  Indian society, by providing a 
guarantee of the access to pharmaceutical products at lower prices (Mathur, 2007, p.33).  
 
Based on the committee’s recommendation, the 1970 Patent Act, which was more inclined 
towards the social and wider benefits of IP over its monopolistic nature of private gain, was 
finally enacted (Thomas, 2001, p.2147). In this regard, even though it was rooted in the 1949 
British Patent Act, the patent system in India, under the 1970 Patent Act that came into force 
in  20  April  1972,  was  far  more  limited  in  both  scope  and  terms  of  protection,  than  the 
corresponding English patent law, and the previous patent act under the colonial rule (Baldia, 
2003, p.439). A less strict patent protection under the 1970 Patent Act, was mainly intended to 
ensure the availability of affordable basic medicine and health care for Indian society (Koshy, 
1995, p.1).  
 
A  limited-scope  patent  regime,  under  the  Patent  Act  of  1970,  has  also  contributed  to  the 
development  of  the  indigenous  Indian  pharmaceutical  industry,  which  managed  to  grow 
impressively. In addition, by only granting process patents, and not patents for pharmaceutical 
products, the 1970 Patent Act provided an incentive for national producers to patent cheaper 
processes for making pharmaceutical products (Drahos and Braithwaite, 1999, p.152). A low 
level of patent protection has also allowed the domestic Indian pharmaceutical industries to 
develop technical expertise in the reverse engineering of existing medicines, and they were 
then able to modify the manufacturing process in order to become an efficient producer of 167 
 
generic medicines (Tellez, n. d., p.1; Keayla, 2005). This, in turn, has also made India, not 
only capable of becoming self-reliant in producing drugs, but also emerge as a major player in 
the global pharmaceutical industry, which gave India world wide recognition as a low-cost 
producer of quality drugs (Chaudhuri, 2005, p.2). According to Mathur (2007, p.27), based on 
the  volume  of  the  medicines  they  produced,  by  the  1990s,  the  Indian  pharmaceutical 
companies had become the fourth largest in the world. Furthermore, Eren-Vural (2007, p.114) 
demonstrates that, during the 1980s, 98 percent of the domestic demand for pharmaceuticals in 
India was supplied by local manufacturers. In this regard, as will be explained in more detail 
later  in  this  section,  the  India’s  pharmaceutical  industry  emerged  as  one  of  the  dominant 
domestic actors, which played a significant role in defining the course of patent policy reform 
in India. 
 
Previous  discussions  indicate  that  the  first  Indian  Patent  Act  of  1970  can  be  seen  as  the 
evidence of the Indian government’s preference for a low level of patent protection. Such a 
preference was highly influenced by India’s condition as a newly independent poor country. 
Furthermore, prior to the 1980s, there were relatively few international pressures, since, at that 
time, IPR protection was still not the trade agenda priority for most of the major developed 
countries,  particularly  the  US.  As  will  be  explained  later,  this  circumstance  changed 
significantly after the 1980s, when IPR protection became the priority of developed countries, 
particularly the US, and contributed to the inclusion of IPR protection in international trade 
negotiations. As explained earlier, when IPR protection was introduced and negotiated during 
the Uruguay Round, the US also intensified its pressure to developing countries, including 
India,  to  improve  their  IPR  protection.  Subsequent  development  also  demonstrates  that, 
domestically,  domestic  societal  actors  (mainly  pharmaceutical  manufacturers),  benefitting 
from the existing patent act also began to play a significant role, which determined the course 
of the patent policy reform in India.   
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5.4.1.2.2 Patent Policy Change during the Transition Period  
 
After the TRIPs negotiations concluded, as a response to its TRIPs obligations, the Indian 
government set up an expert group, with the task of providing suggestions to the government 
regarding the essential amendments that needed to be taken, in order for India to comply with 
its  TRIPs  obligations  (Ganguli,  1999,  p.279;  UNESCAP,  2001,  p.8).  Immediately  after  it 
ratified  the  WTO  Agreement  on  30  December  1994,  on  the  basis  of  this  expert  group’s 
recommendation, the Indian government enacted the 1994 Patent Ordinance on 31 December 
1994. Under this ordinance, the Indian Patent Office would accept the applications for patents 
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, and provide the necessary mechanism 
for granting the EMR (Ganguli, 1999, p.279; UNESCAP, 2001, p.8). However, an ordinance 
issued by the president, as explained earlier, can be regarded as only a temporary solution, as 
it would expire within six weeks, unless parliament adopted it. As argued by a former Indian 
government official in the interview with the author, the Indian government chose this route 
because it was aware of the fact that patent protection was a very sensitive issue, and it would 
create a lengthy debate in parliament. In the interview, a former Indian government further 
argued that “...the executive believed that adopting an ordinance as a temporary step would 
suffice to meet the deadline to comply with India’s TRIPs obligations”.
93 
 
Nevertheless, realising that the Patent Ordinance of 1994 was insufficient in the long term, the 
Indian government undertook another important effort to comply with the TRIPs Agreement, 
by proposing the Patent (Amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha in March 1995 (UNESCAP, 
2001, p.9). After the Lok Sabha passed the bill, the government then brought the Bill to the 
Rajya Sabha. However, since the ruling party did not have a majority in the Rajya Sabha, the 
opposition parties diverted the bill to the Select Committee on Patents (UNESCAP, 2001, p.9). 
Before the Select Committee finished its task, Lok Sabha was dissolved in May 1996. With 
the dissolution of Lok Sabha, the ongoing amendment process also automatically terminated 
(Ganguli, 1999, p.279; UNESCAP, 2001, p.9; Chaudhuri, 2005, p.5).  
 
Unlike previous periods, during its transition period, India received strong pressures from the 
US  and  the  EU  to  improve  its  patent  protection  regime.  One  important  indicator  of  the 
pressure is the fact that India had consistently been placed with Priority Watch List (PWL) 
                                                 
93 Author’s interview with a former Indian government official (Geneva, 23 November 2009). 169 
 
status from 1994 to 2010, on the USTR Special 301 Report. Based on the USTR Special 301 
Reports from 2000 to 2010, the main reason behind India’s PWL status is principally due to 
inadequate  patent  protection  particularly  related  to  the  protection  of  pharmaceutical  and 
agricultural chemical products.
94  
 
In addition to that, because of the failure to enact the Patent (Amendment) Bill, the US (in 
1996) and the EU (in 1997) initiated complaints before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB).  They  contended  that  the  1994  Patent  Ordinance  was  inadequate  to  serve  as  the 
purposed legal protection for patent applications for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical 
products (WTO, 1997a; 1998b, p.51). In defence, India argued that, even though it was still 
unable to provide a legal arrangement, it had issued administrative instructions for accepting 
patent applications for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products. Furthermore, India 
argued that the TRIPs Agreement did not require a country to provide such measures through 
legislative, rather than administrative practices (Garde, 2009, p.65).  Nevertheless, the WTO 
DSB  concluded  that  India  had  violated  its  TRIPs  Agreement,  since  it  failed  to  provide  a 
system for filing patent applications for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products by 
the 1
st of January 1995 (WTO, 1997a; WTO, 1998b). India appealed to the WTO Appellate 
Body on 15 October 1997, and, on its report dated 19 December 1997, the WTO Appellate 
Body upheld the ruling of the previous decisions on substantive issues.  
 
A patent bill which was designed to meet India’s obligations to the WTO DSB ruling was 
introduced by the Indian government in the Rajya Sabha on 16 December 1998. After the 
Rajya Sabha passed the Bill on 22 December 1998, the bill was brought to Lok Sabha to 
become an act (UNESCAP, 2001, p.10; Chaudhuri, 2005, p.5). Nevertheless, due to strong 
resistance from the members of parliament, the Lok Sabha opposed to pass the bill. During the 
debate, some members of parliament, including some from minority parties such as the Janata 
Dal (JD) Party, argued that the bill proposed by the government did not provide sufficient 
safeguards,  and  also  did  not  incorporate  certain  exemptions,  which  were  permitted  under 
TRIPs (Lok Sabha, 1999c, p.3). With this failure, as a temporarily solution, the government, 
therefore had to adopt another ordinance, through the Patent (Amendment) Ordinance on 8 
January 1999. In this regard, despite receiving substantial external pressures, due to strong 
                                                 
94 As will be explained in the subsequent section on copyrights, another important reason for India’s constant 
PWL status was also related to the piracy of motion pictures, music, software, books, and other copyrighted 
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domestic  resistance,  the  Indian  government  failed  to  make  substantial  patent  legislation 
reforms to fulfil its TRIPs obligations (Ramanna, n. d., p.4).  
 
During the debate in Lok Sabha in March 1999, many members of parliament criticised the 
decision of the executive to adopt the 1999 Patent (Amendment) Ordinance, which granted the 
EMR. A member of parliament from one of the opposition parties, the Revolutionary Socialist 
Party  (RSP),  criticised  that  the  ordinance  was  adopted  without  taking  into  account  the 
recommendations  from  the  Standing  Committee  on  Commerce,  which  stated  that  granting 
EMR would place India under “...the absolute surrender to the dictates of the transnational 
corporations” (Lok Sabha, 1999b, p.26). However on the other hand, members from the ruling 
party  argued  that  the  enactment  of  a  new  patent  act  was  a  necessity,  as  part  of  India’s 
obligations as a member of WTO and it was part of India’s commitment to the international 
system  (Lok  Sabha,  1999b,  p.11).
95  In  the  interview  with  the  author,  a  former  Indian 
government official stated that “...the opposition agreed to meet the TRIPs obligations because 
India as a responsible international player adheres to its international obligations even if they 
cost a lot”.
96 
 
After  contentious  debate,  which  was  also  included  a  walk-out  by  some  members  of  the 
parliament, mostly from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M) and the Rashtriya 
Janata Dal (RJD), the  Lok Sabha finally  passed the  Bill on 13 March 1999 (Lok Sabha, 
1999b, p.52). The Rajya Sabha also then agreed to pass the bill. The new Patent (Amendment) 
Act came into effect on 26 March 1999, just in time to meet the deadline of 19 April 1999, set 
by the Appellate Body of WTO. However, this patent act was basically only intended to fulfil 
the obligations required by the WTO DSB ruling, to provide the necessary procedures related 
to EMR. In this context, since India was still eligible for the transition period until 2005, the 
Indian government did not find it necessary to incorporate other important TRIPs provisions, 
such as the minimum 20-year duration of protection, and granting patent for pharmaceutical 
products.  Furthermore,  the  decision  for  not  incorporating  these  aspects  was  also  to  avoid 
further controversy, particularly considering the strong domestic resistance. 
                                                 
95 The wide division between the opposition mostly from left wing parties, and the ruling party, in Lok Sabha, 
during the debate on the first Patent (Amendment) bill process, is pointed out in the author’s interview with a 
former Indian government official (Geneva, 23 November 2009). The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was a ruling 
party during the Twelfth Lok Sabha from 10 March 1998 to 26 April 1999 (Lok Sabha, n. d. (b)). See Appendix 
IX (table IX.2) for a complete list of the political parties in Lok Sabha during this period. 
96 Author’s interview with a former Indian government official (Geneva, 23 November 2009). 171 
 
 
Strong domestic resistance to reform patent legislation can be understood, since the domestic 
constituency interested in strong patent protection in India was relatively small. Figure 5.1 
illustrates that foreign applicants dominated the total patent applicants in India, except during 
the  short  period  from  1999  to  2002,  when  there  was  a  significant  increase  in  domestic 
applications for patent protection.
97 Aside from that short period, foreign applicants accounted 
for more than 66.50 percent of total patent applications in India, while domestic applicants 
only accounted for less than 33.50 percent since 1992 (see also Appendix VIII (Table VIII.1).  
This figure, however, is still higher than the domestic applicants for patents in the Indonesian 
case study, as explained in the previous chapter, which only accounted only for around 10 
percent.  
 
Figure 5.1 Patent Applications in India (1992–2009) 
 
Sources:  Annual  Reports  of  the  Indian  Controller  General  of  Patents,  Designs,  and  Trade 
Marks 2001–2002 to 2008–2009. 
  
As part of its effort to further reform its existing patent legislation, the Indian government then 
undertook several initiatives, involving both  government institutions and domestic societal 
actors, through the establishment of several committees, expert groups, and working groups. 
These initiatives were intended to thoroughly examine all aspects relating to the amendments, 
in order to be consistent with the TRIPs Agreement, while still maintaining the necessary 
                                                 
97 It should be noted, however, explaining a sudden increase in short period which then followed by a dramatic 
decline is beyond the scope of this thesis. 172 
 
mechanism  to  safeguard  India’s  public  interest,  including  the  guarantee  of  affordable 
medicines  (UNESCAP,  2001,  p.11).  Based  on  the  result  of  these  consultations,  the 
government of India introduced another patent bill in the Rajya Sabha on 20 December 1999. 
The Rajya Sabha passed a motion to refer the Bill to a Joint Select Committee on patent. The 
Lok Sabha also agreed with this motion, on 22 December 1999 (UNESCAP, 2001, p.10).  
 
In  his  opening  statement  in Rajya  Sabha,  and then  also  when  introducing  the  bill  to Lok 
Sabha, the Minister of Commerce and Industry
98 stated that the enactment of the new patent 
bill was not only intended to honour India’s international commitment, but also to protect 
India’s interest, which had already emerged as the new world leader of the knowledge-based 
drug  industry  in  the  world  (Lok  Sabha,  2002,  pp.2–3;  Rajya  Sabha,  2002,  p.253).  In  this 
regard, the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry stated, “[N]ow it is the time for the rest 
of the industry to come out of its ‘reverse-engineering’ mode and move forward into the era of 
innovative  ‘research  and  development’  mode...”  (Lok  Sabha,  2002,  pp.2–3;  Rajya  Sabha, 
2002, p.253). Nevertheless, on the other hand, the Minister of Commerce and Industry also 
clearly  stated  that  the  proposed  bill  did  not  introduce  patent  protection  for  drugs, 
pharmaceuticals, and agro-chemical products, considering that India was still not obliged to 
provide the protection for these areas until 2005 (Lok Sabha, 2002, p.2; Rajya Sabha, 2002, 
p.253). Based on the joint committee’s recommendation, the bill was finally approved by Lok 
Sabha in May 2002, as the Patent (Second Amendment) Act of 2002 (Chaudhuri, 2005, p.6).  
 
Nearly approaching the end of its transition period, the Indian government introduced another 
patent bill in parliament in December 2003. However, the Lok Sabha was dissolved before the 
bill could be passed (Chaudhuri, 2005, p.6). According to Mahapatra (2004), the differences 
within the ruling coalition contributed to the failure of the enactment of the new act. Under 
this circumstance, since the Indian government only had a limited time to fulfil its TRIPs 
obligations before its transition period expired on 1 January 2005, the president adopted a 
Presidential Decree (the Patent (Amendment) Ordinance) on 26 December 2004 (Chaudhuri, 
2005, p.6). The decree included a provision to protect patents for pharmaceuticals, foods, and 
agricultural chemical products (Rajya Sabha, 2005, p.59). By adopting this provision, India 
                                                 
98 It should be noted that, as argued by Narlikar (2008b, p.277), the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry is 
one of the most powerful bureaucracies in the Indian political system. Even though the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry consults with relevant ministries concerning certain trade issues, the ministry is the dominant state 
executive, and plays a key role as the agenda-setter (Narlikar, 2008, p.277) including in IP issues.  
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can be considered as TRIPs compliant, since this was the only TRIPs obligation that had not 
been fulfilled by India’s existing patent law (see table 5.1). Nevertheless, a permanent solution 
for India to become TRIPs-compliant was only achieved when the parliament finally approved 
the Patent (Third Amendment) Act, on 4 April 2005.   
 
As can be seen from previous debates in Lok Sabha, after the president adopted the ordinance 
in 1999, many members of parliament also criticised the decision of the executive to adopt the 
ordinance in 2004, and the proposed bill (Lok Sabha, 2005). During the debate, a member of 
parliament from the opposition party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stated that the proposed 
bills would jeopardise India’s relations with other developing countries, because many lesser 
developed countries depended on India’s affordable medicine, which would be affected by the 
new regulation under the proposed bill (Lok Sabha, 2005, p.8). In addition, the opposition did 
not only come from the opposition coalition but also from the left wing political alliance of the 
ruling government (Mukherjee, 2006, p.133).
99 During the debate, it can also be observed that 
India’s  credibility  in  the  international  arena  was  one  of  the  main  reasons  argued  by  the 
members of dominant ruling party, the Indian National Congress (INC) (Lok Sabha, 2005, 
p.30). Since India already enjoyed 10 years of transition period, a member of parliament from 
the INC argued that it was time for India to fully comply with its international commitment, 
otherwise India would lose its credibility in the international arena (Lok Sabha, 2005, p.30). 
As summarised in table 5.1, the Patent (Third Amendment) Act of 2005 included a provision 
to  protect  patents  for  pharmaceuticals,  foods,  and  agricultural  chemical  products.  By  the 
adoption of this provision, the Indian patent law met the minimum standards of its TRIPs 
requirements.
100 
                                                 
99 In 2004, during the Fourteenth Lok Sabha (17 May 2004–18 May 2009), a coalition government, the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) came to power. The Indian National Congress (INC) dominated the coalition, but the 
coalition included the Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M) (Kohli and Basu, 2009, pp.155–56). The 
major opposition party was the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Lok Sabha, n. d. (d)). See Appendix IX (Table 
IX.4) for a complete list of the political parties in Lok Sabha during this period.  
100 After the adoption of the Patent (Third Amendment) Act of 2005, in April 2005 the government of India 
established a technical expert group on patent law issues, to assess whether the amendment act had already 
fulfilled India’s TRIPs obligations or not. The technical expert group produced a report which was published in 
December 2006, and the report was known as the Mashelkar Report, after the name of the expert group chairman, 
Dr. R.A. Mashelkar. The report concluded that the Indian (Third Amendment) Act of 2005 was not TRIPs 
compliant, since it only restricted patent protection for new chemical entities and micro-organisms. The 
publication of this report triggered controversy because of plagiarism issue, since the conclusion of the report was 
accused as only a copy of a report published by the Intellectual Property Institute, a UK-based industry think 
tank, which was financially supported by Interpat, a Swiss association of major European, Japanese and US 
research-based pharmaceutical companies (Sharma and Hiddleston, 2007). Due to the controversy, the technical 
expert group withdrew the report and the government of India gave an additional period in which to resubmit the 
report. The technical expert group resubmitted the report in August 2009. For a more detailed discussion on the 174 
 
 
During  the  policy  reform  process  which  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  Patent  (Third 
Amendment)  Act  of  2005,  there  was  a  significant  development  in  the  domestic  actors’ 
preferences regarding IPR protection, as evident from a shift in the interests of the Indian 
national  pharmaceuticals  industry.  Prior  to  the  late  1990s,  most  small-medium  national 
pharmaceuticals  companies,  focused  on  generic  manufacturing  and  relying  on  reverse 
engineering, opposed the patent policy reforms, due to their fear that the implementation of the 
TRIPs obligations would have detrimental effects for their interests in generic manufacturing 
(Tellez  n.  d.,  p.2).  They  were  mainly  represented  by  the  Indian  Drug  Manufacturers’ 
Association (IDMA). In this context, the Indian pharmaceuticals manufacturers were united to 
urge the Indian government to fully exploit flexibilities available under TRIPs (Eren-Vural, 
2007, p.131). By the late 1990s, however, some of these national pharmaceutical companies, 
that were not only focusing on generic manufacturing but were also able to build on their 
research and innovative capacity started to change their preference. These companies became 
the demanders of the patent laws amendment (Tellez, n. d., p.2). In this regard, in 1999, the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA) was established to “…represents the interests of firms 
that  want  to  utilize  [sic]  their  patent  potential  but  also  capitalize  [sic]  on  their  generic 
manufacturing capability” (Ramanna, n. d., p.9). The shift in the preference of some small-
medium pharmaceutical industries in India, regarding patent protection, was also pointed out 
by a former Indian government official in the interview with the author.
101  
 
The  shift  in  the  preference  of  some  of  the  national  Indian  pharmaceutical  companies 
contributed to the change in domestic societal actors’ constellations in patent protection. Prior 
to  the  late  1990s,  domestic  societal  actors  demanding  a  patent  policy  reform  to  provide 
stronger patent protection, were mostly coming from multinational companies that had already 
established  their  business  in  India,  represented  by  the  Organisation  of  Pharmaceutical 
Producers of India (OPPI) (Gupta, 2004, pp.615–16). According to Ramanna (n. d., p.7), one 
of the main reasons behind the change in some Indian national pharmaceutical industries’ 
preferences towards patent protection was because they sought to gain the potential benefits 
                                                                                                                                                         
Mashelkar Report controversy, see Park and Prabhala (2007), Sharma and Hiddleston (2007), CENTAD (2007a, 
2007b), Golikeri (2009), Gopakumar (n. d.), Lawyers Collective (n. d.). 
   
101 Author’s interview with a former Indian government official (Geneva, 23 November 2009). 175 
 
from the new patent regime.
102 After being able to impressively develop under government 
protection for several decades, they found themselves to have the ability to transform from 
reverse engineering to concentrating their activity on new drug discovery (see also Lawton, 
Lindeque, and McGuire, 2009, pp.8–9). At the same time, some of the Indian national firms 
also began to seek the opportunity to export their products overseas, particularly to developed 
countries, rather than to other developing countries (Cullet, 2002b, p.5). In addition, the study 
by  Lawton,  Lindeque,  and  McGuire  (2009,  pp.8–9)  further  demonstrates  that  the  Indian 
pharmaceutical  firms  also  started  to  establish  a  network  with  developed  countries-based 
pharmaceutical  companies  to  work  on  certain  drugs,  which  required  a  sufficient  patent 
protection. The change in the preference of the Indian pharmaceutical industries regarding 
patent protection can be seen from the following statement by the Chief Executive of one of 
India’s most prominent research-based companies: 
“China is already ahead, having a strong patent act as well as data 
protection  laws.  India  needs  to  shift  its  mindset  from  becoming  a 
leader  of  developing  countries  to  taking  its  place  at  the  table  of 
developed  nations.  It  is  China  and  Korea  that  will  be  India’s  real 
competitors  and  not  the  small  countries  in  sub-[S]aharan  Africa” 
(Sikka (2005) as quoted in Mukherjee, 2006, p.138). 
 
Another crucial development regarding domestic societal actors’ preference during the patent 
policy reform in the 2000s was the emergence of a pro-IP policy reform among Indian NGOs 
and research-based institutions. Prior to 2000, the majority of Indian NGOs strongly opposed 
patent policy reform. One of the prominent Indian NGOs, the National Working Group on 
Patent  Laws  (NWGPL)
103  was  actively  engaged  in  mobilising  political  opposition  against 
patent reform. The NWGPL was also directly involved in the process of patent policy reform, 
not only through facilitating a public awareness campaign and supporting the joint resistance 
movement,  but  also  working  closely  with  parliament  by  establishing  the  Forum  of 
Parliamentarians on Intellectual Property and WTO Issues, during the late 1980s to mid-1990s 
(Tellez n. d., p.2; Ramanna, n. d., p.5; Matthews, 2006, p.21). Furthermore, the NWGPL also 
established the People’s Commissions on TRIPs which consisted of leading senior former 
                                                 
102 It should be noted that the shift in the preference can be found mainly at the Indian firms with a greater sales 
and export competition as well as a higher level of research and development capacity (Ramanna, n. d., p.7). 
Meanwhile, the position of smaller pharmaceutical firms, which had no sufficient research and development 
capacity with which to compete internationally, in opposing patent policy reform, remained unchanged. 
103 The National Working Group on Patent Law (NWGPL) is an informal public interest expert group established 
in 1988, which mainly concerned with the impact of the TRIPs Agreement on the access to affordable generic 
medicines for Indian society (Tellez n. d., p.2; Ramanna n. d., p.5).  176 
 
government officials and experts, in order to provide a forum for public consultations. The 
People’s Commissions also provided suggestions to parliament to ensure the amended act 
would prioritise national interest and access to medicines (Tellez n. d., p.2; Thomas, 2001, 
p.2155). The NWGPL and other prominent NGOs
104 were able to carry political weight in the 
Indian policy making process, and contributed to prevent a substantial patent policy reform in 
India, at least until the end of the 1990s.  
 
Nevertheless, the domestic societal actors’ constellation changed in the late 1990s, when there 
was a movement from some of the Indian national research institutes towards having a more 
constructive opposition regarding the patent policy reform. They argued that engaging in the 
patent policy reform is important for ensuring the amended act would provide sufficient public 
health safeguards (Tellez n. d., pp.2–3). These domestic societal actors also stated that, instead 
of opposing patents, India should have a more strategic means of securing gains from IP by 
trying  to  extend  IPR  protection  to  protect  traditional  knowledge  and  innovation  including 
protecting farmers’ rights (Ramanna, n. d., p.10).
105 In this regard, the active involvement of 
these actors, therefore, contributed towards creating a more favourable condition in which 
policy reform could to take place.  
 
5.4.1.2.3 Patent Policy Change after the end of the Transition Period 
 
Previous  discussions  demonstrated  that  India  took  advantage  of  its  full  10  year  transition 
period in order to fulfil its TRIPs obligations for patent protection, which was given until 
2005.  The  empirical  evidence  also  shows  that,  during  its  transition  period,  the  Indian 
government amended its patent legislation several times, in 1999, 2002, and 2005. Fulfilling 
its TRIPs obligations through several amendment processes exhibited the Indian government’s 
strategic effort to reconcile its international obligations and domestic opposition. During this 
process, India utilised most of the flexibilities available under TRIPs as well as leaving the 
                                                 
104 These include the Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Nature Resource Policy led by Vandana 
Shiva, the Federation of Medical Representatives Association of India (FMRAI), and the Affordable Treatment 
and Action Campaign (AMTC) (Tellez n. d., p.2). 
105 One of these domestic societal actors is the Society for Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies 
and Institutions (SRISTI) which focused its activities on defending the IPRs protection for third world farmers 
(Ramanna, n. d., p.11; SRISTI, n. d.). These pro-patent reform research institutes, however, according to 
Ramanna (n. d., pp.11–12) had strong connections with industry and policy networks, and were well-quipped 
with their own biotechnology research facilities, which would enable them to commercialise the traditional and 
local innovations.  177 
 
most controversial provisions until the end of its transition period. By amending its patent act 
in 2005, the Indian government finally fulfilled its obligations under the TRIPs Agreement, 
and, after this last amendment in 2005, the Indian government has not adopted any other 
patent legislation (as of January 2011).  
 
As explained earlier, despite receiving substantial pressures from the US (in various forms 
such as threats of trade sanctions; being on the USTR Special 301 Report mostly with PWL 
status; and also being brought to the WTO dispute), India still did not make a substantial 
policy change in its patent legislation until the end of its transition period. In this regard, by 
choosing  to  take  advantage  of  the  full  transition  period,  India  gradually  introduced 
controversial  provisions  under  TRIPs  in  separate  amendment  processes.  The  empirical 
evidence shows that, prior to the late 1990s, domestic societal actors through various means, 
including mobilising political opposition, establishing expert groups on the patent issue, as 
well as facilitating public awareness campaigns, were  able to gain influence in the patent 
policy making process, and contributed to the failure of the Indian government to reform the 
patent law, despite strong external pressures. Given India’s persistence, despite receiving such 
pressures, indicates that the role of external pressures cannot fully explain India’s response 
towards its TRIPs obligations. The empirical findings further demonstrate that a substantial 
policy reform took place in the 2000s when there was a shift in domestic societal actors’ 
preference regarding patent protection. 
 
5.4.2  India’s  Copyright  Policy  Change:  Complying  without  Substantial  Policy 
Reform 
 
Compared to patents, the copyright policy reform in India did not create a strong controversy. 
This  is  because,  even  prior  to  TRIPs,  India’s  existing  copyright  act  to  a  large  extent  had 
already  resembled  the  international  standards  for  copyright  protection  under  the  Berne 
Convention.  In  this  regard,  therefore,  in  order  to  respond  to  its  TRIPs  obligations,  the 
government  of  India  only  needed  to  take  minor  reforms  on  its  existing  copyright  act. 
Furthermore, unlike in the case of patents, the domestic supports demanding a higher level of 
copyright protection was also constantly high. In this regard, the Indian government did not 
only reform its existing copyright legislation before the deadline, but also adopted even more 
rigorous rules than required by TRIPs.  
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5.4.2.1 Assessing India’s Copyright Legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
The existence of the Indian copyright law can be traced back to 1914, when India was still 
under the British colonial rule (Baldia, 2003, pp.434–35). The first Indian copyright law after 
independence was adopted in 1957, much earlier than its patent law. After the adoption of this 
act, the government of India amended its copyright legislation twice, even before the TRIPs 
Agreement  was  introduced  in  multilateral  trade  negotiations  in  1983  and  1984.  The 
government  of  India  took  another  policy  reform  on  copyright  protection  when  the  TRIPs 
Agreement was still being negotiated, in 1992 and again in 1994. After the TRIPs Agreement 
negotiations were concluded, India again amended its copyright law in 1999. To date, in total, 
the Indian government has adopted 6 copyright acts since the independence. Based on the 
timing  of  its  first  copyright  law  after  TRIPs,  the  Indian  copyright  law  already  met  the 
minimum requirement of TRIPs. Furthermore, based on the quality of the last amendment of 
its copyright law, India even adopted regulations beyond the minimum standards as required 
by TRIPs (see table 5.2).  
 
The  first  Indian  copyright  act  after  the  independence  was  essentially  the  extension  of  the 
previous copyright act under the British colonial rule (the Copyright Act of 1911), and also 
closely mirrored the British Copyright Act of 1956 (Baldia, 2003, p.435; Indian Copyright 
Office, n. d.). To a large extent, the 1957 Copyright Act, as amended several times prior to the 
TRIPs  Agreement,  was  already  consistent  with  the  international  standards  for  copyright 
protection under the Berne Convention. Nevertheless, the 1957 Copyright Act also provided 
an extensive list of non-infringing uses of copyrighted work for educational purposes, private 
use, and research activities (Garde, 2009, p.71). The 1957 Copyright Act provided protection 
for original works of a literary, dramatic, musical and artistic kind, inclusive of architecture, 
art, cinema and sound recording (Thomas, 2001, p.2152; Gopakumar and Unni, 2003, p.2935). 
The duration of protection for some of the areas under the original 1957 Copyright Act already 
fulfilled  the  minimum  requirement  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement.  Under  the  1992  Copyright 
(Amendment) Act, the length of protection for literary works, dramatic works, musical works, 
and  artistic  works  was  extended  to  the  life  of  the  author  plus  60  years,  meanwhile  the 
minimum terms of protection under TRIPs is life of author plus 50 years (see table 5.2). In 
addition, photographs, cinematography films, sound recordings, and computer programmes 
enjoy a similar duration of protection. Furthermore, as consistent with the Berne Convention 179 
 
and  the  Universal  Copyright  Convention,  the  1957  Copyright  Act  also  reserved  several 
provisions for granting compulsory licenses for translation and the reproduction of foreign 
works for educational purposes (UNESCAP, 2001, p.14).  
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  existing  copyright  act  in  India  was  more  or  less  already  in 
compliance with the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, when the TRIPs negotiations were finally 
concluded, the government of India just needed to undertake minor adjustments. This could be 
done by broadening the scope of protection to wider areas, such as broadcasting reproduction 
rights and performers’ rights, and a new area to include IT and the software industry. In doing 
so, the Indian government introduced a new Copyright Act in 1994, which granted protection 
for  broadcasting  reproduction  rights  and  performers'  rights  (see  table  5.2).  The  Indian 
government then introduced another copyright act in 1999. The main revision under the newly 
enacted act was extending the term of protections for performers rights from 25 to 50 years 
(UNSECAP, 2001, p.14). 
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Table 5.2 The Indian Copyright Acts and TRIPs Compatibility 
Aspects  TRIPs 
Obligations 
Prior to TRIPs 
No.14/1957 
During Transition 
Period 
No. 38/1994 
By the end of 
Transition  
No. 49/1999 
Subject matter 
coverage 
Scientific, literary, 
and artistic works 
Protected  Protected  Protected 
Computer 
programmes, video 
recording, sound 
recording 
Not protected  Protected  Protected 
Rental rights   Not protected  Protected  Protected 
Related rights   Not protected  Protected   Protected 
Database and 
optical discs 
Not protected  Not protected  Protected 
Duration of 
protection for 
original work 
(literary, dramatic, 
musical, artistic 
works) 
Life of author +50 
years 
Life of author  
+50 years 
Life of author 
+60 years  
Life of author 
+60 years  
Duration of 
protection for 
performers and 
producers of 
phonograms 
50 years  Not protected  25 years  50 years 
Duration of 
protection for 
broadcasting 
organisation 
20 years  Not protected  25 years  25 years 
Duration of 
protection for 
computer 
programme 
50 years  Not protected  50 years  50 years 
Eligible copyright 
holders 
National treatment 
and MFN 
principles 
Only for Indian 
citizens and 
foreign works 
where the first 
publication of the 
creation took 
place in India 
Granted 
national 
treatment and 
MFN principles 
on the basis of 
reciprocity 
Granted national 
treatment and 
MFN principles 
on the basis of 
reciprocity 
Enforcement  Requires civil and 
criminal 
enforcement but 
no minimum 
requirements 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
TRIPs Compatibility  --  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-minimum  TRIPs-Plus 
 
Note: Author’s assessment on the Indian Copyright Act No.14 of 1957, the Indian Copyright 
(Amendment) Act No. 38 of 1994, and the Indian Copyright (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 1999. 
This table is the author’s assessment on the main copyright acts only. It does not include the 
assessment of the amendment in 1983, 1984, and 1992, since the most substantial reform after 
the Copyright Act of 1957 was under the amendment of 1994 (Indian Copyright Office, n. d. 
(a)). Under the Copyright Act of 1994, for some aspects, India adopted more rigorous rules than 181 
 
required by TRIPs including longer terms of protection for original work, but India still did not 
protect databases and optical discs as required. Therefore, the Copyright Act of 1994 can only be 
categorised as TRIPs minimum instead of TRIPs-Plus. It should be noted that related rights 
include the rights of performers, producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organisations 
rights. 
 
5.4.2.2 India’s Copyright Legislation: Explaining Policy Change 
 
India’s extensive policy reform, as a response to its TRIPs obligations on copyright protection, 
cannot  be  explained  by  only  focusing  on  external  pressures.  This  is  particularly  because, 
compared to its patent reform, India did not receive strong external pressures on copyright 
issues, yet India reformed its copyright act earlier, and adopted more rigorous rules. A closer 
observation  demonstrates  that,  unlike  in  patents,  domestic  support  for  strong  copyright 
protection in India was considerably high. Moreover, given the fact that the existing copyright 
legislation prior to TRIPs already provided sufficient protection for copyrights according to 
international standards, copyright policy reform after TRIPs in India took place easily, without 
any substantial domestic opposition.    
 
5.4.2.2.1 Copyright Policy Change prior to and during the TRIPs Negotiations 
 
As explained earlier, India’s existing copyright legislation prior to TRIPs, as can be seen from 
the Copyright Act of 1957, was already in line with international standards under the Berne 
Convention.  After  the  adoption  of  its  first  copyright  law  after  independence,  the  Indian 
government undertook several policy reforms, until it adopted the Copyright Act of 1994. 
During this period, the evidence of external pressures can only be seen from the fact that India 
was always attributed with PWL status on the USTR Special 301 Report, which was due to the 
high rate of piracy of motion pictures, music, software, books, and other copyrighted work 
(USTR Special 301 Reports 2001–2009, see table 5.3). As can be seen from table 5.3, the 
level  of  motion  pictures  piracy  in  India,  from  1995  to  2004,  was  continuously  above  60 
percent, with the estimated trade losses from US$46 million to US$80 million per year. The 
table also illustrates that the level of piracy for business software in India, from 1995 to 2009, 
was  steadily  above  61  percent,  with  estimated  trade  losses  from  US$114.6  million  to 
US$1,505 million per year. In total, due to piracy in India, the trade losses increased from 
US$233.4 million in 1995 to approximately US$1,522.7 billion in 2009.  
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Table 5.3 Estimated Trade Losses and Level of Piracy in India 1995–2009 (in US$ 
millions) 
 
Industry  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level 
Motion Pictures  58.0  99%  66.0  85%  66.0  80%  66.0  80%  66.0  80% 
Records & 
Music  
10.0  30%  7.0  30%  6.0  40%  6.0  30%  8.0  40% 
Business 
Software  
114.6  78%  182.4  78%  148.7  69%  158.0  65%  160.2  61% 
Entertainment 
Software 
25.8  76%  31.4  82%  35.9  82%  36.8  84%  42.8  86% 
Books  25.0  NA  25.0  NA  22.0  NA  30.0  NA  35.0  NA 
TOTALS  233.4    311.8    278.6    296.8    312.0   
Industry  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level 
Motion Pictures  47.0  60%  70.0  60%  75.0  60%  77.0  60%  80.0  60% 
Records & 
Music  
6.0  40%  NA  40%  6.6  40%  6.0  40%  67.3  50% 
Business 
Software  
181.6  63%  256.0  70%  257.7  70%  187.0  73%  239.0  74% 
Entertainment 
Software 
NA  80%  NA  NA  NA  NA  113.3  84%  59.5  86% 
Books  36.0  NA  37.0  NA  36.5  NA  36.5  NA  38.0  NA 
TOTALS  270.6    363.0    375.8    419.8    483.8   
Industry  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level  Loss  Level 
Motion Pictures  NA  29%  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Records & 
Music  
56.4  57%  52.7  55%  13.8  55%  36.2  55%  17.7  60% 
Business 
Software  
255.0  72%  574.0  71%  1013.0  69%  1384.0  68%  1505.0  66% 
Entertainment 
Software 
65.2  86%  85.6  86%  129.9  89%  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Books  42.0  NA  40.0  NA  38.0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
TOTALS  418.6    752.3    1194.7    1420.2    1522.7   
 
Sources: IIPA Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement on India (2001–
2009) and IIPA 2010 “Special 301”.  
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5.4.2.2.2 Copyright Policy Change during the Transition Period 
 
Despite the fact that India did not receive extensive external pressures to improve its copyright 
protection, India amended its copyright legislation again in 1999, just nearly at the end of its 
transition period. This, in essence, illustrates the flaw in the role of the external pressures 
explanation  in  understanding  copyright  policy  reform  in  India.  A  closer  observation  on 
domestic  politics  shows  that  a  relatively  swift  copyright  policy  reform  is  reflected  in  an 
unproblematic process in the parliament debate. Unlike the impact of the TRIPs Agreement on 
the patent regime, which drew contentious debate in parliament, the effort to strengthen the 
copyright system did not receive comparable critical attention. This can be seen from the fact 
that the support to reform India’s existing copyright law was high among the members of 
parliament. Members of parliament, such as from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), believed 
that  strong  copyright  protection  would  be  beneficial  for  protecting  India’s  rich  cultural 
activities  (Lok  Sabha,  1999d,  p.3).    The  low  level  of  opposition  against  copyright  policy 
reform in parliament was also because India’s existing copyright act was largely in conformity 
with India’s obligation under TRIPs. In this context, therefore, India’s obligation to implement 
the  TRIPs  Agreement  did  not  constitute  an  immense  burden,  as  it  was  on  India’s  patent 
regime. However, even though compared to the patent amendment process, the amendment 
process of the copyright bill could be passed without substantial resistance from members of 
parliament,  there  was  still  a  minor  objection  from members  or  parliament  from  left  wing 
minority parties, such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI (M), who argued that the 
amendment was only serving foreign interest, particularly the US (Lok Sabha, 1999d, p.5).  
 
Another reason behind the rapid copyright policy reform in India was also because of the 
existence of domestic constituents for strong copyright protection which is reflected in the 
impressive  development  of  its  local  companies,  particularly  in  the  IT,  services,  and 
entertainment sectors. As Thomas (2001, p.2151) argues, the key sectors of economic growth 
in India today are IT, in particular software and allied services, as well as the entertainment 
industry. Furthermore, the services sectors dominated the Indian economy, and contributed to 
more  than  half  of  the  national  income,  which  reached  54.4  percent  during  1999  to  2000 
(Thomas, 2001, p.2151). A Study on Copyright Piracy in India by the Indian Ministry of 
Human Resource Development (Indian Copyright Office, 1999, p.1) confirmed that India in 
1999 was among the top seven publishing nations of the world. In addition, according to this 184 
 
study, India is also the largest market for audio cassettes, and the country produces more than 
600 films per year.
106 This cultural industry, therefore, became a potential and actual source of 
revenue for both the government and the private sector (Thomas, 2001, p.2153). In this regard, 
therefore, as pointed out by the counsellors of the WTO IP Division in the interview with the 
author, strong copyright protection is clearly in line with the interest of India’s domestic film 
industries,  which  became  powerful  domestic  constituents  demanding  strong  copyright 
protection.
107 
 
Furthermore,  with  the  rapid  growth  of  the  software  industry  above  50  percent  since  the 
beginning of the 1990s, India had a remarkable market potential for the computer software 
industry (Indian Copyright Office, 1999, p.1). According to Mathur (2006, p.1), the share of 
the software industry in India’s export increased from 4.9 percent in 1997, to 20 percent of 
India’s total export revenue in 2003–2004. This figure, according to Mathur (2006, p.1) was 
predicted to increase to up to 40 percent of India’s annual exports by 2010. In terms of its 
contributions to  India’s  export revenue, the value of the software industry increased  from 
US$0.50 million in 1990 to US$23.6 billion in 2005–2006 (Mathur, 2006, p.1). As can be seen 
from the following figure, the software export value steadily increased from US$12.9 billion 
in 2003–2004 and reached an estimated US$49.7 billion in 2009–2010 (see figure 5.3 and 
Appendix VIII (Table VIII.2)). In this regard, it can be concluded, therefore, that the Indian 
government’s effort to strengthen its copyright laws further would benefit India’s software and 
IT industry. 
 
                                                 
106 According to Thomas (2001, p.2153), the data on the film industry in India is even higher, with a 27,000 
feature film database and an average of 800 productions per year. While Chowdhury (2008, p.109) argues that 
Indian biggest film industry ‘Bollywood’, produces over 1000 films a year.  
107 Author’s interviews with the counsellors of the WTO IP Division (Geneva, 17 November 2009 and 19 
November 2009). 185 
 
Figure 5.2 The Indian Software Exports (2003–2010) 
 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Indian Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology 2004–2005 to 2009–2010. 
 
5.4.2.2.3 Copyright Policy Change after the end of the Transition Period 
 
As  explained  earlier,  after  the  adoption  of  the  Copyright  Act  of  1999,  India  had  already 
fulfilled  its  TRIPs  obligations.  Furthermore,  under  this  new  act,  India  had  adopted  more 
rigorous rules than those required by TRIPs. It should be noted, that in December 2009, the 
parliament of India approved a proposal to introduce a bill to amend the Copyright Act of 
1999,  in  order  to  bring  the  act  into  conformity  with  WIPO  Internet  Treaties,  the  WIPO 
Copyright  Treaty  (WCT),  and  the  WIPO  Performances  and  Phonograms  Treaty  (WPPT) 
(Indian  Copyright  Office,  2009).  As  of  the  time  of  writing,  this  bill  is  still  under  the 
examination of the parliament.   
 
In conclusion, unlike during the patent policy reform, for which India received strong external 
pressure, during its copyright policy reform, India only received a moderate level of external 
pressure. Despite a moderate level of external pressure, however, the Indian government still 
undertook the necessary steps to amend its copyright law. Furthermore, compared to the patent 
policy reform, India’s copyright policy reform could be regarded as a relatively trouble-free 
process, since it did not draw contentious debate in parliament, and was relatively absent of 
opposition  from  domestic  societal  actors.  This  is  mainly  because  India’s  obligation  under 
TRIPs  did  not  require  the  Indian  government  to  make  any  major  changes  in  its  existing 186 
 
copyright  law,  since  it  was  mainly  already  compatible  with  its  TRIPs  requirements.  The 
reason that copyright policy reform in India took place without difficulty was also because the 
policy  reform  was  in  accordance  with  India’s  domestic  societal  actors’  economic  interest, 
which was evident from the existence of domestic constituents for strong copyright protection.  
 
5.4.3 India’s Trademark Policy Change: Another Case of Compliance without 
Substantial Policy Reform 
 
As with copyright policy reform, trademark policy reform in India also did not cause a strong 
controversy. However, unlike the copyright act which was amended several times after the 
adoption of its first act, India’s first trademark act, which was adopted in 1958, survived until 
1999  without  any  amendments.  This  is  because  the  existing  trademark  legislation  was 
arguably  already  in  line  with  the  international  standards  as  governed  under  the  Paris 
Convention.  Furthermore,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  copyright  policy  reform  process,  the 
support  from  domestic  constituents  for  strong  trademark  protection  was  also  high.  In  this 
regard, therefore, India’s effort to reform its existing trademark legislation, as a response to its 
TRIPs obligations, did not receive any substantial challenges domestically. The opposition 
was only evident in the early 1990s, when the TRIPs Agreement was still being negotiated. 
Nevertheless,  by  nearly  the  end  of  its  transition  period,  India  had  already  adopted  more 
rigorous rules than required by TRIPs.  
 
5.4.3.1 Assessing India’s Trademark Legislation and TRIPs Compatibility 
 
As  can  be  seen  from  both  patents  and  copyrights,  the  existence  India’s  first  trademark 
legislation can be traced back to the British colonial rule, through the adoption of the Indian 
Merchandise  Marks  Act  in  1889  (Garde,  2009,  p.73).The  first  Indian  trademark  law  after 
independence was the Indian Trade and Merchandise Marks Act of 1958, which was largely 
based on the English Trade Marks Act of 1938 (Baldia, 2003, p.435). The Indian Trade and 
Merchandise Act of 1958 (supplemented by the Trade Marks Rules 1959), was more or less 
already compatible with the international standards. In this regard, therefore, as can be seen in 
the case of copyrights, as part of its TRIPs obligations, the Indian government only had to 
make minor adjustments to include the protection for service marks and well-known marks 
(UNESCAP, 2001, p.13).  
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In order to fulfil its TRIPs obligations, the Indian government amended its existing trademark 
law in 1999. The newly adopted trademark act provided the protection of both service and 
well-known marks, which was absent from the previous act. The 1999 Trademark Act also 
extended the term of protection from 7 years to 10 years (see table 5.3). The new act also 
enhanced the punishment for a violation of the trademark rights, which could be charged by a 
fine of between Rs50,000 Indian rupees and Rs200,000,
108 and an imprisonment of no less 
than 6 months (UNESCAP, 2001, p.13). By doing so, India had fulfilled its TRIPs obligations 
on time, and adopted more rigorous rules than those required by TRIPs (see table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4 The Indian Trademark Acts and TRIPs Compatibility 
Aspect  TRIPs Obligations  Prior to TRIPs 
1958 
By the end of 
Transition  
No. 47/1999 
Scope  Goods  Protected  Protected 
Services  Not protected  Protected 
Well-known trademark  Not protected  Protected 
Duration of protection  7 years  7 years  10 years  
Enforcement  Requires civil and 
criminal enforcement 
but no minimum 
requirements 
Included 
provisions for 
enforcement 
Included provisions 
for enforcement 
TRIPs compatibility  --  TRIPs-minus  TRIPs-plus 
 
Note: Author’s assessment on the Indian Trademark Act of 1958 and the Indian Trademark 
(Amendment) Act No. 47 of 1999. Since the Indian Trademark of 1958 is publicly 
unavailable, the assessment of this act is based on UNESCAP’s assessment (see 
UNESCAP, 2001). 
 
5.4.3.2 India’s Trademark Legislation: Explaining Policy Change  
 
As can be seen from copyrights, India’s trademark policy reform, as a response to its TRIPs 
obligations, cannot be explained by only focusing on external pressures. This is particularly 
because,  compared  to  its  patent  reform,  India  did  not  receive  strong  external  pressures  to 
improve its trademark regime, yet India reformed its trademark act on time, by the end of its 
transition period, and adopted more rigorous rules. Empirical findings demonstrate that as can 
be found in copyrights, domestic support for strong trademark protection in India was also 
noticeably high. Moreover, since the existing trademark legislation prior to the TRIPs already 
                                                 
108 Approximately between US$1,100 and US$4,400 based on the Reserve Bank of India’s current exchange 
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provided sufficient protection for trademark in line with international standards, the trademark 
policy reform after TRIPs, could therefore, be done without any substantial change.    
 
5.4.3.2.1 Trademark Policy Change prior to and during the TRIPs negotiations 
 
Compared to the other two IP laws, the trademark law in India was the only IP law that 
survived  until  1999  without  single  amendment  since  its  first  adoption  after  India’s 
independence. As mentioned earlier, India’s first trademark law after the independence was 
adopted in 1958, only a year after its copyright law, through the adoption of the Indian Trade 
and  Merchandise  Marks  (Baldia,  2003,  p.435).  Since  then,  the  earliest  effort  to  reform 
trademark legislation only took place in 1993, when the government proposed a trademark bill 
to parliament. The Lok Sabha approved to pass the bill in 1995, and brought it to the Rajya 
Sabha to get a final approval. Nevertheless, as can be seen from the patent policy reform 
during this period, the trademark bill did not get approval from the Rajya Sabha because the 
ruling party did not have a majority there. As with patent bills, the trademark bill was also 
then brought to a Select Committee. When the bill was still under examination by the Select 
Committee,  the Lok  Sabha  was  dissolved  on  16  May  1996,  and,  as  a  result,  the  ongoing 
amendment process also lapsed (UNESCAP, 2001, p.13).  
 
During  this  amendment  process,  unlike  in  the  case  of  patents,  India  did  not  receive  any 
substantial external pressures to improve its trademark protection. In this context, the survival 
of the first Indian trademark act, without any reform since its adoption until the late 1990s 
would arguably lead to the conclusion that this is because of the absence of external pressures. 
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, even though it was eventually not successful due to the 
objection from the opposition parties, despite the absence of external pressures, the Indian 
government  proposed  a  bill  to  reform  its  trademark  legislation.  In  this  regard,  external 
pressure alone is unable to provide a comprehensive understanding regarding the trademark 
policy reform in India prior to and during the TRIPs negotiations.  
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5.4.3.2.2 Trademark Policy Change during the Transition Period 
 
The government’s effort to enact the new trademark law was finally successful at the second 
attempt in 1999.  The trademark bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 1 December 1999, 
and within a very short period, the Rajya Sabha passed it. Shortly after the bill was brought to 
the Lok Sabha, the Lok Sabha passed the bill, and it finally received the president's consent on 
30 December 1999 (UNESCAP, 2001, p.13). In the opening statement when proposing the 
bills to the Lok Sabha on 22 December 1999, the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry 
stated that the proposed bill, in principle, was the same as the previous bills discussed in 
parliament  in  1995  (Lok  Sabha,  1999e,  p.1).  The  difference  was  in  only  minor  aspects, 
regarding the drafting language and a provision on the composition of the appellate body to 
accommodate the suggestion from the Ministry of Law (Lok Sabha, 1999e, p.1).  
 
Given the fact that this was the same bill as the one that was proposed back in 1993, but the 
different response received from the members of parliament indicates that the change in the 
domestic  political  constellation  played  a  significant  role.  During  the  parliament  debate  in 
1999,  the  government  in  power  was  from  the  Bharatiya  Janata  Party  (BJP),  which  was 
previously an opposition party, during the parliament debate in 1993–1996.
109 When the BJP 
came to power and became the ruling party in 1999, the government introduced the bill which 
was essentially the bill that they were opposed to back in 1993–1996. Even though some 
members of parliament pointed out the inconsistency taken by the BJP concerning trademark 
protection when they were in the opposition and once they were in power, yet, many members 
of parliament agreed that the bill was needed for the Indian people, since it was good for trade, 
industry, and would also be beneficial for the India’s companies in future competition (Lok 
Sabha, 1999e, pp.1–3). 
 
Unlike  patents,  India  did  not  receive  strong  external  pressure  during  the  process  of  its 
trademark policy reform. This could have been because India’s existing trademark act was 
already  in  conformity  with  the  TRIPs  obligations.    In  addition,  as  can  be  seen  from  the 
Indonesian  case  study,  domestic  applications  for  trademark  protection  in  India  were  also 
                                                 
109 See Appendix IX for a complete list of the political parties in Lok Sabha: the Tenth Lok Sabha from 20 June 
1991 to 10 May 1996 (Table IX.1), the Twelfth Lok Sabha from 10 March1998 to 26 April 1999 (Table IX.2), 
and the Thirteenth Lok Sabha from 10 October 1999–06 February 2004 (Table IX.3). 190 
 
significantly high. As can be observed from figure 5.3, domestic applications for trademark 
protection in India accounted for a minimum of 79 percent, from 1997 to 2009. 
 
Figure 5.3 Trademark Applications in India (1997–2009) 
 
Sources:  Annual  Reports  of  the  Indian  Controller  General  of  Patents,  Designs,  and  Trade 
Marks 2001–2002 to 2008–2009. 
 
5.4.3.2.3 Trademark Policy Change after the end of the Transition Period 
 
In  23  August  2007,  the  Indian  government  proposed  a  new  trademark  bill  to  amend  the 
Trademark Act of 1999, in order to make India’s trademark law compatible with the Madrid 
Protocol.  The  new  trademark  bill  provided  protection  for  the  trademark  registration  of 
international applications, which meant that trademark owners would have the protection of 
their trademark in all member countries, regardless of the place of the registration (Lok Sabha, 
2009, pp.1–2). Without any substantial objection, the Lok Sabha agreed to pass the bill on 25 
February 2009 (Lok Sabha, 2009), and the bill was brought to the Rajya Sabha for further 
approval. At the time of writing, the bill is still under negotiation at the Rajya Sabha. In 
addition to this, it should be noted that after the end of the transition period, the government of 
India also adopted implementation rules under the Trademark Rules in 2002. In September 
2010, the government proposed a new draft to amend the Trademark Rules of 2002, but at the 
time of writing the discussion regarding the amendment of the rules is it still in progress.  
 
Despite the absence of external pressures, the Indian government adopted more stringent rules 
than required by TRIPs, by the end of its transition period. Given this fact, the trademark 191 
 
policy reform in India, particularly challenges the external pressure explanation as argued by 
neo-realism. Neo-liberal institutionalism may provide a better explanation since trademark 
policy reform which was taken by the Indian government by the end of its transition period 
can be considered as part of the Indian government’s effort to fulfil its TRIPs obligations as 
required. Neo-liberal institutionalism, however, is unable to explain the fact that the Indian 
government adopted more stringent rules, as there is no obligation under the TRIPs to do so. 
The  empirical  findings  indicate  that,  as  can  be  found  in  the  case  of  the  copyright  policy 
reform,  domestic  support  for  strong  trademark  protection  was  significantly  high.  In  this 
regard, despite the failure of the first attempt to reform the trademark legislation in the early 
1990s,  because  of  the  objection  from  the  opposition  party,  domestic  resistance  for  the 
trademark policy reform, in essence, was incomparable with the case of patent policy reform. 
It can be concluded, therefore, that the difference in domestic resistance contributed to the 
different  approaches taken by the  government in responding to the different  IP categories 
under its TRIPs obligations. 
 
5.5 Analysing IP Policy Change in India: Competing Perspectives 
 
Previous discussions indicated that, along with Brazil, India was in the vanguard in resisting 
the TRIPs Agreement during the Uruguay Round. However, by the end of its transition period, 
India had reformed its IP legislation and even adopted more rigorous rules for its copyright 
and  trademark  legislations,  than  required  by  TRIPs.  Neo-realism  and  neo-liberal 
institutionalism provide only partial explanations of India’s responses to its TRIPs obligations. 
It  is  true  that,  as  with  many  other  developing  countries,  India  received  external  pressure, 
mainly from the US and the EU, to improve its IP standards. However, a careful assessment of 
India’s responses to its TRIPs obligations in each IP area, both in terms of the timing of its 
adoption  and  the  quality  of  the  legislation  adopted,  reveals  that  India’s  response  did  not 
correlate neatly  with the external pressures it received.  India failed to  meet the minimum 
TRIPs requirement for its patent protection when the external pressure was mounting, while 
India reformed both its copyright and trademark legislation when there was no substantial 
external pressure (see table 5.5).  
 
Arguably, neo-liberal institutionalism may provide a better account in understanding India’s 
IP policy change, since the WTO complaints influenced the Indian government’s point of view 192 
 
of its obligations under the TRIPs Agreement. This can be seen from a growing concern over 
India’s loss of reputation and fear of retaliation among domestic political elites, especially 
after India was defeated in the dispute concerning its patent regime. In this regard, in line with 
neo-liberal institutionalism’s argument, India’s decision to reform its patent laws can also be 
understood as a response to the calculations of the costs and benefits of non-compliance that 
are  associated  with  international  institutions.  Neo-liberal  institutionalism,  however,  cannot 
provide a satisfactory explanation regarding India’s decision to adopt more stringent rules for 
its copyright and trademark laws, since there is no obligation under TRIPs for a country to go 
beyond  the  minimum  requirement.  Furthermore,  both  neo-realism  and  neo-liberal 
institutionalism  are  unable  to  capture  the  differences  in  India’s  responses  to  its  TRIPs 
obligations for different IP categories. Against this background, the Indian case study suggests 
that external pressure is neither necessary nor sufficient for policy change to take place. 193 
 
Table 5.5 India’s IP Policy Change and External Pressures 
 The timing 
of Policy 
Change 
IPR 
Categories 
External Pressures  Policy Change  
Forms  Degree 
Prior to and 
during the 
TRIPs 
negotiations 
Patent  Trade sanctions 
in the form of  
the withdrawal 
of GSP benefits 
and USTR list 
with PFC and 
PWL status  
Strong  Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
Copyright  USTR list with 
PFC and PWL 
status  
Moderate  Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
Trademark  No pressure 
 
None  Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
During the 
transition 
period 
 
Patent 
 
WTO 
complaints and 
USTR list with 
PWL status 
 
Strong  Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements) 
Copyright  USTR list with 
PWL status 
 
Moderate  Substantial (into compliance 
with TRIPs) 
Trademark 
 
No pressure  None  No legislation adopted 
By the end of 
the transition 
period  
Patent 
 
USTR list with 
PWL status 
Moderate  Substantial (into compliance 
with TRIPs) 
Copyright  USTR list with 
PWL status 
Moderate  Not substantial (adopted more 
rigorous rules than TRIPs) 
Trademark  No pressure  None  Not substantial (adopted more 
rigorous rules than TRIPs) 
 
In order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the IP policy reform taken by the 
Indian government as a response to its TRIPs Agreement, this chapter, therefore, emphasises 
the importance of domestic politics of compliance analysis. Of the three types of IPR, patents 
were by far the most controversial, initially facing stiff opposition from India’s pharmaceutical 
industry. Policy change was, therefore, minimal and grudging; the government made extensive 
use of the TRIPs Agreement’s safeguard provisions, utilised most of the flexibilities available 
under the TRIPs, and left the most controversial provisions until the end of India’s transition 
period. Moreover, even these reforms were possible only after the domestic pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers with research and development capacity shifted from being sceptical about IPR 194 
 
protection to favouring strong IPR protection. With the shift in the preference among these 
domestic societal actors, the Indian government faced less hostile opposition, which then led 
to providing a more conducive circumstance in which patent policy reform could take place. 
By  contrast,  India’s  existing  rules  on  copyright  and  trademark  largely  met  its  TRIPs 
obligations.  As there were no domestic societal actors opposed to strengthening copyright or 
trademark legislation, the Indian government was able to adopted rules stricter than required 
by TRIPs (see table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6 India’s Patent Policy Change and Domestic Politics Analysis  
The timing of 
Policy Change 
Preferences of Domestic Actors  Policy change 
Preferences  Actors 
Prior to and during 
the TRIPs 
negotiations 
Pro-IP  Multinational 
pharmaceutical 
industries  
Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum 
TRIPs requirements) 
IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry 
IP-sceptics  Small-medium 
pharmaceutical 
industries; NGOs  
During the 
transition period 
 
Pro-IP 
 
Multinational 
pharmaceutical 
industries 
Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum 
TRIPs requirements) 
IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry; ruling 
party in parliament 
IP-sceptics  Small-medium 
pharmaceutical 
industries; NGOs; left 
wing parties 
By the end of the 
transition period  
Pro-IP 
 
Multinational 
pharmaceutical 
industries; large-
medium national 
pharmaceutical 
industries; private 
research institutes 
Substantial (into 
compliance with TRIPs) 
IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry; ruling 
party in parliament 
IP-sceptics   Small-medium 
pharmaceutical 
industries; NGOs; left 
wing parties 
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Table 5.7 India’s Copyright Policy Change and Domestic Politics Analysis 
The timing of 
Policy Change 
Preferences of Domestic Actors  Policy change 
Preferences  Actors 
Prior to and during 
the TRIPs 
negotiations 
Pro-IP  Films, services, 
entertainment, software, 
IT industries  
Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum 
TRIPs requirements) 
IP-indifferent  Not existing/not 
significant 
IP-sceptics  Not existing/not 
significant 
During the 
transition period 
Pro-IP 
 
Films, services, 
entertainment, software, 
IT industries 
Substantial (into 
compliance with TRIPs) 
IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry 
IP-sceptics  Left wing parties 
By the end of the 
transition period  
 
Pro-IP 
 
Films, services, 
entertainment, software, 
IT industries  
Not substantial (adopted 
more rigorous rules than 
TRIPs) 
IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry 
IP-sceptics  Not existing/not 
significant 
 
Table 5.8 India’s Trademark Policy Change and Domestic Politics Analysis 
The timing of 
Policy Change 
Preferences of Domestic Actors  Policy change 
Preferences  Actors 
Prior to and during 
the TRIPs 
negotiations 
Pro-IP  Business and commerce 
associations 
Not substantial (adopted 
below the minimum TRIPs 
requirements)  IP-indifferent  Not existing/not 
significant 
IP-sceptics  Opposition party in 
parliament 
During the 
transition period 
Pro-IP 
 
Business and commerce 
associations 
No legislation adopted 
IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry 
IP-sceptics  Opposition party in 
parliament 
By the end of the 
transition period  
 
Pro-IP 
 
Business and commerce 
associations 
Not substantial (adopted 
more rigorous rules than 
TRIPs)  IP-indifferent  Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry 
IP-sceptics   Not existing/Not 
significant 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
As  with  Indonesia,  India  represents  an  unlikely  case  for  compliance  with  the  TRIPs 
Agreement. Nonetheless, India reformed its existing IP legislation in order to fulfil its TRIPs 
obligations by the end of its transition period and even adopted more stringent rules for its 
copyright  and  trademark.  As  the  preceding  discussion  illustrated,  external  pressure  played 
only a limited role.  In particular, bilateral great power coercion had little effect. The adverse 
WTO ruling, however, had greater impact, in particular by fostering concern within the Indian 
government  about  a  potential  loss  of  reputation  and  of  retaliation.  Since  India  took  the 
necessary steps to comply with the DSB ruling, external pressure in the form of collective 
enforcement  through  the  WTO  DSB  arguably  played  crucial  role  in  influencing  India’s 
decision to reform its patent legislation.  
 
External  pressure–bilateral  or  collective–however,  cannot  explain  the  variance  in  the 
stringency of protection across the different categories of intellectual property rights.  Rather, 
the stringency of protection maps more closely onto the strength of demands from societal 
actors. Opposition to patent protection was strongest, leading to only gradual change, until a 
shift in the preferences of domestic research-active pharmaceutical companies combined with 
government concerns about reputation and reciprocity to enable policy change. Since there 
was no opposition for policy reform, and at the same time, domestic constituents for strong 
copyright  and  trademark  protection  were  essentially  available,  policy  reform  in  these  two 
categories  could  be  taken  relatively  smoothly.  Consequently,  a  domestic  politics  analysis 
provides a better account of the timing and quality of changes to India’s IP legislation and to 
how those varied across IPR categories. 
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Chapter 6 
Locating the Causes of Compliance in the Domestic Sphere and Resolving the 
Puzzle: A Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Considering the conflicting norms embodied in the agreement and the coercive nature of its 
adoption,  the  TRIPs  Agreement  represents  an  inconvenient  obligation  for  developing 
countries.  The  subsequent  development  after  the  TRIPs  negotiations  concluded,  however, 
demonstrated  unexpected  responses  from  developing  countries  towards  their  TRIPs 
obligations. Almost all developing countries had taken the necessary steps to reform their 
existing IP legislation in response to the TRIPs Agreement. Furthermore, many had done so 
before they were required to, and many had adopted more stringent IP rules than outlined by 
TRIPs. Given the contentious nature of the agreement, the IP policy reform taken by most 
developing countries posed a puzzle that this thesis sought to explain. In resolving the puzzle, 
the preceding chapters extensively examined both the role of external pressures and domestic 
actors’  preferences  in  finding  the  reasons  behind  the  change  in  developing  countries’  IP 
legislation, as a response to their inconvenient obligation under TRIPs.  
 
Much of the literature on developing countries and IPR protection emphasised coercion by a 
great  power  particularly  the  US,  as  the  driving  force  behind  the  change  in  developing 
countries’ IP legislation (Simons, 1999; McIlroy, 1998; Sell, 1998). Drawing empirically from 
the  case  studies  of  both  Indonesia  and  India  (discussed  in  Chapters  4  and  5),  this  thesis 
suggested, however, that external pressure is not irrelevant, but neither is it necessary nor 
sufficient to explain the policy change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation as a 
response to their TRIPs obligations. This can be seen from the fact that IP policy reform took 
place both with the presence and in the absence of these pressures. Empirical findings also 
indicated that in the absence of external pressures, IP policy reform took place when there was 
a shift in domestic actors’ interests concerning IPR protection.  Empirical evidence in two case 
studies showed that as major domestic actors’ interests changed, their preferences regarding 
IPR protection also shifted, which in turn contributed greatly to the course of the IP policy 
reform process. By arguing this, this thesis suggested that the domestic politics of compliance 
analysis provides a causal mechanism, and thus offers a better account, in understanding IP 
policy change in developing countries. 198 
 
 
The rest of this chapter will focus on both the theoretical and empirical contributions of this 
thesis, drawing from these findings. The next section deals with how the findings of this thesis 
engaged with wider theoretical debates on the leading International Relations (IR) theories, in 
explaining domestic policy change as a response to international obligations. The section, in 
essence,  argues  that,  since  both  the  major  IR  theories  of  neo-realism  and  neo-liberal 
institutionalism, which emphasised external pressures, were unable to provide a satisfactory 
explanation regarding developing countries’ responses to their inconvenient obligations, this 
thesis confirmed the necessity to bring domestic politics back into the study of IR. The chapter 
then continues to present the empirical implications by highlighting the contribution of this 
thesis in the debate regarding whether the TRIPs Agreement is good or bad for developing 
countries. In addition to underlying the limitations of this study, the last part of the chapter 
concludes  both  the  chapter  and  the  thesis  as  a  whole,  by  emphasising  how  the  findings 
contribute  to  our  understanding  of  developing  countries  in  the  current  international  trade 
regime.  
 
6.2 Theoretical Debates: Explaining Policy Change  
 
This  section  particularly  deals  with  the  question  of  what  theoretical  contributions  can  be 
drawn from the case studies of Indonesia and India, in explaining the change in developing 
countries’ IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations. As evident from the previous 
chapters,  in  explaining  IP  policy  change  in  developing  countries,  this  thesis  tested  two 
competing explanations, the role of external pressures (as argued by both neo-realism and neo-
liberal  institutionalism),  and  domestic  actors’  preferences  regarding  IPR  protection  (as 
proposed by domestic politics of compliance analysis). Within this context, this study engaged 
with a wider theoretical debate on how power, in the forms of  great  power  coercion and 
international authority, affect domestic actors’ preferences, and what role that they play in 
shaping policy change in domestic legislation.  
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6.2.1 Beyond Great Power Coercion: Insufficient Cause of Compliance?   
 
As  discussed  to  a  large  extent  in  Chapter  1,  in  understanding  the  correlation  between 
international  obligations  and  domestic  policy  change,  neo-realism  argues  that  great  power 
coercion plays a significant role behind domestic policy change. In addition, by emphasising 
the relative power of states, neo-realism further argues that domestic policy change will vary 
directly  with  the  states’  power.  In  this  context,  neo-realism  would  therefore  predict  that 
weaker states would be more susceptible to the pressure from stronger states.  
 
The discussion in the previous chapters indicated that major developed countries, particularly 
the US, extensively pressurised developing countries to reform their IP legislation through 
various forms. These include threats of trade sanction, withdrawal of Generalised System of 
Preferences  (GSP)  benefits,  the  publication  of  the  USTR  Special  301  Report  on  the  US 
government’s assessment regarding its trading partners’ IP practices and regulations, as well 
as diplomatic lobbies and pressures through repeated visits by US top officials to specifically 
address  IPR  protection  issues.  In  addition  to  pressures  from  major  developed  countries’ 
governments, developing countries also experienced industrial pressures from multinational 
companies, mainly based in the US and in the EU.  
 
As elaborated in Chapter 3, the results of the survey on the implementation of the TRIPs 
Agreement  of  102  WTO  developing  country  members  on  the  timing  and  quality  of  their 
domestic  IP  laws  illustrated,  however,  developing  countries’  responses  to  their  TRIPs 
obligations did not correspond neatly with the external pressures they received. The results of 
the survey across patents, copyrights, and trademarks indicated that most developing countries 
that adopted IP legislation prior to the deadline were not on the USTR Special 301 Report 
during the transition period from 1995 to 2000. On the other hand, only a very limited number 
of developing countries that adopted IP legislation earlier than they had to were subject to US 
pressure  during  the  same  period.  The  empirical  findings  also  revealed  that  the  pattern  of 
variation in the quality of IP legislation adopted also did not correspond to US pressure, as 
neo-realism would expect. Most countries that could be identified as being clearly subject to 
substantial pressure from the US adopted only minimum TRIPs requirements in their national 
legislation. On the other hand, most countries that were not subject to significant US pressure 
adopted more rigorous IPR protection in their national legislation. Based on these findings, it 200 
 
can be argued, therefore, that great power coercion would not seem to be sufficient to cause 
policy change, and at the same time, it did not appear to be necessary for policy change to take 
place, either. Detailed case studies, in the case of both Indonesia and India, as presented in 
Chapters  4  and  5,  also  confirmed  the  findings  regarding  developing  countries’  IP  policy 
change in general, and, therefore, also invalidated the neo-realists’ argument of the role of 
great power coercion behind the policy change. This thesis argued that the main reason why 
neo-realism failed to provide a satisfactory explanation is due to the fact that, by focusing only 
on the systemic level, the argument is not equipped with the necessary analytical tools to go 
deeper into evaluating how the impact of these pressures affected, and were distributed in, the 
domestic arena.  
 
The case study of Indonesia in Chapter 4 demonstrated that, despite the fact that, as with many 
other developing countries, Indonesia also experienced pressures from the US to improve its 
IP regime, the pressures with a more tangible and immediate impact, in the form of trade 
sanctions, were mostly noticeable on copyright protection. Yet, IP policy reforms taken by the 
Indonesian government did not correspond neatly with the pressures it received. Within this 
context, despite receiving extensive pressures, in the form of the threat of withdrawal of GSP 
benefits from the US unless they improved their copyright protection, Indonesia did not make 
substantial  reform  of  its  copyright  legislation  prior  to  the  mid-1980s.  On  the  other  hand, 
despite receiving only a moderate level of pressure, in the form of industry and diplomatic 
pressures,  Indonesia  adopted  more  stringent  rules  for  its  trademark  legislation,  during  the 
TRIPs negotiations. Similarly, in spite of only experiencing a moderate level of pressure to 
reform its patent regime, Indonesia also adopted more rigorous rules for its patent protection 
during its transition period. In this regard, it can be concluded that neo-realism is unable to 
provide a satisfactory explanation in understanding IP policy reform in Indonesia.  
 
A closer observation on the IP policy reform in Indonesia also exposed that, in order to fully 
understand  the  implications  of  great  power  coercion  on  policy  change,  other  important 
external  factors,  such  as  an  economic  crisis  also  needed  to  be  taken  into  account.  The 
empirical findings showed that as Indonesia experienced an economic crisis, the Indonesian 
government became more sensitive to external pressures. In this context, as a consequence of 
the oil crisis in the 1980s, Indonesia’s position as an energy producer was declining, and this 
had  made  Indonesia’s  dependence  on  the  US  market  for  non-oil  commodities  increase 201 
 
significantly. As a result, Indonesia was no longer sceptical about the US demands to improve 
the standards of its IPR protection. Similarly, in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, as 
Indonesia’s dependence on foreign markets and investment increased as part of Indonesia’s 
effort  to  recover  from  the  crisis,  the  urgency  to  accommodate  external  pressure  by 
strengthening  its  IPR  protection  also  intensified.  In  short,  the  crisis  provided  a  necessary 
condition for external pressures to affect domestic actors’ preference regarding IPR protection. 
Prior to the crisis, since external pressures arguably did not have an immediate impact on the 
interests of the major domestic actors, thus, they did not find it necessary to respond to these 
pressures rigorously.  
 
Whilst in the case of India, examined in Chapter 5, despite receiving strong external pressures 
since the conclusion of the TRIPs negotiations, including threats of trade sanctions from the 
US if they did not reform their existing patent regime, due to strong domestic societal actors’ 
resistance, however, a substantial policy reform did not take place until the end of India’s 
transition  period.  In  this  regard,  accommodating  external  pressures  to  reform  its  existing 
patent regime was politically undesirable, since the Indian government was fully aware of the 
fact that doing that would have a destructive effect on the interests of major domestic societal 
actors (particularly the Indian national pharmaceutical industry).  The case study of India also 
demonstrated that, as the preference of the domestic pharmaceutical industry, as one of the key 
domestic societal actors, changed, a substantial policy reform could take place, even when 
there was no significant change in the degree of external pressures. 
 
It can be concluded, therefore, that great power coercion, as offered by neo-realism, can only 
provide a partial explanation in understanding the change in developing countries’ domestic IP 
legislation. It is true that great power coercion, in the form of either threats of trade sanctions 
or  diplomatic  pressures,  could  influence  domestic  actors’  preferences  regarding  IPR 
protection. However, to fully understand of their role in shaping policy outcomes, one needs to 
understand the distributional impact of these pressures on domestic actors’ interests. In the 
case study of Indonesia specifically, other external factors, such as an economic crisis, also 
provided a necessary condition for these pressures to have a more direct and crucial effect on 
major domestic actors’ interests regarding IPR protection. In short, the empirical findings of 
this thesis suggest that the role of great power coercion was not the only cause of compliance 202 
 
behind the change in developing countries’ IP legislation, as widely echoed in the existing 
literatures.    
 
6.2.2 Authoritative International Institutions: It Barked but not so Loud 
 
Neo-liberal institutionalism emphasises the role of authoritative international institutions in 
explaining the correlation between international obligations and domestic policy change. From 
the  neo-liberal  institutionalist’s  point  of  view,  the  more  institutionalised  an  international 
agreement, the more significant an impact it is expected to have. As discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2, considering the TRIPs Agreement is a highly institutionalised and legalised form of 
international  agreement  under  WTO,  neo-liberal  institutionalism  would  predict  that 
developing countries would be more likely to reform their domestic IP legislation in order to 
comply with the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, despite the fact that the WTO complaints, through its Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM), represent a high-watermark of institutionalised enforcement of 
the TRIPs Agreement, the assessment on the use of the dispute settlement for TRIPs issues 
and developing countries, exhibited only a few cases of the dispute settlement that involved 
developing countries as respondents. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 also demonstrated that, within 
these few cases, it can be observed that when a state was being specifically targeted in adverse 
ruling, it responded to the ruling by improving the quality of its IPR protection as demanded.  
 
As explored in Chapter 5, the Indian government responded to the WTO ruling by reforming 
its  patent  regime  in  1999.  After  being  brought  to  the  WTO  dispute  in  1996,  there  was  a 
growing  concern  over  India’s  loss  of  reputation  and  fear  of  retaliation,  especially  among 
domestic political elites. As can be observed from the amendment process of patent legislation 
in the late 1990s, many members of parliament from the ruling party argued that if India did 
not comply with the WTO ruling, then India was at risk of retaliation from major developed 
countries. In this regard, in line with the neo-liberal institutionalists’ argument, the Indian 
government then used reputational loss and fear of retaliation associated with international 
institutions,  to  overcome  domestic  opposition  to  policy  reform.  However,  the  role  of  the 
international institutions in the Indonesian case study was less clear than in the Indian case 
study.  Unlike  India,  which  was  brought  to  the  WTO  DSB  exclusively  on  TRIPs-related 203 
 
disputes, Indonesia was brought to the WTO DSB, which was not exclusively on a TRIPs-
related  dispute.  Furthermore,  neo-liberal  institutionalism  is  also  unable  to  explain  early 
compliance and TRIPs-Plus approaches taken by the Indonesian government for its patent and 
trademark rules. This is particularly because neo-liberal institutionalism would suggest that 
policy reform should all be both on time and to minimum for all different IP categories. In this 
regard, in the Indonesian case study, the empirical evidence was insufficient to be used to 
support  the  neo-liberal  institutionalists’  argument  regarding  the  role  of  authoritative 
international institutions on influencing IP policy change.  
 
It can be concluded, therefore, given the fact that there were only a few cases of disputes 
involving developing countries on the WTO dispute concerning TRIPs-related issues, the neo-
liberal institutionalist’s expectation on the extensive use of the WTO DSB, representing the 
legalisation of international institutions, only portrayed a partial picture. Nevertheless, as can 
be  seen  from  India’s  experience,  the  role  of  the  authoritative  international  institution  was 
evident on the targeted country, which took the necessary policy change as demanded by the 
WTO  DSB  ruling.  In  this  regard,  India’s  decision  to  comply  with  the  WTO  DSB  ruling 
confirmed the neo-liberal institutionalist’s argument, on the role of the calculations of costs 
and benefits of non-compliance associated with international institutions, both in terms of 
reputational loss and fear of retaliation. This, however, cannot be used to explain the general 
phenomena  of  the  role  of  collective  enforcement  through  the  legalisation  of  international 
institutions  in  influencing  developing  countries’  domestic  policy  change.  In  the  end,  the 
empirical evidence demonstrated that the WTO DSB really barked, even though not so loud. 
 
6.2.3 Bringing Domestic Politics Back in: Where Other Causes of Compliance 
can be Found  
 
Previous discussions exhibited the flaws of the leading IR theories of compliance, derived 
from neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, in understanding the change in developing 
countries’ domestic IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations. In particular, these 
accounts cannot explain why reform occurred in the absence of external pressures, nor why it 
should go beyond the minimum required by the TRIPs Agreement. Thus external pressure 
alone  cannot  explain  the  development  of  developing countries’  IP  legislation.  Rather,  one 
must consider domestic politics, particularly the preferences of domestic actors regarding IP 
protection (the pro- and the anti-IP, including the IP-indifferent) and how these actors respond 204 
 
to external pressure. This thesis, therefore, suggested that the domestic politics analysis can 
provide a complementary explanation to the external pressures account in revealing the change 
in  developing  countries’  domestic  IP  legislation,  by  giving  further  details  about  the 
distribution of the different implications of these pressures among domestic actors. 
 
For example, the case study of Indonesia showed that external pressures played a significant 
role only when they directly affected the interests of major domestic actors. Prior to the mid-
1980s, the demands from foreign governments and their business communities to improve its 
IP regime were not accommodated when they did not immediately threaten the interests of 
major domestic actors. However, after Indonesia was hit by the oil crisis in the mid-1980s, 
external  pressure  began  to  have  implications  for  its  economic  interests,  and  therefore,  the 
Indonesian government took foreign demands more seriously. Similarly, the India case study 
revealed that the Indian government considered the political cost of accommodating external 
pressures to be higher than being sceptical towards them, leading to incremental and grudging 
policy  change.  Only  when  the  domestic  research-active  pharmaceutical  industry  came  to 
support stricter IP protection, did patent reform leap ahead.      
 
The domestic politics of compliance analysis also allows us to uncover the differences in the 
approaches taken by governments in developing countries to different IPR categories. As can 
be seen particularly in the India case study, various approaches taken by the government to 
different  IP  categories  closely  corresponded  to  the  variance  in  domestic  support  in  each 
category. Patent policy reform was the most controversial IPR issue in India. Due to strong 
opposition from the pharmaceutical industry, the Indian government’s effort to fulfil its TRIPs 
obligations for patent protection was, until the splitting of the pharmaceutical industry lobby, 
incremental and minimalist. By contrast, due to the presence of strong domestic constituents 
for copyright and trademark protection and the absence of significant domestic opposition, the 
Indian government reformed its existing copyright and trademark legislation relatively easily 
and even adopted more rigorous rules than required by TRIPs.   
 
Even  though  the  differences  were  less  striking  than  in  the  case  of  India,  the  Indonesian 
government  also  approached  the  different  IP  categories  differently.  Despite  the  role  of 
domestic societal actors being largely limited in Indonesia’s policy making process, opposition 
from  politically  well-connected  Indonesian  conglomerate  pharmaceutical  manufacturers,  to 205 
 
some extent, contributed to the failure of the early government’s effort to reform the existing 
patent legislation prior to and during the TRIPs negotiations. In the cases of copyrights and 
trademarks, for which opposition was mainly from small-medium producers of counterfeit 
products with no strong political connections, policy reform in these two IPR categories was 
relatively smooth. Within this context, by focusing on domestic actors’ preferences, domestic 
politics  account  does  a  better  job  of  explaining  the  difference  in  approaches  taken  by 
government in developing countries to different IPR categories than do the external pressure 
accounts. By treating a state as a unitary actor, external pressure accounts fail to explain the 
variation in developing countries’ approaches to different IPR categories.  
 
By analysing the preference of domestic actors regarding IPR protection it also revealed that 
IP policy reform could take place because there was a shift in domestic actors’ preference 
regarding IPR protection. The shift of preference regarding IPR protection can be found both 
in the Indonesian and Indian case studies even though the two cases differ in the details. While 
in the case of Indonesia, the change in preference regarding IPR protection was predominantly 
evident among domestic political actors, in the Indian case study, it was apparent for the most 
part  among  domestic  societal  actors.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  most  policy  makers  in 
Indonesia  prior  to  and  during  the  TRIPs  negotiations  tended  to  be  sceptical  about  IPR 
protection. This can be understood largely because of the incompatibility of norms regarding 
IPR protection governed under the TRIPs Agreement with the existing domestic norms. IPR 
(particularly patent and copyright) protection was essentially an alien concept in Indonesia’s 
national laws prior to the TRIPs Agreement, and even at odds with its norms and traditions as 
reflected  on  its  ‘adat’  customary  laws.  However,  by  the  end  of  the  transition  period,  the 
importance of strong IPR protection was commonly seen as a necessity among Indonesia’s 
domestic political elites and more government institutions displayed either IP-indifferent or 
Pro-IP position. Why this shift occurred, however, is not clear, at least in the light of the 
research conducted for this thesis.  In the Indian case, the crucial shift in preferences regarding 
IP  (particularly  patent)  protection  occurred  among  the  Indian  national  pharmaceutical 
companies with, a research and development capacity. As their preference changed, the Indian 
government faced a less hostile opposition to patent policy reform. Furthermore, the change in 
the Indian national pharmaceuticals industry’s preference was also accompanied by a fresh 
movement from other domestic societal actors, such as domestic research institutes, which 
took  a  more  constructive  position  regarding  patent  policy  reform.  The  change  in  these 206 
 
domestic societal actors’ preferences contributed to providing a more favourable context in 
which  policy  reform  could  take  place.  The  primary  reason  for  the  change  in  preferences 
among some Indian pharmaceutical companies was that, after being able to develop under 
government’s protection for several decades, they found themselves able to shift from reverse 
engineering to new drug discovery and seeking access to developed countries’ markets, which 
required strong patent protection.  
 
The shift in the preferences among domestic actors might provide fuel for a constructivist 
account of change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation. Arguably, the shift in the 
preferences of political elites regarding IPR protection could be understood as being due to 
them  being  socialised  to  international  norms.  This  is  because  the  shift  in  the  preferences 
among domestic actors regarding IP protection can also be understood as the evident of the 
change in existing domestic norms and closer to the international ones. As argued by Ruggie 
(1998: 863-4), since norms and identity of the same state can change and so do its interests, 
there is a possibility that as their domestic norms changed developing countries would have 
the same preferences with international norms. However, there is reason to doubt that this is 
what was going on. While such an account might explain what occurred in Indonesia, the 
change in their preferences might also have been the result of policy learning and/or due to 
‘inducements’ and other material gains.  The Indian case is more clear cut, with little evidence 
of socialisation.  In India the change in policy preferences of the research-active portion of the 
domestic  pharmaceutical  industry  was  consistent  with  changes  in  its  competitiveness. 
Moreover, even if we accept that socialisation has occurred, as was discussed in Chapter 1, 
unless  looking  at  domestic  mechanisms,  constructivists,  especially  state-centric  version  of 
constructivism  common  in  IR  alone,  fail  to  provide  further  explanation  regarding  how 
socialisation  occurs.  In  this  context,  state-centric  version  of  constructivism  is  unable  to 
provide  further  explanation  regarding  how  these  domestic  norms  change,  through  what 
mechanisms,  and  what  conditions  are  needed  to  make  the  change  can  take  place.  In  this 
regard, therefore, in order to have a more comprehensive understanding it is necessary to 
analyse mechanisms available at domestic politics. While explaining the reason behind the 
shift in the Indonesian government’s preference is beyond the scope of this thesis, the shift 
itself indicates that domestic actors’ preferences are a dynamic and critical factor. This thesis, 
therefore,  argues  that  analysing  domestic  actors’  preferences  over  time,  for  different  IPR 
categories, is essential in order to explain IP policy change in developing countries. 207 
 
 
While a domestic politics analysis may provide a good account of compliance, it is not a 
parsimonious approach.  This is because in order to capture the actual state’s response to its 
international obligations requires a thorough observation of the roles of different key domestic 
actors, their preferences, and how they interact. Even governments cannot be treated as unitary 
actors since they consist of different ministries that represent divergent interests according to 
the specific roles they hold. In short, in order to have a powerful argument, a study requires 
detailed observation of this multifaceted domestic arena.  This may mean that, in line with 
Guzman  (2000,  p.1839),  domestic  politics  analysis  cannot  provide  a  general  model  of 
compliance. 
 
In conclusion, by arguing that the major IR theories failed to provide satisfactory explanations, 
this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  great  power  coercion,  authoritative  international 
institutions,  and  international  norms  have  no  role  in  explaining  change  in  developing 
countries’  legislation.  These  three  variables  can  be  significant  factors  that  affect  domestic 
policy change. However, to understand when and how they affect policy outcomes, one must 
examine  how  they  play  out  through  domestic  politics.  In  this  regard,  therefore,  domestic 
politics of compliance analysis can complement major IR theories, in explaining the change in 
developing  countries’  domestic  IP  legislation  as  a  response  to  their  TRIPs  obligations.  
Further, domestic politics analysis can help to explain the adoption of IP protection even when 
international pressure is absent.  
 
6.3  The  TRIPs  Agreement  and  Developing  Countries:  What  Lessons  can  be 
Learned 
 
As  the  earlier  discussions  have  fulfilled  this  thesis’s  main  task  of  explaining  change  in 
developing countries’ IP legislation, as a response to their inconvenient obligations under the 
TRIPs Agreement, this section focuses on how the main findings of this thesis engaged with 
the debate about whether the TRIPs Agreement is good or bad for developing countries, by 
arguing that the answer is not as straightforward as one might expect. As discussed in Chapter 
1, the existing literature on the implications of the TRIPs Agreement for developing countries’ 
economic  development  tends  to  see  the  agreement  as  either  good  or  bad  for  developing 
countries. Little attention is given to the effects of the agreement on different domestic actors 
within developing countries. Careful observation of domestic actors in India and Indonesia 208 
 
revealed  the  existence  of  both  pro-  and  anti-IP  policy  actors  for  different  types  of  IPR 
protection across time. In other words, there are both the winners and the losers from IPR 
protection within each country. These findings also implied that, in order to assess whether the 
TRIPs Agreement is good or bad for developing countries, one needs to look at the impact of 
the different types of IP categories on different domestic societal actors. By arguing this, this 
thesis,  therefore,  engaged  with  a  wider  debate  on  the  importance  of  observing  the 
distributional  impacts  at  societal  level  of  external  pressures  in  explaining  compliance,  by 
identifying who benefits and who loses in the domestic arena in a given cooperative setting 
(Slaughter, 1995, p.508;Raustiala, 2000, p.411; Dai, 2005, p.363).  
 
Since patent protection is considered to be one of the most controversial IPR issues in most 
developing  countries,  the  debate  on  whether  the  TRIPs  Agreement  is  good  or  bad  for 
developing countries, therefore, is mainly centred on the costs and benefits of strong patent 
protection. This particularly concerns the access to affordable medicines in most developing 
country societies.  The controversy relating to access to affordable medicines is particularly 
apparent in India. Due to strong resistance from India’s pharmaceutical industry, as one of the 
most influential domestic societal actors, patent policy reform could not initially be adopted 
easily. Rather, policy reform could only take place when there was a shift in the preference of 
India’s  domestic  pharmaceutical  industry.  The  change  in  the  domestic  actors’  preference 
regarding  patent  protection  indicates  the  existence  of  a  domestic  constituency  that  would 
benefit from a strong patent regime. Thus, even with regard to this most controversial aspect 
of the TRIPs Agreement, there are actors within developing countries that benefit.  
 
Moreover, the case studies of Indonesia and India both demonstrated that, unlike patent, not 
all  forms  of  intellectual  protection  attract  meaningful  resistance.    The  strengthening  of 
copyright  and  trademark  protection  was  relatively  easy  in  both  countries  as  there  were 
domestic constituencies in favour of strong protection for these two IP categories. Given the 
fact that different IPR categories under the TRIPs Agreement had different impacts on various 
domestic  constituents,  this  thesis  suggested  that,  in  order  to  assess  whether  the  TRIPs 
Agreement  is  good  or  bad  for  developing  countries,  one  needs  to  look  at  the  impact  of 
different  IP  categories  on  different  domestic  societal  actors.  Given  the  variance  not  only 
among  developing  countries  but  also  within  individual  developing  countries,  making 209 
 
generalisations about whether the TRIPs Agreement is good or bad for developing countries is 
rather problematic.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Conducting research into explaining change in developing countries’ domestic IP legislation 
had numerous challenges, which also inevitably illustrated the limitations of this study. The 
focus  of  this  thesis  was  limited  only  in  explaining  why  and  how  developing  countries’ 
domestic IP policy changed in response to their inconvenient international obligations. This 
thesis, however, did not strive to assess the effectiveness of these policies or to assess whether 
the change in domestic IP policy has significantly fulfilled its policy objectives as outlined by 
TRIPs. This thesis, nevertheless, underlines the importance of analysing the effectiveness of 
the policy taken by developing countries for future research agenda, in order to comprehend 
our understanding of the relationship between TRIPs and developing countries.  
 
Another limitation of the study can be found from the fact that this study did not go further to 
analyse the reason behind the change in domestic actors’ preferences. As discussed earlier, 
one  of  the  main  reasons  behind  the  change  in  IP  legislation  in  developing  countries  was 
because  there  was  a  shift  in  domestic  actors’  preferences,  from  sceptical  to  being  either 
indifferent  or  more  favourable  regarding  IPR  protection.  In  the  Indian  case  study,  a 
straightforward  explanation  suggested  that  the  shift  in  the  preference  of  India’s  national 
pharmaceutical  industry  was  more  likely  to  have  been  motivated  by  the  material  benefits 
expected from a stronger patent protection. Finding the reasons behind the shift of preference 
among the domestic political actors in Indonesia, however, was not as definite as those in the 
Indian  case  study.  As  mentioned  earlier,  locating  the  answer  as  to  whether  the  shift  in 
preference among the Indonesian policy makers regarding IPR protection was as a result of 
socialisation,  policy  learning,  or  ‘inducement’  and  other  material  gains,  requires  a  deeper 
analysis—and this study, nevertheless, only highlights its importance. 
 
By observing detailed case studies of Indonesia and India, this thesis, however, has fulfilled its 
primary  task,  of  testing  leading  IR  theories  on  compliance  to  explain  the  changes  in 
developing  countries’  IP  legislation  as  a  response  to  their  TRIPs  obligations.  The  main 
findings  suggested  that  external  pressure  (as  proposed  by  both  neo-realist  and  neo-liberal 210 
 
institutionalists) is not irrelevant, but neither is it necessary nor sufficient to explain policy 
change in developing countries’ IP legislation as a response to their TRIPs obligations. This 
thesis, therefore, argued the value of a domestic politics of compliance analysis to fill the gap 
left by the external pressures explanation, since it is able to provide a causal mechanism in 
understanding  IP  policy  change  in  developing  countries.  In  so  doing,  this  thesis  has 
contributed to the existing literature on developing countries’ compliance with international 
trade commitments both in terms of empirical and theoretical.  
 
In terms of practical contributions, based on the findings in both the Indonesia and India case 
studies, this thesis has reaffirmed the importance of comparative politics in IR study. The 
experience of Indonesia and India indicated that there were different internal preferences and 
institutions within the domestic sphere that influence the policy outcomes. Considering the 
complexity and the diversity of developing countries, analysing and comparing two or more 
developing countries would be useful, in order to have a more comprehensive understanding 
of change in domestic policy in developing countries as a response to their international trade 
commitments. In this context, this thesis then has confirmed the need to take comparative 
politics into considerations in the study of IR.  
 
In addition to its empirical contribution, the theoretical contribution of this thesis is twofold. 
First,  since  major  IR  theories  of  compliance  derived  from  neo-realism,  neo-liberal 
institutionalism, and constructivism cannot provide a satisfactory explanation in understanding 
policy change in developing countries’ IP legislation, this thesis reaffirmed the existing study 
on the necessity to ‘bring domestic politics back in’, which is prominent in a trade policy 
study  for  elucidating  more  specifically  a  country’s  compliance  with  its  international 
obligations.    In  this  context,  this  thesis  suggested  the  need  to  observe  domestic  actors’ 
preferences, and the interaction among them in shaping the IP policy reform process, in order 
to understand a country’s decision as to whether or not it would comply with its international 
obligations. By emphasising these, this thesis, therefore, has contributed to fill the gap in the 
existing literature, which still gave little attention to a domestic politics of compliance analysis 
in explaining developing countries’ responses to their TRIPs obligations. 
 
Another  theoretical  contribution  of  this  thesis  is  that  the  study  of  IP  policy  change  in 
developing countries’ compliance also has contributed to the conceptual debate concerning the 211 
 
relations between ‘compliance’ and ‘implementation’ in compliance study. Even though it is 
widely  accepted  that  the  implementation  of  the  agreement  is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a 
sufficient condition for compliance, based on developing countries’ experience in responding 
to their TRIPs obligations, this thesis indicated that, in measuring compliance specifically with 
the agreement, which can be considered as an ‘inconvenient obligation’, implementation of the 
agreement is essential. As discussed in the previous chapters, since IPR protection in the vast 
majority of developing countries was either initially absent or incompatible with the minimum 
standard outlined by TRIPs, the agreement required an extensive adjustment in developing 
countries’  national  IP  legislation.  In  this  regard,  in  the  case  of  developing  countries’ 
compliance with the TRIPs Agreement, which can be seen as an inconvenient obligation, the 
implementation  in the  form  of  domestic  IP  policy  reform  can  be  regarded  as  a  necessary 
condition  for  developing  countries  to  comply  with  the  TRIPs  Agreement.  In  this  context, 
therefore, unlike a country’s compliance with international agreements in general, in the case 
of  fulfilling  specifically  an  ‘inconvenient  obligation’,  compliance  which  requires  domestic 
policy  change  also  means  implementing  the  agreement.  By  claiming  this,  this  thesis  has 
contributed to our understanding in the study of developing countries’ compliance with one of 
the most controversial trade agreements under the current international trade regime. 
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Appendix I 
 
The WTO Developing Country Members based on the World Bank’s Income 
Classification (as of January 2011) 
 
No  Upper Middle Income  Lower Middle Income  Low Income 
1.  Albania  Angola  Bangladesh 
2.  Argentina  Armenia  Benin 
3.  Botswana  Belize  Burkina Faso 
4.  Brazil  Bolivia  Burundi 
5.  Bulgaria  Cameroon  Cambodia 
6.  Chile  Cape Verde  Central African Republic 
7.  Colombia  China  Chad 
8.  Costa Rica  Cote D’Ivoire  Congo Democratic Republic 
9.  Cuba  Congo Rep  Gambia 
10.  Dominica  Djibouti  Ghana 
11.  Dominican  Ecuador  Guinea 
12.  Fiji  Egypt  Guinea Bissau 
13.  Gabon  El Salvador  Haiti 
14.  Grenada  Georgia  Kenya 
15.  Jamaica  Guatemala  Kyrgyz 
16.  Lithuania  Guyana  Madagascar 
17.  Macedonia  Honduras  Malawi 
18.  Malaysia  India  Mali 
19.  Mauritius  Indonesia  Mauritania 
20.  Mexico  Jordan  Mozambique 
21.  Namibia  Lesotho  Myanmar 
22.  Panama  Maldives  Nepal 
23.  Peru  Moldova  Niger 
24.  Romania  Mongolia  Rwanda 
25.  South Africa  Morocco  Sierra Leone 
26.  St. Kitts and Nevis  Nicaragua  Solomon Islands 
27.  St. Lucia  Nigeria  Tanzania 
28.  St. Vincent and Grenadines  Pakistan  Togo 
29.  Suriname  Papua New Guinea  Uganda 
30.  Turkey  Paraguay  Zambia 
31.  Uruguay  Philippines  Zimbabwe 
32.  Venezuela  Senegal   
33.    Sri Lanka   
34.    Swaziland   
35.    Thailand   
36.    Tonga   
37.    Tunisia   
38.    Ukraine   
39.    Vietnam   
 
Source: World Bank  
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Notes: 
•  Underlined countries: members that joined after the establishment of the WTO and are 
obliged to adopt the TRIPs Agreement by the time of accession. These countries are 
(with year of accession): Upper middle income economies: Albania (2000); Bulgaria 
(1996); Lithuania (2001); Macedonia (2003); Panama (1997). Lower middle income 
economies: Armenia (2003); Cape Verde (2008); China (2001); Ecuador (1996); 
Georgia (2000); Jordan (2000); Moldova (2001); Mongolia (1997);  Tonga (2007); 
Ukraine (2008); Vietnam (2007). Low income economies: Kyrgyz (1998 and not 
recognised as a WTO LDC member). 
•  Countries in bold: the WTO LDC members that do not fall into the World Bank’s low 
income economy categories. These countries are required to fulfil their TRIPs 
Agreement obligations by the end of additional transition period in 2013 for general 
obligations and 2016 for patents, test data protection, and exclusive marketing rights 
for pharmaceuticals (as amended under the Doha Round). These countries are Angola, 
Djibouti, Lesotho, and Senegal (See also Appendix II for a complete list of the WTO 
LDC members). 
•  Countries in italic: the World Bank’s low income economies that are not recognised as 
the WTO LDC members and therefore should meet the deadline as developing 
countries in general. These countries are Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyz, and Zimbabwe. 215 
 
Appendix II 
 
The WTO Least Developed Country (LDC) Members (as of 17 February 2011) 
 
No  Countries 
1.    Angola 
2.    Bangladesh 
3.    Benin 
4.    Burkina Faso 
5.    Burundi 
6.    Cambodia 
7.    Central African Republic 
8.    Chad 
9.    Congo, Democratic Republic 
10.   Djibouti 
11.   Gambia 
12.   Guinea 
13.   Guinea Bissau 
14.   Haiti 
15.   Lesotho 
16.   Madagascar 
17.   Malawi 
18.   Mali 
19.   Mauritania 
20.   Mozambique 
21.   Myanmar 
22.   Nepal 
23.   Niger 
24.   Rwanda 
25.   Senegal 
26.   Sierra Leone 
27.   Solomon Islands 
28.   Tanzania 
29.   Togo 
30.   Uganda 
31.   Zambia 
 
Source: WTO 216 
 
Appendix III 
 
The Timing of Major IP Legislation Adoption in WTO Developing Country Members and US Pressure  
 
World Bank 
classification 
Country  Year of The First Law Adoption  Year of The Last Amendment  US Pressure (1995–2010) 
Patent  Copyright  Trademark  Patent  Copyright  Trademark  PWL  PFC  S306 
U
p
p
e
r
-
M
i
d
d
l
e
-
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
e
s
 
Albania  1994 (ot)  1995 (ot)  1994 (ot)  2008 (l)  2001 (l)  2008 (l)  -  -  - 
Argentina  1995 (e)  1997 (e)  1995 (e)  2004 (e)  2009 (l)  2008 (l)  1996–2010  -  - 
Botswana  1996 (e)  2000 (ot)  1996 (e)  1997 (e)  2000 (ot)  1997 (e)  -  -  - 
Brazil  1996 (e)  1998 (e)  1996 (e)  2001 (e)  1998 (e)  2001 (l)  1995, 2002–6   -  - 
Bulgaria  1993 (ot)  1993 (ot)  1999 (l)  2007 (l)  2009 (l)  2007 (l)  1998  -  - 
Chile  2005 (ot)  1993 (e)  2005 (l)  2007 (l)  2003 (l)  2007 (l)  2007–10   -  - 
Colombia  1994 (e)  1993 (e)  1994 (e)  2000 (e)  2010 (l)  2000 (ot)  2002  -  - 
Costa Rica  2000 (e)  1994 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2001  -  - 
Cuba  1995 (e)  1994 (e)  1999 (ot)  1996 (e)  1994 (e)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Dominica  1999 (e)  2003 (l)  1999 (ot)  1999 (e)  2003 (l)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Dominican   2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (l)  1998–2002  -  - 
Fiji  2003 (l)  1999 (ot)  1978 (ny)  2003 (l)  1999 (ot)  1978 (ny)  -  -  - 
Gabon  1999 (e)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  1999 (e)  2001 (l)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Grenada  2002 (e)  1989 (ny)  2002 (l)  2002 (e)  1989 (ny)  2002 (l)  -  -  - 
Jamaica  2001 (e)  1993 (e)  1999 (ot)  2001 (e)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Lithuania  1994 (ot)  1999 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2007 (l)  2010 (l)  2006 (l)  -  -  - 
Macedonia  1993 (ot)  1996 (ot)  2006 (l)  2009 (l)  2002 (ot)  2009 (l)  -  -  - 
Malaysia  1993 (e)  1996 (e)  1994 (e)  2006 (l)  2006 (l)  2002 (l)  2000–1   -  - 
Mauritius  1998 (e)  1997 (e)  1993 (e)  2004 (e)  1997 (e)  2004 (l)  -  -  - 
Mexico  1999 (e)  1996 (e)  1999 (ot)  2005 (ot)  2005 (l)  2005 (l)  -  -  - 
Namibia  1942 (ny)  1994 (e)  1989 (ny)  1942 (ny)  1994 (e)  1989 (ny)  -  -  - 
Panama  1996 (ot)  1994 (ot)  1996 (ot)  2009 (l)  1996 (ot)  2009 (l)  -  -  - 
Peru  1996 (e)  1996 (e)  1996 (e)  2008 (l)  2008 (l)  2008 (l)  1999, 2000  -  - 
Romania  1998 (e)  1996  (e)  1998 (e)  1998 (e)  2006  (l)  1998 (e)  -  -  - 
South Africa  1996 (e)  1996 (e)  1993 (e)  2005 (ot)  2002 (l)  2002 (l)  -  -  - 
St Kitts & 
Nevis 
1956 (ny)  1919 (ny)  1958 (ny)  1956(ny)  1919 (ny)  1958 (ny)  -  -  - 217 
 
St. Lucia  2001 (e)  1995 (e)  2001 (l)  2001 (e)  2000 (ot)  2001 (l)  -  -  - 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 
2004 (ot)  2003 (l)  2003 (l)  2004 (ot)  2003 (l)  2004 (l)  -  -  - 
Suriname  1969(ny)  1981 (ny)  1984 (ny)  1969(ny)  1981 (ny)  1984 (ny)  -  -  - 
Turkey  1995 (e)  1995 (e)  1995 (e)  2004 (e)  2001 (l)  1995 (e)  1995–2000, 
2004–7 
-  - 
Uruguay  1999 (e)  2003 (l)  1998 (e)  1999 (l)  2003 (l)  2005 (l)  2001–2   -  - 
Venezuela  1955 (ny)  1993 (e)  1955 (ny)  1955 (ny)  1993 (e)  1955 (ny)  2005–10   -  - 
L
o
w
e
r
 
M
i
d
d
l
e
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
Angola  2003 (e)  2006 (e)  2003 (e)  2003 (e)   2006 (e)  2003 (e)  -  -  - 
Armenia  1993 (ot)  1996 (ot)  1997 (ot)  2008 (l)  2010 (l)  2010 (l)  -  -  - 
Belize  2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2001 (e)  2001 (l)  2001 (l)  -  -  - 
Bolivia  1998 (e)  1993 (e)  1998 (e)  2007 (l)  2005 (l)  2005 (l)  -  -  - 
Cameroon  1999 (e)  2000 (ot)  1999 (ot)  1999 (e)  2000 (ot)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Cape Verde  2006 (ot)  1993 (ot)  - (o)  2007 (ot)  2007 (ot)  - (o)  -  -  - 
China  2000 (ot)  2001 (ot)  1993 (ot)  2008 (l)  2010 (l)  2001 (ot)  2005–10   1996  1997–
2004   
Côte D’Ivoire  1999 (e)  1996 (e)  1999 (ot)  1999 (e)  2004 (l)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Congo Rep  1999 (e)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  2003 (e)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Djibouti  2009 (e)  - (o)  - (o)  2009 (e)  - (o)  - (o)  -  -  - 
Ecuador  1998 (l)  1998 (l)  1998 (l)  2006 (l)  2006 (l)  2006 (l)  1997–8  -  - 
Egypt  2002 (e)  2002 (l)  2002 (l)  2002 (e)  2002 (l)  2006 (l)  1997–2002, 
2004–7   
-  - 
El Salvador  1993 (e)  1993 (e)  1993 (e)  2005 (ot)  2005 (l)  2005 (l)  -  -  - 
Georgia  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  2010 (l)  2010 (l)  2010 (l)  -  -  - 
Guatemala  2000 (e)  1998 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  1999, 2000  -  - 
Guyana  1972 (ny)  1966 (ny)  1972 (ny)  1972 (ny)  1966 (ny)  1972 (ny)  -  -  - 
Honduras  1999 (e)  2000 (ot)  1999 (ot)  1999 (e)  2000 (ot)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
India  1999 (e)  1994 (e)  1999 (ot)  2005(ot)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  1995–2010  -  - 
Indonesia  1997 (e)  1997 (e)  1997 (e)  2001 (e)  2002 (l)  2001 (l)  1996–9, 2001 
-6, 2009–10     
-  - 
Jordan  1999 (ot)  1994 (ot)  1999 (ot)  2001 (l)  2005 (l)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Lesotho  1993 (e)  1989 (o)  1997 (e)  1995 (e)  1989 (o)  1997 (e)  -  -  - 
Maldives  - (ny)  - (ny)  - (ny)  - (ny)  - (ny)  - (ny)  -  -  - 
Moldova  1995 (ot)  1994 (ot)  1994 (ot)  2003 (l)  2002 (l)  2001 (ot)  -  -  - 218 
 
Mongolia  1993 (ot)  1993 (ot)  1997 (ot)  1999 (l)  1999 (l)  2003 (l)  -  -  - 
Morocco  1997 (e)  2000 (ot)  1997 (e)  2006 (l)  2006 (l)  2006 (l)  -  -  - 
Nicaragua  1998 (e)  1999 (ot)  2001 (l)  2007 (l)  2006 (l)  2006 (l)  -  -  - 
Nigeria  1990 (ny)  1997 (e)  1990 (ny)  1990 (ny)  1999 (ot)  1990 (ny)  -  -  - 
Pakistan  1997 (e)  2000 (ot)  2001 (l)  2002 (l)  2002 (l)  2004 (l)  2004–5, 
2008–10   
-  - 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2000 (e)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  -  -  - 
Paraguay  2000 (e)  1998 (e)  1998 (e)  2000 (e)  1999 (ot)  1998 (e)  1997  1998  1999–
2010  
Philippines  1993 (e)  1993 (e)  1993 (e)  2008 (l)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2001–5, 2008   -  - 
Senegal  1999 (e)  1999 (ot)  1999 (ot)  1999 (e)  2008 (l)  1999 (ot)  -  -  - 
Sri Lanka  1997 (e)  1997 (e)  1997 (e)  2003 (e)  2003 (l)  2003 (l)  -  -  - 
Swaziland  1997 (e)  1933 (ny)  1994 (e)  1997 (e)  1933 (ny)  1994 (e)  -  -  - 
Thailand  1999 (e)  1994 (e)  1997 (e)  1999 (e)  1997 (e)  2000 (ot)  2007–10  -   - 
Tonga  1994 (ot)  2002 (ot)  1994 (ot)  2002 (ot)  2002 (ot)  2002 (ot)  -  -  - 
Tunisia  2000 (e)  1994 (e)  2001 (l)  2001 (e)  2009 (l)  2007 (l)  -  -  - 
Ukraine  1993 (ot)  1993 (ot)  1993 (ot)  2009 (l)  2003 (ot)  2008 (ot)  1999–2000, 
2006–7  
2001–5   - 
Vietnam  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2000 (ot)  2009 (l)  2009 (l)  2009 (l)  -  -  - 
L
o
w
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
Bangladesh  1911(o)  2000 (e)  2003 (e)  1911(o)  2006 (e)  2009 (e)  -  -  - 
Benin  1977 (o)  2006 (e)  1977 (o)  1977 (o)  2006 (e)  1977 (o)  -  -  - 
Burkina Faso  1977 (o)  1993 (e)  1977 (o)  1977 (o)  2001 (e)  1977 (o)  -  -  - 
Burundi  1968 (o)  1978 (o)  1968 (o)  1968 (o)  1978 (o)  1968 (o)  -  -  - 
Cambodia  1996 (e)  2003 (e)  2000 (e)  2003 (e)  2003 (e)  2000 (e)  -  -  - 
Central 
African Rep 
1999 (e) 
 
1985 (o)  1999 (e) 
 
2010 (e) 
 
1985 (o)  2010 (e) 
 
-  -  - 
Chad  1999 (e)  2003 (e)  1999 (e)  1999 (e)  2003 (e)  1999 (e)  -  -  - 
Congo Dem 
Rep 
2004 (e)  1986 (o)  2004 (e)  2004 (e)  1986 (o)  2004 (e)  -  -  - 
Gambia  1989 (o)  - (o)  1989 (o)  1989 (o)  - (o)  1989 (o)  -  -  - 
Ghana  1992 (ny)  2005 (l)  1988 (ny)  1992 (ny)  2005 (l)  1988 (ny)  -  -  - 
Guinea  1999 (e)  1980 (o)  1999 (e)  1999 (e)  1980 (o)  1999 (e)  -  -  - 
Guinea Bissau  1997 (e)  - (o)  1997 (e)  1997 (e)  - (o)  1997 (e)  -  -  - 219 
 
Haiti  1924 (o)  2005 (e)  1960 (o)  1924 (o)  2005 (e)  1960 (o)  -  -  - 
Kenya  1993 (e)  1995 (e)  1994 (e)  2001 (e)  1995 (e)  2002 (l)  -  -  - 
Kyrgyz  1997 (ot)  1997 (ot)   1997 (ot)  2005 (l)  2005 (l)   2008 (l)  -  -  - 
Madagascar  1995 (e)  1994 (e)  1989 (o)  1995 (e)  1994 (e)  1989 (o)  -  -  - 
Malawi  1985 (o)  1989 (o)  1987 (o)  1985 (o)  1989 (o)  1987 (o)  -  -  - 
Mali  1995 (e)  1994 (e)  1999 (e)  1999 (e)  2008 (e)  1999 (e)  -  -  - 
Mauritania  1999 (e)  2002 (e)  1999 (e)  1999 (e)  2002 (e)  2000 (e)  -  -  - 
Mozambique  1993 (e)  2001 (e)  1993 (e)  2006 (e)  2004 (e)  2006 (e)  -  -  - 
Myanmar  1994 (e)  1996 (e)  1962 (o)  1996 (e)  1996 (e)  1962 (o)  -  -  - 
Nepal  2001 (e)  2002 (e)  2001 (e)  2006 (e)  2002 (e)  2006 (e)  -  -  - 
Niger  1999 (e)  1993 (e)  1999 (e)  1999 (e)  1993 (e)  1999 (e)  -  -  - 
Rwanda  1967 (o)  2009 (e)  1967 (o)  1967 (o)  2009 (e)  1967 (o)  -  -  - 
Sierra Leone  1979 (o)  - (o)  1979 (o)  1979 (o)  - (o)  1979 (o)  -  -  - 
Solomon 
Islands 
- (o)  - (o)  - (o)  - (o)  - (o)  - (o)  -  -  - 
Tanzania  1994 (e)  1999 (e)  2000 (e)  1994 (e)  2000 (e)  2000 (e)  -  -  - 
Togo  1999 (e)  1991 (o)   1999 (e)  1999 (e)  1991 (o)  1999 (e)  -  -  - 
Uganda  1993 (e)  2004 (e)  1999 (e)  2004 (e)  2006 (e)  2010 (e)  -  -  - 
Zambia  1990 (o)  1994 (e)  1994 (e)  1990 (o)  1994 (e)  1994 (e)  -  -  - 
Zimbabwe  1994 (e)  2000 (ot)  1994 (e)  2001 (e)  2000 (ot)  2001 (l)  -  -  - 
 
Sources: Intellectual Property Justice on the USTR Section 301 Annual Reports (2001–2007); the USTR Special 301 Reports 2001–2010; the 
USTR National Trade Estimate Reports 1996–1999 and 2001–2002; Deere (2008, pp.341–42); the WTO TRIPs Council Country’s 
Official Notification [as of 15 January 2011]; the WIPO’s Country Profiles [as of 15 January 2011]. 
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Notes: 
•  The earlier version of this table (data of US pressure from 1995 to 2008) appears in 
Winanti and Young (2009, pp.76–78).  
•  This table is a summary of the results of the author’s survey on the timing of the 
adoption of 102 WTO developing country members’ legislation across patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks, in order to identify the first legislation adopted and the 
latest amendment as of 15 January 2011. A complete database can be provided 
upon request. 
•  The deadline for implementing patent legislation for upper middle and lower 
middle countries is 2005, given the longer transition period (until 2005) for 
products not previously patented. 
•  Notes on abbreviations: (e): early; (ot): on time; (l): late; (ny): not yet; (o): other 
(see table 3.1 in Chapter 3 for the explanation of the timing of IP policy adoption 
categories); (PFC): Priority Foreign Country; (S306): Section 306; (PWL): Priority 
Watch List (see table 3.4 in Chapter 3 for the explanation of the USTR Special 301 
Report categories).  
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Appendix IV 
 The WTO TRIPs Disputes 1995–2011 Involving Developing Country 
Members as Respondents  
 
Request for 
consultations 
Respondent  Complainant  Issue  Status 
30 April 1996  Pakistan  United States   Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products 
Mutually agreed 
solution (7 March 1997) 
2 July 1996  India  United States   Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products 
Panel report circulated 
(5 September 1997); 
Appellate Body Report 
circulated (19 December 
1997); Implementation 
notified by respondent 
(28 April 1999) 
8 October 1996  Indonesia  United States  Certain Measures 
Affecting the 
Automobile Industry 
(in combination with 
the TRIMs Agreement) 
Panel report circulated 
(2 July 1998); 
Implementation notified 
by respondent (26 July 
1999) 
28 April 1997  India  European 
Union  
Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical 
Products 
Panel report circulated 
(24 August 1998); 
Implementation notified 
by respondent (28 April 
1999) 
6 May 1999  Argentina  United States   Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceuticals and 
Test Data Protection 
for Agricultural 
Chemicals 
Mutually agreed 
solution (20 June 2002) 
30 May 2000  Argentina  United States   Certain Measures on 
the Protection of 
Patent and Test Data 
Mutually agreed 
solution (20 June 2002) 
30 May 2000  Brazil  United States   Measures Affecting 
Patent Protection 
Mutually agreed 
solution (19 July 2001) 
10 April 2007  China  United States  Measures Affecting the 
Protection and 
Enforcement of 
Intellectual property 
rights 
Panel report circulated 
(26 January 2009); 
Implementation notified 
by respondent (19 
March 2010) 
3 March 2008  China  European 
Union 
Measures Affecting 
Financial Information 
Services and Foreign 
Financial Information 
Suppliers (in 
combination with the 
GATS Agreement) 
Mutually agreed 
solution (4 December 
2008) 
 
Source: Data is compiled by author from the WTO Dispute Settlement based on the disputes by 
agreement [as of 31 January 2011]. 222 
 
 
Appendix V 
Patent Applications by Resident in Selected Developing Countries in 2000 
 
Country  Number of 
Applicants  Percentage 
Brazil  3,080  33.0% 
India  2,179  23.3% 
Romania  1,003  10.7% 
Thailand  561  6.0% 
Egypt  534  5.7% 
Mexico  431  4.6% 
Turkey  277  3.0% 
Chile  241  2.6% 
Malaysia  206  2.2% 
Indonesia  156  1.7% 
Philippines  154  1.6% 
Morocco  104  1.1% 
Colombia  75  0.8% 
Sri Lanka  71  0.8% 
Venezuela  56  0.6% 
Tunisia  47  0.5% 
Pakistan  46  0.5% 
Uruguay  44  0.5% 
Peru  40  0.4% 
Nicaragua  14  0.1% 
Guatemala  13  0.1% 
Jamaica  11  0.1% 
Honduras  4  0.0% 
Total  9,347   
 
Note: Data is compiled by author from WIPO statistics database on patent applications by 
patent office (1883-2007) by resident and non-resident (WIPO, n. d. (f)). It should 
be noted that not all 102 WTO developing country members’ data is available from 
WIPO Statistics Database in 2000.  223 
 
 
Appendix VI – IP Applications in Indonesia 
 
Table VI.1. Patent Applications in Indonesia   
 
Year 
Patent Applications 
Total  Patent  Simple Patent 
Domestic  Foreigners  Domestic  Foreigners 
1991 – 2000  750  2.56%  28,500  97.44%  782  63.71%  465  37.29%  30,497 
2001  212  5.40%  3,714  94.60%  197  89.14%  24  10.86%  4,147 
2002  234  6.09%  3,609  93.91%  157  76.59%  48  23.41%  4,048 
2003  201  6.09%  3,099  93.91%  163  84.90%  29  15.10%  3,492 
2004  227  6.19%  3,441  93.81%  177  84.69%  32  15.31%  3,877 
2005  235  5.46%  4,069  94.54%  163  83.59%  32  16.41%  4,499 
2006  288  6.24%  4,324  93.76%  242  90.30%  26  9.70%  4,880 
2007  284  5.53%  4,850  94.47%  209  86.01%  34  13.99%  5,377 
2008  386  7.52%  4,747  92.48%  214  86.29%  34  13.71%  5,381 
2009   415  9.19%  4,103  90.81%  247  86.67%  38  13.33%  5,527 
2010   507  10.07%  4,530  89.93%  253  41.14%  362  58.86%  5,652 
Total  3,739    68,986    2,804    1,124    76,653 
 
Source: The Indonesian Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights [as of 15 
January 2011].  
Note: The 1989 Patent Act defines simple patent as a product or device, which cannot be 
qualified as invention, but it has the novelty and possess practical use values because 
of its shape, configuration, construction, or component. The duration of protection for 
simple patent under the 2001 Patent Act is 10 years.  
 
Table VI.2 Copyright Applications in Indonesia 
 
Copyright Applications 
Year  Domestic   Foreigners   Total 
1991 – 2000              26,375   95.85%  1141  4.15%              27,516  
2001 (as of Oct)                1,117   97.13%  33  2.87%                1,150  
2002                1,877   98.89%  21  1.11%                1,898  
2003                2,036   99.27%  15  0.73%                2,051  
2004                2,998   98.04%  60  1.96%                3,058  
2005                4,269   99.53%  20  0.47%                4,289  
2006                5,857   98.85%  68  1.15%                5,925  
2007                6,411   99.89%  7  0.11%                6,418  
2008                4,733   99.64%  17  0.36%                4,750  
2009                5,049   99.21%  40  0.79%                5,089  
2010                 4,758   99.41%  28  0.59%                4,786  
Total              65,480      1,450                 66,930  
 
Source: The Indonesian Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights [as of 15 
January 2011]. 
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Table VI.3 Trademark Applications in Indonesia 
 
Year  Trademark Applications  Total 
Domestic  Foreigners 
2001  26,128  67.61%  12,520  32.39%  38,648 
2002  20,423  68.07%  9,581  31.93%  30,004 
2003  28,317  77.92%  8,023  22.08%  36,340 
2004  35,626  72.25%  13,685  27.75%  49,311 
2005  30,734  75.30%  10,082  24.70%  40,816 
2006  36,644  69.60%  16,005  30.40%  52,649 
2007  32,181  74.39%  11,078  25.61%  43,259 
2008  33,555  70.48%  14,051  29.52%  47,606 
2009   37,759  88.27%  5,018  11.73%  42,777 
2010   43,269  90.53%  4,525  9.47%  47,794 
Total  324,636    104,568    429,204 
 
Source: The Indonesian Directorate General of Intellectual Property Rights [as of 15 
January 2011]. 
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Appendix VII 
 
Documents submitted by the Indonesian Government on the Negotiating 
Groups during the Uruguay Round 1986–1994 
 
Subject/Negotiating 
Group 
Documents submitted 
Textiles and Clothing  1.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/5  (10 July 1987) and 
MTN.GNG/NG4/W/5/Corr.1 (7 July 1987) 
2.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/7 (20 November 1987) 
3.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/9 (7 December 1987) 
4.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/11 (27 April 1988) 
5.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/15 (17 June 1988) on behalf of 
members of the International Textiles and Clothing 
Bureau (ITCB) 
6.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/17 (19 July 1988) on behalf of 
ASEAN 
7.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/18 (1 August 1988) on behalf of 
members of the ITCB 
8.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/19 (4 August 1988) 
9.  MTN.GNG/NG4/W/20 (28 September 1988) on behalf of 
members of the ITCB 
10. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/22 (10 November 1988) on behalf of 
members of the ITCB 
11. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/23 (8 June 1989) and 
MTN.GNG/NG4/W/23/Corr.1 (13 June 1989) 
12. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/31 (13 December 1989) 
13. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/32 (14 December 1989) 
14. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/44 (13 March 1990) on behalf of 
members of the ITCB 
15. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/49 (5 June 1990) and 
MTN.GNG/NG4/W/49/Corr.1 (12 June 1990) 
16. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/52 (12 June 1990) 
17. MTN.GNG/NG4/W/53 (14 June 1990) on behalf of 
members of the ITCB 
Agriculture  1.  MTN.GNG/NG5/W/69 (13 July 1988) as part of the 
Cairns Group 
2.  MTN.GNG/NG5/W/128 (27 November 1989) as part of 
the Cairns Group 
Tropical Products  1.  MTN.GNG/ W/4 (19 November 1986) on behalf of 
ASEAN  
2.  MTN.GNG/NG6/LT/49 (29 May 1989)  
Services  1.  MTN.GNS/W/81 (2 November 1989) 
 
Source: WTO  226 
 
 
Appendix VIII – IP Applications and Value of Software Exports in India 
 
Table VIII.1. Patent Applications in India 
 
Years 
Patent Applications 
Total  Domestic  Foreigners 
1992 - 1993                     1,128   33.50%                2,239   66.50%             3,367  
1993 - 1994                     1,266   32.72%                2,603   67.28%             3,869  
1994 - 1995                     1,741   32.66%                3,589   67.34%             5,330  
1995 - 1996                     1,606   22.83%                5,430   77.17%             7,036  
1996 - 1997                     1,661   19.40%                6,901   80.60%             8,562  
1997 - 1998                     1,926   18.97%                8,229   81.03%           10,155  
1998 - 1999                     2,247   25.09%                6,707   74.91%             8,954  
1999 - 2000                     2,206   48.43%                2,349   51.57%             4,555  
2000 - 2001                     2,179   50.22%                2,160   49.78%             4,339  
2001 - 2002                     2,371   55.91%                1,870   44.09%             4,241  
2002 - 2003                     2,693   23.49%                8,772   76.51%           11,465  
2003 - 2004                     3,218   25.51%                9,395   74.49%           12,613  
2004 - 2005                     3,630   20.78%              13,836   79.22%           17,466  
2005 - 2006                     4,521   18.45%              19,984   81.55%           24,505  
2006 - 2007                     5,317   17.87%              24,430   82.13%           29,747  
2007 - 2008                     6,040   17.15%              29,178   82.85%           35,218  
2008 - 2009                     6,161   16.74%              30,651   83.26%           36,812  
 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Indian Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade 
Marks 2001–2002 to 2008–2009. 
 
Table VIII.2. The Value of Indian Software Exports 
 
Year  Value 
2003 – 2004  US$12.9 billion  
2004 – 2005  US$17.7 billion  
2005 – 2006  US$23.6 billion  
2006 – 2007  US$31.3 billion  
2007 – 2008  US$40.4 billion  
2008 – 2009  US$47.1 billion  
2009 – 2010 (estimated)  US$49.7 billion  
 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Indian Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology 2004–2005 to 2009–2010. 
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Table VIII.3 Trademark Applications in India 
 
Years 
Trademark Applications 
Total  Domestic  Foreigners 
1997 - 1998                   37,918   81.19%                8,784   18.81%             46,702  
1998 - 1999                   41,562   80.24%              10,234   19.76%             51,796  
1999 - 2000                   60,985   91.88%                5,393   8.12%             66,378  
2000 - 2001                   67,262   79.81%              17,013   20.19%             84,275  
2001 - 2002                   79,746   88.37%              10,490   11.63%             90,236  
2002 - 2003                   88,190   93.70%                5,930   6.30%             94,120  
2003 - 2004                   76,801   83.25%              15,450   16.75%             92,251  
2004 - 2005                   63,906   80.90%              15,090   19.10%             78,996  
2005 - 2006                   73,308   85.57%              12,361   14.43%             85,669  
2006 - 2007                   88,210   85.29%              15,209   14.71%           103,419  
2007 - 2008                 117,014   94.74%                6,500   5.26%           123,514  
2008 - 2009                 119,371   91.70%              10,801   8.30%           130,172  
 
Sources: Annual Reports of the Indian Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade 
Marks 2001–2002 to 2008–2009.  
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Appendix IX Lok Sabha Party List during IP Policy Reform 
 
Table IX.1 Tenth Lok Sabha Party List (20 June 1991–10 May 1996) 
 
No.  Name of Party  Member 
1  Congress (I)(Congress (I))  252 
2  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  121 
3  Janata Dal (JD)  63 
4  Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M))  36 
5  Communist Party of India (CPI)  14 
6  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)  12 
7  Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)  7 
8  Telugu Desam Party (TDP)  7 
9  T.D.(V)(TD(V))  6 
10  Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)  5 
11  Janata Party (Janata Party)  4 
12  Shiv Sena (SS)  4 
13  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  3 
14  Forward Bloc (Marxist)(FB(M))  3 
15  Nominated (NM)  3 
16  Muslim League (ML)  2 
17  All India Forward Bloc (AIFB)  1 
18  All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)  1 
19  Asom Gana Parishad (AGP)  1 
20  Communist Party of India (Marxist-Lennist Liberation)(CPI(ML)(L))  1 
21  Congress (S) (Congress(S))  1 
22  Congress (Congress)  1 
23  Haryana Vikas Party (HVP)  1 
24  Independent (Ind.)  1 
25  Kerala Congress (KEC)  1 
26  Manipur People's Party (MPP)  1 
27  N.P.C. (NPC)  1 
28  Samata Party (SAP)  1 
29  Sikkim Sangram Parishad (SSP)  1 
 
Source: Lok Sabha229 
 
 
 
Table IX.2 Twelfth Lok Sabha Party List (10 March1998–26 April 1999) 
 
No.  Name of Party  Member 
1  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  183 
2  Indian National Congress (INC)  142 
3  Communist Party of India (Marxist)(CPI(M))  32 
4  Samajwadi Party (SP)  20 
5  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)  18 
6  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)  17 
7  Samata Party (SAP)  12 
8  Telugu Desam Party (TDP)  12 
9  Biju Janata Dal (BJD)  9 
10  Communist Party of India (CPI)  9 
11  Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)  8 
12  Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)  6 
13  Independent (Ind.)  6 
14  Janata Dal (JD)  6 
15  Shiv Sena (SS)  6 
16  West Bengal Trinamul Congress (WBTC)  6 
17  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  5 
18  Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)  5 
19  Haryana Lok Dal (Rashtriya) (HLD(R))  4 
20  Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)  4 
21  Republican Party of India (RPI)  4 
22  Lok Shakti (LS)  3 
23  Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)  3 
24  Tamil Manila Congress (Moopanar) (TMC(M))  3 
25  All India Forward Bloc (AIFB)  2 
26  Arunachal Congress (AC)  2 
27  Muslim League Kerala State Committee (MLKSC)  2 
28  National Conference (NC)  2 
29  Nominated (NM)  2 
30  All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)  1 
31  All India Rashtriya Janata Party (AIRJP)  1 
32  All India Trinamool Congress (AITC)  1 
33  Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC)  1 
34  Haryana Vikas Party (HVP)  1 
35  Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (J&KNC)  1 
36  Janata Party (Janata Party)  1 
37  Kerala Congress (M) (KC(M))  1 
38  Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP)  1 
39  Peasants And Workers` Party of India (PAWPI)  1 
40  Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) (SJP(R))  1 
41  Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF)  1 
42  United Minorities Front, Assam (UMFA)  1 
 
Source: Lok Sabha230 
 
 
 
Table IX.3 Thirteenth Lok Sabha Party List (10 October 1999–06 February 2004) 
 
No.  Name of Party  Member 
1  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  189 
2  Indian National Congress (INC)  118 
3  Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M))  35 
4  Telugu Desam Party (TDP)  30 
5  Samajwadi Party (SP)  29 
6  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  15 
7  Shiv Sena (SS)  15 
8  Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)  12 
9  Samata Party (Samata Party)  12 
10  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)  11 
11  Biju Janata Dal (BJD)  11 
12  All India Trinamool Congress (AITC)  9 
13  Independent (Ind.)  7 
14  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  7 
15  Janata Dal (United) (JD(U))  6 
16  Communist Party of India (CPI)  5 
17  Indian National Lok Dal (INLD)  5 
18  Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (J&KNC)  5 
19  Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)  5 
20  Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)  4 
21  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)  4 
22  Rashtriya Janata Dal (Democratic)(RJD (D))  3 
23  Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)  3 
24  Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress (ABLTC)  2 
25  All India Forward Bloc (AIFB)  2 
26  Janata Dal (JP) (JD (JP))  2 
27  Janata Dal (Secular) (JD (S))  2 
28  Lok Jan Shakti Party (LJSP)  2 
29  Muslim League Kerala State Committee (MLKSC)  2 
30  Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)  2 
31  All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)  1 
32  Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha (BBM)  1 
33  Communist Party of India (Marxist-Lennist Liberation) (CPI(ML)(L))  1 
34  Himachal Vikas Congress (HVC)  1 
35  Indian Federal Democratic Party (IFDP)  1 
36  Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)  1 
37  Kerala Congress (KEC)  1 
38  Lok Dal (Secular)(LD(S))  1 
39  Peasants And Workers` Party of India (PAWPI)  1 
40  Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD)  1 
41  Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) (SJP(R))  1 
42  Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann) (SAD(M))  1 
43  Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF)  1 
 
Source: Lok Sabha231 
 
 
 
Table IX.4 Fourteenth Lok Sabha Party List (17 May 2004–18 May 2009) 
 
No.  Name of Party  Member 
1  Indian National Congress (INC)  159 
2  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  147 
3  Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M))  44 
4  Samajwadi Party (SP)  40 
5  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)  25 
6  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  24 
7  Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)  16 
8  Shiv Sena (SS)  14 
9  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  12 
10  Biju Janata Dal (BJD)  11 
11  Communist Party of India (CPI)  11 
12  Janata Dal (United) (JD(U))  10 
13  Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)  8 
14  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  7 
15  Independent (Ind.)  6 
16  Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)  6 
17  Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK)  6 
18  Telugu Desam Party (TDP)  6 
19  All India Forward Bloc (AIFB)  4 
20  Lok Jan Shakti Party (LJSP)  4 
21  Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK)  4 
22  Janata Dal (Secular)(JD(S))  3 
23  Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD)  3 
24  Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)  3 
25  Asom Gana Parishad (AGP)  2 
26  Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (J&KNC)  2 
27  Kerala Congress (KEC)  2 
28  -( )  1 
29  All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)  1 
30  All India Trinamool Congress (AITC)  1 
31  Bharatiya Navshakti Party (BNP)  1 
32  Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (J&KPDP)  1 
33  Mizo National Front (MNF)  1 
34  Muslim League Kerala State Committee (MLKSC)  1 
35  Nagaland Peoples Front (NPF)  1 
36  National Loktantrik Party (NLP)  1 
37  Republican Party of India (A) (RPI (A))  1 
38  Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)(SJP (R))  1 
39  Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF)  1 
 
Source: Lok Sabha 
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Appendix X – Interview List 
 
1.    Former Indonesian diplomat (Jakarta) 
2.    Indonesian NGO representative (Jakarta) 
3.    The Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology – 2 government officials 
(Jakarta) 
4.    The Indonesian Institute of Sciences – 4 researchers (Jakarta) 
5.    Government official of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jakarta) 
6.    WTO Intellectual Property Division – 3 Counsellors (Geneva) 
7.    Permanent mission of Indonesia to the WTO – 2 representatives (Geneva) 
8.    Permanent mission of India to the WTO representative (Geneva) 
9.    Geneva-based journalist dealing with IP issues (Geneva) 
10.   Geneva-based research institutes dealing with IP issues and developing 
countries – 2 representatives (Geneva) 
11.   Geneva-based international organisation representative (Geneva)  
12.   Permanent mission of the United States to the WTO representative (Geneva)  
13.   Former Indian government official of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
(Geneva) 
  Total interviews: 21 
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